The drone strike on Poland was a test not only for the military but also for those working in the information space. Alongside the attack came a surge of disinformation and a flood of social media posts in Poland pointing the finger at Ukraine. On the morning of 10 September, when the strike occurred, claims that it was a “Ukrainian provocation” outnumbered those blaming Russia, according to data from the analyst group Res Futura. By the afternoon, however, the balance shifted. As disinformation researcher Anna Mierzyńska — author of The Destructive Effect: How Disinformation Shapes Our Lives (“Efekt niszczący. Jak dezinformacja wpływa na nasze życie”, 2022) — told The Ukrainian Week, posts attributing responsibility to Russia became much more common. Yet the volume of anti-Ukrainian disinformation circulating in Poland has remained high since the start of the full-scale invasion.
– On Wednesday, immediately after Russia’s drone attack on Poland, many posts appeared under Polish media reports on social networks claiming the drones were “Ukrainian” or a “provocation by Ukraine’s Security Service.” Some of the accounts posting these comments appeared to be bots. Do you observe the activity of what are likely Russian bots in Poland, or are they not bots? What is the situation with comments in the Polish segment of social media?
– From early Wednesday morning, under posts by major Polish media outlets — mainly on Facebook — numerous comments appeared pushing anti-Ukrainian narratives, attempting to shift responsibility for the drones over Poland onto Ukraine. Several recurring narratives emerged. First, they questioned whether the drones were Russian at all. Second, they claimed it was a Ukrainian provocation in response to remarks by Polish President Karol Nawrocki, who had stated that Poland would not send troops to Ukraine if needed [Nawrocki made this comment on 9 September — Ed.].
Bots are accounts that operate automatically according to pre-set programming, often publishing nearly identical messages. In this case, however, the narratives were repeated but presented in different forms. That is why, in Poland, analysts more often refer to Russian trolls or suggest that these may be various types of accounts, either controlled directly from Russia or created in Poland on its behalf. The repetition of identical messages, the simultaneous publication by Russian propagandists and media in Russian, and the sheer frequency of these posts all point to a coordinated campaign. Given that the operation clearly served Russia’s interests, it is reasonable to conclude that it was directed or instigated from Moscow.
But this was only one aspect of the campaign. There were also noticeable posts from genuine Polish users supporting the same anti-Ukrainian narratives. In the morning, a large volume of anti-Ukrainian posts was evident, but by later in the day the situation had evened out, and evening data showed that more posts explicitly attributed responsibility for the attack to Russia.
Those posting anti-Ukrainian content in the morning were often Poles who had already held such views before the drone attack. Many of these accounts had clear connections to political groups known for their hostility toward Ukraine, including far-right and anti-system movements.
– You mentioned Russian internet trolls. Have you noticed any increase in such accounts during or since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine?
– After the start of the full-scale war in 2022, there were definitely more of these accounts and posts. However, they are not as frequently active now, though they become particularly visible at certain moments that are most critical for Russia.
Instead, it seems to me that it’s not so much that the number of Russian trolls has increased, but rather — and unfortunately, as surveys also show — that there are more Poles holding anti-Ukrainian views. This group of genuine Polish social media users with anti-Ukrainian attitudes is, regrettably, growing.
– How much has the wave of disinformation about Ukraine in Poland grown over the past four years? Have you seen a noticeable spike over the last year, or is this a longer-term trend?
– The most recent anti-Ukrainian posts I analysed in detail appeared at the turn of August and September, following President Karol Nawrocki’s veto of the law on aid for Ukrainian citizens [officially announced on 25 August — Ed.]. In late August, Poland saw the largest surge of anti-Ukrainian posts since we began monitoring online activity at the start of the war. To put it in perspective: in just one week, as many anti-Ukrainian posts or mentions appeared online as we would normally record over an entire month.
It’s important to note that these mentions aren’t always disinformation in the strict sense, since disinformation implies false information. Many were simply opinions — not fact-based, but often hostile commentary targeting Ukrainians, Ukraine, and anything connected to its citizens.
– If we’re talking specifically about disinformation rather than general hate speech, can we say Russia is actively behind it, or is it more of a wave sparked by tensions between Poles and Ukrainians? What role do you think Russia plays here?
– Russia has been aggressively spreading anti-Ukrainian disinformation in Poland since at least 2020, though evidence suggests these efforts go back as far as 2014. The volume and intensity of this disinformation spiked in 2022 with the onset of the full-scale war, and it has remained high ever since. Its impact on Polish society is clear: anti-Ukrainian narratives are repeatedly circulated by pro-Russian networks and accounts, and they have even infiltrated certain local groups. The consequences extend beyond Ukraine, undermining Poland’s social cohesion and sowing divisions within Polish society.
– You mentioned Russia’s infiltration of certain circles. Is it trying to invest politically or financially in these groups in Poland?
– There haven’t been any official investigations in Poland, so it’s hard to make definitive claims about funding or direct links between these groups and Russia. What we do see, however, are pro-Russian circles—groups that push narratives or promote political agendas favourable to the Kremlin. This includes far-right actors, such as the Confederation of the Polish Crown [KPP, led by Grzegorz Braun, known for his anti-Ukrainian rhetoric and a 2025 presidential candidate supported by 6.34% of voters; Braun calls for a complete halt to military aid to Ukraine — Ed.], the Confederation [currently polling around 20%, with its 2025 presidential candidate Sławomir Mentzen receiving 14.8% — Ed.], and various anti-system movements. Many of these groups coalesced during the COVID-19 pandemic, uniting people who opposed government measures at the time, including anti-vaxxers.
I’ve been following these movements since the pandemic and have seen how they were infiltrated by pro-Russian activists in Poland. These activists joined the movements, often played active roles, and in some cases even rose to leadership positions.
Poland also has small, “niche” parties, such as Front, led by Krzysztof Tołwiński. This party openly cooperates with Belarus, maintains personal contacts there, and supports Russia. There was also previously an active pro-Russian group called Safe Poland, led by Leszek Sykulski. It still exists, but is now largely inactive.
Currently, we’re seeing an effort to create a new pro-Russian grouping. In just a week, a congress is scheduled for Bezpartyjni Samorządowcy (“Non-Party Local Government Activists”), led by Marek Woch [also a candidate in the 2025 presidential elections — Ed.], who received the fewest votes — 0.09% [Ed.]. I recently covered this in an article for oko.press.
This group is set to merge with the so-called Camp of Great Poland (Obóz Wielkiej Polski, OWP), a well-known pro-Russian organisation whose leaders collaborated with Russian propagandists back in 2014–2016. OWP was also funded by Russia, and now it is expected to join an existing, active—though small—political movement in Poland.
