Hungarian political scientist and historian Sándor Földvári spoke with The Ukrainian Week about Viktor Orbán’s rhetoric, Hungary’s deepening ties with China, the reach of Russian propaganda, the risk of leaving the EU, and what to expect from the upcoming parliamentary elections in April 2026.
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— Recently, Viktor Orbán urged Hungarians to vote against Ukraine’s EU accession, claiming in an official letter that it would seriously harm Hungary. How do you view Orbán’s rhetoric, and is there any way to counter it?
— Orbán’s rhetoric is constantly shifting, tailored to his personal interests and political survival. He has no real principles or values—only a strategy for holding on to power. He has a history of flip-flopping: in Brussels, he voted for sanctions against Russia, only to return home and declare Hungary would never bow to foreign pressures. Now, Hungary is plastered with posters declaring that we’re standing up to Brussels.
The Fidesz party primarily targets Hungary’s less educated, working-class voters—those who consistently back it. The anti-Brussels messaging is aimed at people in vulnerable positions, like the unemployed or those dependent on public work programs, which task them with jobs like clearing roads, picking up trash, or planting flowers in city squares. These individuals often vote for Fidesz, yet remain trapped in poverty because of the very policies that keep the party in power.
But the dynamics are shifting. Since the last European Parliament elections, Orbán has consistently voted in Moscow’s favour. He now leads his own faction in the European Parliament, the “Patriots,” so far-right that even Giorgia Meloni’s Italian right has distanced itself from it.
Today, Orbán’s stance toward Ukraine is even more hostile and anti-Ukrainian than it has been in the past. As for his plans with Putin—or what Putin has in store for him—it’s all a matter of speculation. Hungary’s opposition politicians are rife with theories, but one thing seems clear: Hungary is unlikely to support Ukraine’s EU membership unless significant pressure is applied.
Orbán has shown little interest in doing anything that would benefit Ukraine. At the same time, he’s also clearly disengaged from maintaining good relations with the European Union.
The EU has frozen a substantial portion of funding due to Orbán’s disregard for the rule of law, his erosion of citizens’ rights, and his increasingly authoritarian grip on power. Take the Istanbul Convention, for example—Hungary has outright refused to ratify it. Then there’s the state of independent media. Fidesz now controls virtually all television and radio outlets, with the notable exception of RTL, which, though still standing, is under constant attack. These issues represent just the tip of the iceberg in a country that no longer functions like a typical EU member state.
And in a blow to Hungary’s finances, on January 1, 2025, the country will lose access to billions in EU aid. In response, Orbán has already begun negotiating another large loan from China—a move that will only deepen the financial strain on ordinary Hungarians.
— Just recently, Orbán announced Hungary’s decision to withdraw from the International Criminal Court, claiming the institution has become too politicised. Given the ICC’s close ties to the European Union, can we infer that Orbán is preparing to take Hungary out of the EU as well?
— There’s no question that Orbán is pulling Hungary out of the International Criminal Court. His reasoning is clear: should his ally Putin come to visit, Hungary would no longer be obliged to arrest him. And this is just one example of a broader pattern. Hungary has become a haven for individuals with questionable legal histories. Take Nikola Gruevski, for instance—the former Macedonian leader wanted for corruption in his home country. Under his rule, North Macedonia shifted to a pro-Russian, anti-Western stance, and he found shelter in Hungary. Then there’s Viktor Shevtsov, a Belarusian businessman closely connected to the Lukashenko regime. His company, registered in Hungary, was filing hundreds of millions of dollars in income with the tax authorities, despite not appearing to engage in any real business activities—until it was finally shut down in 2024. Shevtsov himself had been under suspicion for financial crimes and sanctioned by the EU. Orbán’s willingness to protect such figures shows just how far he’s willing to go to cultivate political alliances, regardless of their legality or ethics.
Unfortunately, Hungary’s exit from the European Union could ultimately come down to Orbán alone. Back in 2012, he rewrote the Constitution, replacing it with a ‘fundamental law’ that gives parliament—not the public—a final say on EU membership. Since Fidesz holds a two-thirds majority, Orbán can push through virtually any vote he wants. His parliamentary supporters are essentially yes-men. So if Orbán wakes up tomorrow and decides Hungary should leave the EU, he can simply instruct parliament to make it happen.
But there’s another theory circulating among Hungary’s opposition thinkers and independent intellectuals: Orbán doesn’t actually want to leave the EU—he wants to stay and consolidate more power from within. Over the past decade, Buda Castle has been under construction. Orbán has moved his office there, along with several key institutions. His new buildings have faced heavy criticism from architects and engineers, who argue they disregard historical accuracy.
There are now rumours that Orbán is aiming to take control of the EU, with some suggesting he’s building palaces that could one day serve as headquarters for a far-right, authoritarian, technofascist Europe—if pro-Putin and far-right forces manage to take power in Brussels. As a historian, I’m not quick to accept such claims without evidence, but the threat is real. Over the past year, Orbán has repeatedly said, ‘We must conquer Brussels.’ People laughed it off—but there’s often a strange logic behind even the wildest ideas.
Orbán is, in many ways, Putin’s Trojan horse inside the European Union. If Putin succeeds in gaining political control over Europe through him, the bigger, more powerful Western countries—like Germany and France—might still be able to push back. But for Ukraine, that would mean complete devastation. Experts and analysts have raised concerns that Orbán’s real aim is to undermine the EU from within and position himself as a leader, opening the door for Putin to install his own puppet at the top of Europe. Let’s hope it doesn’t come to that. But when it comes to security, threats aren’t dealt with through sighs and prayers—they require decisive action and preventative measures.
— You’ve suggested that Hungary, with its strong ties to Russia and China, is unlikely to deepen political relations with the U.S., and that Orbán will continue to move closer to Beijing and Moscow. Where do you think we’ll see this shift the most?
— On April 15, 2025, Robert Palladino, a U.S. Embassy official in Budapest, delivered a speech at the Central European Summit, which was hosted by the Center for Fundamental Rights and the Economus Economic Research Foundation. Though the event was private, the U.S. Embassy posted a video of it on its YouTube channel, and in it, you can hear very clearly the Trump administration’s demands directed at Hungary.
Among the demands were a military spending target of 5% of GDP—double the current level—a push to use American liquefied natural gas, and a preference for Westinghouse nuclear power plants (even though Hungary is currently building a new Russian nuclear plant with Russian loans). There was also a stipulation that Hungary’s exports to the U.S. should not exceed imports from there. Additionally, sanctions against Russia were to remain in place, and there was a clear directive to avoid further business with China, particularly in high-tech sectors, due to the risks involved. The Trump administration also made it clear that it disapproved of the suppression of opposition voices in Hungary.
The U.S. President seeks firm economic commitments and opposes overly close ties with China, especially in advanced technology, as such relationships threaten national sovereignty. Yet Hungary is home to several Chinese battery factories, which have sparked public protests and demonstrations. Now, America is demanding that Orbán distance Hungary from China. But he can’t—because the factories didn’t come to Hungary because of any admiration for China; they likely arrived because Orbán personally profited from the deals.
An even more pressing issue is the huge amount of Chinese loans that will be repaid by future generations. If Orbán were to turn against China politically, Beijing could demand that money back. China is shrewd and knows exactly how to bring people like Orbán into its fold. The same goes for Russia. I’ve already mentioned the relationship between Putin and Orbán. If Orbán can’t—or won’t—distance himself from both China and Russia, the United States won’t view him as an ally, and he’ll find himself even further entangled with Moscow and Beijing.
— Back in 2020, you mentioned that Russian propaganda was extremely active in Hungary. What’s the situation like today? Can you share any striking examples from your own experience?
— Russian propaganda continues to thrive through Fidesz-controlled media, which acts as its mouthpiece. Here in Hungary, it’s not as easy to operate as a Russian agent like it might be in countries like Poland or Serbia, where the local language is easier to learn. Instead, the strategy is to recruit pro-Russian individuals and use them to influence public opinion—particularly through state-controlled television and radio, which are firmly in the hands of the ruling party.
In the spring of 2024, a respected Hungarian journalist I know cynically told me that I “wouldn’t enjoy my success among Ukrainians for long, because by the summer, Ukraine would be destroyed, Russia would win, and I wouldn’t have a Ukraine to love anymore.” Fortunately, he was wrong. But it’s disheartening that such pro-Russian views can even be found within Hungary’s intellectual and educated circles.
I frequently get threats on Facebook simply for having the Ukrainian flag as my profile photo. Strangers message me, saying they’ll beat me up over it. There was also a scandal at work when I wore a Ukrainian patch on my jacket—the one I bought in Estonia at a scientific congress, where we showed solidarity with Ukraine. I’ve attended public events in Hungary wearing that same small Ukrainian flag, and I’ve been called all sorts of harsh names for it. These are just a few examples of the kind of hostility some Hungarians hold toward Ukraine, all influenced by Russia.
So how much of this is tied to Russian intelligence and how much to pro-Russian Hungarian propaganda? The two are deeply intertwined. It’s like when Ukraine was under the criminal Yanukovych—Russian agents flooded the country, but they couldn’t operate without a pro-Russian government in power. What the public encounters is disinformation from Russia; its social influence. Unfortunately, the reality on the ground is that many Hungarians seem to lean towards pro-Russian views.
– A year from now, in April 2026, Hungarians will head to the polls for a new parliamentary election that will determine the next government and shape the country’s power structure. Some predict that Orbán’s party will lose its majority. What’s your take on this?
– Orbán’s system is only worsening. The police are increasingly targeting peaceful protesters—people who are just walking down the street can be stopped, searched, and even dispersed. There was an incident where officers pushed a disabled person to the ground, breaking their glasses in the process. The opposition party Momentum shared this on social media. There’s growing fear that instead of holding fair elections, Orbán might impose a military dictatorship. Some people genuinely worry about that. Another possibility is that he’ll manipulate the election process, using intimidation and dirty tricks to secure another victory. If he stays in power, we could see even harsher measures.
If Péter Mádjár wins, two scenarios could unfold. If he manages a two-thirds majority, he could change laws at will. Left-wing and democratic critics argue that Mádjár’s real goal is simply to hold power—unfortunately, it’s a pretty logical assumption. On the other hand, if he wins with a simple majority, he’ll be blocked at every turn by Fidesz.
I believe most Hungarians wouldn’t vote for Orbán’s party, but sadly, Fidesz has a base of voters who don’t think critically—they follow him blindly, like a religious sect. So now, all political forces are focused on winning over the undecided, the passive voters. That leaves me feeling far from optimistic.
On October 23, 2024, the anniversary of Hungary’s anti-Soviet revolution in 1956, Orbán made it clear in his speech that he has no intention of relinquishing power. He vowed to do whatever it takes to hold onto it. For instance, by the end of 2024, Fidesz passed a new law restructuring electoral districts—an obvious move to secure their dominance. Such changes are classic tactics for the ruling party to consolidate power, though there are plenty of other ways they can bend the system to their advantage. While we might hope for a change, it’s uncertain whether that change will actually come.
— Today, Péter Mádjár, a former ally of Orbán, seems to be at the height of his popularity. According to polls, his party, Tisa, is well ahead of Fidesz. What’s behind his success?
— Some analysts believe that Mádjár’s rise is a strategically crafted move designed to block pro-European leftists from gaining power. There are even whispers that Russia could be involved. But there’s no hard evidence to back that up, and in reality, Mádjár is hardly a pro-Russian figure. He’s pragmatic, focused on power, and ultimately just wants to win.
By the end of 2023, the strongest left-wing party in Hungary, the Democratic Coalition, had secured 20% of the vote. While not enough to topple the government, it showed their significant influence. At the time, Klára Dobrev, who led the “shadow government,” was a highly experienced politician. She had served as a financial advisor in five countries, holds degrees in law and financial economics, speaks five languages, and was once the vice president of the European Parliament. Although she’s been pushed off Hungary’s political stage for now, Dobrev is back in the European Parliament, where she chairs key committees. She is widely respected in the West as a left-wing social democrat and, undoubtedly, a strong ally of Ukraine.
Then, in the spring of 2024, Péter Mádjár unexpectedly rose to prominence. Today, he’s polling between 51% and 56%, leading the pack. Mádjár, from a right-wing family, represents national conservative politics. Previously a member of Fidesz, some worry that he may not challenge Orbán directly but instead collaborate with him in a power-sharing arrangement. While Mádjár promises to imprison Fidesz politicians guilty of corruption, we’ve seen many politicians make bold promises during elections only to deliver little once in office. Notably, Mádjár has voted alongside Fidesz in the European Parliament and even abstained during the vote on Ukraine, raising questions about his true intentions.
One of the key reasons behind Mádjár’s rise in popularity is his willingness to travel across rural Hungary, speaking in nearly every electoral district. He’s gained significant support from the remnants of the old small landowners’ party, which has roots going back over a century. This party, historically nationalist and right-wing, represented rural Hungarians. However, when Orbán first came to power, Fidesz crushed it to eliminate any competition.
Many right-wing individuals are now disillusioned with Orbán, feeling they cannot thrive while Fidesz continues to siphon off the country’s resources. These citizens, craving a more just civil society, now naively look to Mádjár as a potential solution. Many have formed so-called “Tisa islands”—authoritarian, centralized organizations that aren’t legally tied to Mádjár’s party but work to bring him to power.
Orbán has entrenched an authoritarian, dictatorial regime, and Mádjár would likely follow a similar path. But in politics, you often have to choose the lesser evil. There’s room for optimism when it comes to Ukraine, but the risks remain high. For instance, when Mádjár asked his supporters whether they backed Ukraine’s EU membership, 58% of “Tisa” voters said yes. An independent poll from the Republikon Institute showed that 47% of Hungarians support Ukraine’s EU membership, with another 7% not opposed. While this offers some hope, the rest of the population remains staunchly pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian—and that is deeply concerning.
What can be done about this? Take Ukraine’s ambassador to Hungary, Fedir Shandor, for example. He’s been working tirelessly to bridge the gap, meeting with local mayors, attending cultural events, and connecting with both Ukrainian and Hungarian communities. Fedir, a professor at Uzhhorod University and a decorated hero of the Ukrainian army, voluntarily went to the frontlines to defend his country. Although his native language is Hungarian, his loyalty to Ukraine is unwavering. He does a lot to help Hungarians better understand and appreciate Ukraine, and for that, he truly deserves respect. I would propose awarding him a state honour in recognition of his efforts.
But even that’s not enough. As ambassador, Fedir has a wide range of diplomatic responsibilities, and it’s not his job to single-handedly challenge Russian propaganda. We need to find others who can take on that task. The Ukrainian government must support individuals with strong reputations who can actively work to change perceptions and increase respect for Ukraine abroad. I firmly believe that once Orbán’s regime in Hungary collapses, Hungary will become a true friend of Ukraine. There’s always hope.
