In recent weeks, Estonia has repeatedly hit the headlines over security concerns — from armed Russian soldiers spotted by Estonian border guards in the Saatse Boot area to Russian MiG-31 fighter jets violating its airspace.
The Ukrainian Week spoke with Marek Kohv, an expert at the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) in Tallinn, about how real the Russian military threat is, the recent provocations around the Saatse Boot, Estonia’s growing defence investments, and how the country is preparing its people and infrastructure for a potential war.
— How real is the threat of a Russian military attack on Estonia in the coming years? And how ready is the country for a potential escalation — not necessarily a full-scale invasion, but things like border incidents or provocations in the air or at sea?
— The military threat to Estonia is low — and Russia’s own behaviour makes that pretty clear. Right now, Moscow isn’t after a conventional fight with NATO; it’s busy testing the Alliance and the EU in other ways.
Estonia has been in Russia’s sights for influence operations for a long time, so none of this is new to us. What really matters is that other European countries now see the threat for what it is and are taking real steps to push back — and thankfully, that’s happening more and more.
For years, we’ve been preparing our people and running regular drills, both within government and alongside the private sector. Ironically, every Russian provocation tends to pull Europeans closer together instead of dividing us. Still, the job’s never done — protecting our democracy and making sure Russia can’t take advantage of our open society is something we have to work on every single day.
— The Estonian government has decided not to reopen the Saatses Boot road, a path that runs through Russian territory. This comes after border guards reported unusually high activity by an armed Russian unit just across the border. How does this move fit into Estonia’s broader efforts to strengthen border security?
— It’s frustrating that the Saatses Boot issue is only being dealt with now — it’s something that should’ve been resolved long ago. Estonia’s been steadily upgrading its border infrastructure and defence systems, and together with the other Baltic states and Poland, we’re building a solid defensive line designed to counter both conventional and hybrid threats.
On top of that, Frontex, the EU’s Border and Coast Guard Agency, has opened a command centre in the Narva region, marking a big shift in how the EU handles border surveillance across Northern and Eastern Europe. Working closely with our NATO allies, we continue to secure both our air and maritime borders. Finland joining the Alliance has also given a major boost to Estonia’s air and sea defences.
— Estonia has a strong national defence and a 50,000-strong reserve force ready to mobilise quickly. With defence spending at 3.4% of GDP this year and set to top 5% next year, where exactly are these investments going — and will they be enough in the years ahead?
— Estonia takes pride in its reserve army and modern conscription system. Under the Ministry of Defence’s new development plan, more than €10 billion will be invested over the next four years to boost the country’s defence capabilities. Situational awareness has always been a top priority, and intelligence is set to receive a significant share of that funding.
The role of drones on the modern battlefield has been fully recognised. The Estonian Armed Forces are developing this capability across the board — from detecting and neutralising enemy drones to building their own strike, reconnaissance, and surveillance systems — all integrated into Defence Forces operations at every tactical level, from individual units to divisions.
Estonia has already bought a significant number of drones, along with Blue Spear anti-ship missiles, and the new development plan calls for additional strike drones. Strengthening air defences is a top priority: a dedicated air-defence brigade will be formed, and short-, medium- and long-range capabilities will be bolstered with extra launchers for IRIS-T, Piorun, and Mistral systems, along with ammunition. For the foreseeable future, defence spending is likely to stay around 5% of GDP — a trend mirrored across the region.
— There’s been a lot of talk about a potential Russian attack on Narva, supposedly under the pretext of “protecting Russian speakers.” How much does Russian propaganda actually affect Estonians — their morale and readiness to mobilise if war broke out?
— Unfortunately, the “Narva is next” narrative is mostly amplified by journalists, and occasionally by officials from more distant European countries. For anyone familiar with Estonia’s defence and security system, such a scenario is extremely unlikely. Narva won’t be next — it’s not 2014 anymore, and Estonia is not the Ukraine of that time. Narva is an Estonian city on Estonian soil, and the country’s border is firmly secured.
A situation in which “little green men” could slip into Estonia simply cannot happen. Significant restrictions on movement across the Estonian-Russian border since 2022, combined with additional control measures introduced both in Estonia and more broadly across the Schengen area, make such a scenario highly improbable.
NATO is still the backbone of Estonia’s security. The country hosts a UK-led battle group that also includes French troops — both nuclear powers. These units are fully integrated into Estonia’s own divisions, ready to respond fast and in sync to any threat. It’s extremely unlikely that Russia would risk testing Article 5 with a limited attack on Estonia — doing so would gravely underestimate both Estonia’s readiness and that of its closest allies. The country wouldn’t wait for NATO’s formal decision-making; any aggression would be met with a full, immediate response. And Estonia wouldn’t be facing such a threat alone. Close defence cooperation with Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland ensures any regional response would be swift and coordinated.
Article 5 would inevitably kick in, but by that point, the aggressor would already be confronting a combined defence force from multiple nations, quickly reinforced by the full power of the Alliance.
In recent years, Estonia has poured more resources into strengthening its independent defence than at any point in its history. But equipment is only part of the picture. Estonian troops and their allies train to the highest standards, and the country’s reservist army model allows it to mobilise a large, motivated force at short notice — a system that’s rigorously tested in practice.
The Internal Security Service (KAPO) keeps a close eye on Russian intelligence efforts to carry out influence operations in Estonia, build espionage networks, or sow division in society — and it has repeatedly succeeded in uncovering and stopping such moves.
Meanwhile, the Foreign Intelligence Service and the Defence Forces’ Military Intelligence Centre are constantly monitoring Russia’s military and political developments, providing Estonia’s leadership and allies with timely warnings about potential threats. Their work ensures that Estonia is never caught off guard strategically.
— When it comes to civil defence, public readiness, and critical infrastructure, what’s already in place? And in practical terms, what does “infrastructure resilience” look like in Estonia today?
— Estonia’s Emergency Act lays out which services must keep running no matter what: electricity, gas, liquid fuels, national and local roads, district heating, water and sewage, phone, mobile and internet networks, digital ID and electronic signatures, emergency medical care, and cash payment systems. The law also specifies who is responsible — ministries, Eesti Pank, and major municipalities — and requires service providers to plan for potential outages and the interdependencies between systems.
On the digital front, Estonia’s main systems communicate through X-Road, a secure data exchange layer that doesn’t rely on blockchain, and use Keyless Signature Infrastructure to keep information consistent across platforms. Critical registers are also backed up at Estonia’s “data embassy” in Luxembourg, protected under a 2018 bilateral agreement like a physical embassy.
Estonia’s electricity grid is fully integrated with Europe, with multiple cross-border connections, black-start capability, and compatible control systems. Procedures for responding to hybrid threats have been tested and refined, especially after the underwater incidents of 2024.
For gas and fuel, the country relies on dual supply routes via pipelines and liquefied natural gas, supported by emergency reserves and market rules that prioritise critical users. Communications and data systems are designed with redundancy: terrestrial and submarine backup channels, regulated uptime for essential services, rapid-recovery contracts, and cross-border data replication under an international treaty. Together, these measures ensure vital services and registers stay online even if domestic data centres fail.
In Estonia’s financial sector, payment systems and cash circulation are considered critical services. Eesti Pank sets minimum continuity standards, including backup sites, communication systems, and logistics for cash during disruptions.
Municipalities with more than 10,000 residents are responsible for keeping district heating, water, and sewage systems running, maintaining local roads, and planning for evacuations and essential services during emergencies — requirements that were updated under the 2025 regulations.
— How are people being prepared for this?
— Regular nationwide exercises bring together local authorities and civil institutions, while national defence education is taught in most secondary schools. The “Ole valmis!” (“Be Ready!”) app, available in Estonian, English, and Russian, provides step-by-step guidance for crises and supports the air alert messaging system during drills.
The Rescue Council runs free emergency preparedness training across the country, often in partnership with the Defence League. Current guidance emphasises self-sufficiency for at least 72 hours – up to a week – with detailed lists of essential supplies.
The council also coordinates public shelters and sheltering instructions. Locations are published on the Land Board’s geoportal, and “shelter-in-place” guidance is standardised. A new law now requires shelters and shelter plans to be developed for many buildings going forward.
