Oleksandr Bondarenko, Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Slavic Philology and Applied Information Studies at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, spoke with The Ukrainian Week about the evolution of Russian propaganda since 2014, new strategies in the occupier’s information warfare, the study of the “enemy,” and Ukraine’s counter-propaganda efforts.
— Where does modern Russian propaganda originate, and who’s shaping the Kremlin’s information strategy today?
— From 2014 up until about 2020, Russian propaganda was basically a continuation of Soviet practices — and Soviet propaganda itself drew heavily on the techniques pioneered during the Second World War. The undisputed master of this craft was Joseph Goebbels. His principles and methods set the standard for everyone else. The American, British, and Soviet propaganda machines were, in many ways, built in response to Goebbels’ playbook.
Was there a Soviet equivalent to Goebbels? Not really. Unlike in Nazi Germany, the Soviet system was faceless. But the KGB did have special training manuals for its operatives, outlining in detail the core principles behind Third Reich propaganda. The Soviet Union tried to counter those methods — but mostly through reactive measures, producing propaganda that answered, rather than anticipated, the enemy’s moves.
What’s fascinating is that Goebbels’ methods were copied even in Britain. He focused on shaping mass consciousness through radio and film. One striking example was the newsreel series Die Deutsche Wochenschau. The pinnacle of visual propaganda, of course, was the work of Leni Riefenstahl — not by chance counted among the hundred most gifted film directors of the last century.
At the same time, the “small format” was widely used. In Germany — and later in the Soviet Union — short newsreels were screened before every film, serving as an ideological “warm-up” for the audience.
— How did the Allies fight back against Goebbels’ propaganda?
— Britain’s experience is especially revealing. Under Sefton Delmer, the British set up about twenty radio stations broadcasting on the same frequencies as the Germans. That gave them access to nearly every household in Germany — helped along by Goebbels himself, who before the war had pushed a microcredit scheme so ordinary Germans could buy cheap radios, mockingly nicknamed “the liars.”
To win over listeners, the British initially aired programmes that mimicked official German broadcasts — music, letters from the front and emotional stories. Gradually, they began slipping in their own narratives, chipping away at Goebbels’ portrayal of the “bloodthirsty Churchill” and the “evil Anglo-Saxons.” These German-language programmes went out live for up to twenty hours a day. It was an expensive operation, but one that effectively broke Goebbels’ monopoly on Germany’s airwaves.
The Soviets couldn’t replicate this model — most citizens didn’t have personal radios. Instead, they relied on loudspeakers in public squares and communal flats. They broadcast counter-propaganda too, but again, it was reactive rather than proactive.
— What changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union?
— In the early years, modern Russia built its propaganda machine on familiar Soviet foundations. But over time, things began to shift. Scholars working in the field started proposing new approaches — though, by around 2008, their papers and studies began quietly disappearing from public access.
Many of these works still exist, but they’ve been classified. To get hold of them, you often need to rely on hackers. We know, for instance, that there’s a centre in Krasnoyarsk devoted to studying what they call the “linguistics of information and psychological warfare.” We have a pretty good idea of the topics they’re working on, but the materials themselves are off-limits. There are several of these research centres across Russia, and we do our best to keep tabs on them. And I have to admit — they’re very good at what they do.
Over the past decade, their methods have evolved. They’ve moved away from the old Soviet-style propaganda and into what some of my colleagues — and I agree with them — describe as post-propaganda.
— How is this new kind of propaganda different from the classical model?
— Classical propaganda — the kind used by Goebbels, the Soviets, the British, and the Americans during World War II and the Cold War — aimed squarely at shaping the mass consciousness. When it worked well, it could reach as much as 80 to 85% of the audience — an extraordinarily high level of influence.
Here’s an interesting parallel: after the annexation of Crimea, Putin’s real approval rating hovered around 85%. Official figures were even higher, but experts agree that the wave of euphoria over the slogan “Crimea is ours” proved a point — propaganda’s reach maxes out at roughly 85 per cent. The remaining 15% are people who, by nature, are almost immune to suggestive messaging.
Classical propaganda worked like a funnel — cast a wide net and pull in as many people as possible. It was aimed at the broad, undemanding public. No wonder Goebbels famously said propaganda shouldn’t target the smart, but those of below-average intelligence. The golden rules were simple: repeat short, clear messages — the simpler, the better. And if there are too many “smart” people in society? Make them dumber.
This brings us to what Noam Chomsky once called the “infantilisation of the population.” One of the most effective tools for this — surprisingly — is crude, lowbrow humour. It’s a deliberate way to dull critical thinking. The first time someone sees a ridiculous joke, they might smirk. If they laugh again the second or third time, it means the process of infantilisation has kicked in. Combine that with the shrinking attention spans shaped by platforms like TikTok, and you get a society that’s easier to manipulate and less inclined to think critically. Classical propaganda pulled this “simplified” mass into its funnel. Modern Russian propaganda flips that logic — it starts with the individual and spreads outward to reach the masses.
— How does this new Russian strategy work in practice today?
— It starts small — with an individual or a tightly defined target group — and then scales up. Audiences are sliced by every imaginable factor: age, gender, interests, lifestyle. Tailored messages are built for each segment, and from this mosaic, the broader narrative takes shape.
In practice, it works through troll farms flooding social media comment sections. A single comment is a direct path into someone’s mind. The troll’s job isn’t just to provoke — it’s to pull people into a back-and-forth and, through that conversation, slip in the narratives they want to push. That’s what we call post-propaganda — and they’ve been laying the groundwork for it for years.
We’ve been warning about this for a long time, telling government agencies that Russia would shift its line of attack. They’ve moved away from traditional methods like television to far more targeted strikes on social media. The old tools haven’t vanished, but Russian TV is now mostly blocked in Ukraine. The digital space, though, is wide open — and that means we need to rethink our defences from the ground up.
The focus has to shift, because the more forward-thinking audience — the one meant to form the backbone of a healthy nation — doesn’t watch television anymore. That’s why it’s baffling that the Ukrainian government keeps pouring money into the United News telethon, even as its audience shrinks and its budget swells. From an efficiency standpoint, that’s just bad spending.
The answer to the question “Who still watches TV?” isn’t hard to guess. It’s mostly older viewers, shaped by Soviet-era habits, who are no longer the most active part of society.
Meanwhile, the people who actually drive the national conversation — those glued to their smartphones — get their information elsewhere. On our phones, we don’t tune in to endless news marathons; we scroll through clips, speeches, and blogs from people we trust.
— Have the Russians been using this approach since 2014?
— No. The real shift didn’t start until around 2018–2020, and by now it’s mostly complete. That said, for their domestic audience, they’re still using old-school propaganda — the kind pushed by the familiar “foul mouths” like Russia’s Solovyov and Simonyan. Our situation is different.
Thankfully, our own approach is starting to evolve. I can see it firsthand: until recently, invitations to professional discussions were rare, but in just the past month, I’ve received as many as I used to get over several years. The authorities are finally beginning to grasp the importance of expert consultation. Both closed-door and public discussions are now taking place, with participation from security agencies and scholars from specialised academies we’ve long collaborated with.
— Has this new collaboration yielded any results so far?
— I hope it will. The situation seems to be drifting toward a potential freeze in the war, but before that happens, both sides will try to inflict as much damage as possible. So the tension is only going to rise.
We’re entering what many clear-headed observers are calling a dead end — no way forward, no way back. General Zaluzhny has spoken about this from a military standpoint. I look at it through the lens of information warfare. What we’re seeing is a kind of parity: their propaganda meets our counter-propaganda — or, in NATO terms, strategic communications — and right now, the score is roughly even.
Unfortunately, the Russians have some very sharp minds on their side — many trained in Shchedrovitskiy’s methodological school. Take Kirienko, for example. His son is now reportedly advising Russia’s propaganda machine. I don’t follow their internal propaganda much — it still runs on the old playbooks for a domestic audience. But when it comes to external audiences — American, European, even Ukrainian — they’ve completely changed their approach.
— How exactly does Russian propaganda target audiences abroad?
— First, they rely on the same targeted methods I mentioned earlier. But more importantly, they use a two-tiered communication model. The first tier is direct messaging from the state to the consumer — but today, hardly anyone pays attention to that. The more effective approach is the second tier, which works through opinion leaders. These influencers receive the official narratives and then transmit them to their own audiences. We do the same on our side — and these influencers are often referred to as “positive” bloggers.
Every audience segment has its own trusted figure. Some follow Oleksiy Arestovych, others Oleg Zhdanov, and still others Vitaliy Portnikov. For each group, information is delivered through “their” leader, which boosts credibility and closes the gap between the source and the consumer, making the influence far more effective.
Meanwhile, when Simonyan appears on Russian television, she’s catering to a different audience — a large domestic base that still relies on traditional media. And her funding reflects that focus.
— How effective is Russian propaganda in Ukraine?
— Unfortunately, the so-called “vatniks” (a term for staunch, uncritical supporters of Russian propaganda –
The so-called “vatniks” [hardline pro-Russian supporters – ed.] haven’t gone away. There are also still plenty of “good Russians” out there quietly pushing the Kremlin’s messages. And in Ukraine, we have our own people spreading the same narratives — lines like “we’re tired of fighting” or “bury bayonets in the ground and come back home.”
I’m surprised that state institutions haven’t taken more decisive action against this. True, some of these voices operate from abroad, but many remain right here in Ukraine.
On top of that, there’s an especially powerful channel of direct influence over conservative audiences: the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Sadly, it remains unblocked, and the security services haven’t dealt with it as they should. Take Pasha Lebed and his network — has anyone inventoried the relics removed from the Lavra? Has anyone systematically investigated these priests, 80% of whom, under their robes, wear FSB epaulettes? And that’s just in Kyiv. At the Pochaiv Lavra in the Ternopil region, that number jumps to 99%.
Yet, these information channels are still operating freely; they haven’t been shut down. For the state and relevant institutions, addressing this wouldn’t be particularly difficult. Under the previous government, there were fears of losing visa-free travel due to accusations of “church oppression,” which forced a cautious approach. But the situation is different now. That path was gradual, and thankfully, the Tomos was secured.
One proposed soft approach was to require the church to use its real name — the “Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine.” This was my initiative, carried out at the legislative level. But in practice, enforcement has been nonexistent. The law was initially blocked by the Constitutional Court, though Serhiy Holovaty, acting as head of the Court, ultimately saw the case through to a proper conclusion. The Court confirmed that the law is fully constitutional — yet it still hasn’t been implemented.
Go to any of their churches and you’ll see signs reading “Ukrainian Orthodox Church.” In the past, at least in small letters, it would note “of the Moscow Patriarchate” in parentheses. Now even that has disappeared. This propaganda channel remains active — and, unfortunately, highly effective.
— What’s your take on where the Russian-Ukrainian information war is headed?
— Let me sum up a few key points. First, we have to admit that Russia has highly skilled communications experts — and they’re effective. In my view, we’re still mostly reacting rather than taking the initiative. That approach needs a serious overhaul.
Second, we need to embrace post-propaganda strategies. That means redirecting the vast sums currently spent on the largely ineffective TV marathon toward centres that produce targeted, positive messaging for specific audiences — both inside Ukraine and abroad. The Russians are highly successful in this arena. Take Jeffrey Sachs, for example — a Kremlin-funded propagandist whose speech supporting Putin was broadcast worldwide from the PACE podium. Who counters him? I managed two programs on American radio. But the reach? Maybe a thousand listeners, many distracted or only half-listening while driving. To effectively push back against this kind of influence, systematic state support is essential.
And third — and most crucial — the state must recognise the urgent need for systematic training of specialists. While security agencies like the SBU and HUR prepare personnel in a targeted way, the field of strategic communications remains largely unaddressed.
Our university is the only one offering a programme of this kind within applied linguistics — in Russia, it’s referred to as the “linguistics of information and psychological warfare.” Informally, we call it the “Department of Enemy Studies,” where students explore the nuances of the Russian mentality, the impact of the so-called “Tolstoian” approach, and more. Yet we receive no state support and no government funding for training these specialists.
Even if the war is temporarily frozen, the information battle will go on. That raises a critical question: who will step in to replace today’s experts? We urgently need to train a new generation capable of professionally countering the enemy on the information front.
