Appointed earlier this week, Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš wasted little time heading to Brussels, where he met on Thursday with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to discuss European security and continued support for Ukraine. According to Czech media, his new government is set to take office on Monday, 15 December. But the election results — and the rhetoric of the parties now forming the governing coalition — suggest that Prague’s new leadership is likely to take a cooler, more cautious approach towards Ukraine than its predecessor.
During his election campaign, Babiš made clear he would scrap the “ammunition initiative” for Ukraine launched by the previous government. After his appointment, the Czech weekly Respekt reported that US General Curtis A. Buzzard — NATO’s point person for security assistance and training for Ukraine — met with Babiš to urge him to reconsider. Meanwhile, the incoming defence minister, Jaromír Zuna, declined last week to comment on the initiative when asked by the same outlet.
That raises a broader set of questions: what should be expected from the new Czech government? How might Prague’s foreign policy shift? And how can Ukraine most effectively engage with a leadership that appears more hesitant than its predecessor? The Ukrainian Week put those questions to Tomáš Petříček, who served as foreign minister in Babiš’s first government and now heads the Progressive Analytical Centre.
— With Petr Macinka, the leader of the Eurosceptic Motorists for Themselves party, confirmed as the next foreign minister — replacing the previously proposed Filip Turek, whose nomination sparked controversy after Czech media uncovered xenophobic and homophobic Facebook posts — what can we expect from Czech foreign policy under the new government? How might it shift in the months ahead?
— I don’t think the direction of the new government’s foreign policy will hinge on who takes over at the Foreign Ministry. In my view, there is a broad consensus among the parties forming the new coalition — from the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy party, through Motorists for Themselves, to the populist ANO movement led by incoming prime minister Andrej Babiš.
When it comes to Ukraine in particular, I am fairly sceptical. I don’t expect a wholesale reversal of Czech policy, but I do think Prague will be more restrained when it comes to proactive engagement — whether in the Coalition of the Willing or in other initiatives aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s defence and its ability to resist Russian aggression.
— What’s the best way for Ukraine to get its message across to the new Czech government?
— The starting point is to understand the rhetoric the new leadership used during the campaign. The position — particularly of the senior coalition partner, Andrej Babiš’s ANO movement — was not that the Czech Republic should abandon support for Ukraine in favour of openly pro-Russian positions. Indirectly, you can trace hints of pro-Russian views among certain actors, but I would strongly caution against rushing to label them as such.
Another key line in the campaign was the call for a “diplomatic solution” to the war. That sounds reassuring, but it remains a vague and underdeveloped position. The coalition partners have not articulated what role, if any, Czech diplomacy should actually play in such a process.
Looking at it pragmatically, I see two main avenues for Ukraine to engage with the incoming Czech coalition. First is the European Union itself, which provides a broader platform for cooperation and support for Ukraine. Here, Kyiv should encourage Prague not to act as a disruptive force in EU discussions, not to wield a veto like some other players, and instead to pursue pragmatic negotiations and dialogue with European partners. That doesn’t mean the new government will actively push Ukraine’s agenda, but it should be possible to curb any overtly unconstructive behaviour.
The second avenue is bilateral relations. There is a solid foundation of cooperation between Ukraine and the Czech Republic, which offers opportunities to strengthen ties going forward. The incoming Czech coalition has expressed a desire to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy, which means there are realistic arguments and incentives that could draw Babiš and other key figures into constructive engagement with Kyiv.
In my view, there are two levels to this engagement. The first is to make clear to the incoming government that the EU should remain an active and influential player in supporting Ukraine and in any future settlement of the war. EU membership is a shared interest for both sides — Ukrainian and Czech alike. The second level concerns bilateral relations: fostering pragmatic cooperation not just in the short term, but, more importantly, building a foundation for sustained long-term collaboration.
— A slightly undiplomatic question: you served as foreign minister under Andrej Babiš. How does he actually shape his foreign policy positions? Does he set the agenda based on his own vision and ideas?
— That’s actually a very relevant question, as it builds on what we discussed earlier. Babiš has no comprehensive strategy or overarching vision for foreign policy. His approach isn’t based on any programme or ideology; it is largely shaped by his personal relationships and his perception of his partners.
This means that personal diplomacy will be crucial. How Ukrainian representatives — particularly President Zelenskyy, the prime minister, and other officials — engage with Babiš on a personal level could make a real difference. I believe he can be persuaded through direct bilateral talks, especially when he interacts personally with leaders from other countries.
Overall, Babiš has never shown any desire to cultivate closer ties with Russia, and that was true even before February 2022. In fact, he has previously expressed interest in cooperating with Ukraine and its government, particularly on economic matters and other areas of mutual interest.
So, I would say that engaging in negotiations with the Ukrainian government is familiar territory for him. He shows no inclination to push Czech foreign policy toward positions similar to those of Viktor Orbán — at least, I hope that’s the case. This suggests he can interact pragmatically with Ukrainian partners, and, as I mentioned before, the personal dimension of those relationships will be key.
— With US-led talks on a peace agreement in the Russian-Ukrainian war now underway, how do you assess the EU’s role? Is Brussels doing enough to influence the process?
— The European Union is trying to stake out a meaningful role in the negotiations, but for now it remains largely reactive to Washington’s initiatives, leaving Europe in a somewhat defensive position. At the same time, key European players understand that any settlement cannot come at Ukraine’s expense — it cannot amount to capitulation.
European partners have a critical role to play: Kyiv must be able to negotiate with the United States, or eventually with Moscow, on equal footing — as an active participant, not merely the subject of talks. Ukraine also needs to enter these discussions from a position where its support isn’t leveraged as a bargaining chip by other partners, as is happening now with the US administration.
