Ukrainian Prism: Rising Moscow-Beijing ties, Shoigu’s North Korea visit, and Ukraine’s opportunities in India’s peace mediation offer

7 April 2025, 13:15

The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden, in collaboration with the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism,’ presents an in-depth overview of Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine and its broader impact on foreign relations, including Russia’s ties to the international community, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and beyond, through the weekly #aggressoranalysis.

This week’s highlights: Rising Moscow-Beijing ties, Shoigu’s North Korea visit, and Ukraine’s opportunities in India’s peace mediation offer

  • Sergei Shoigu meets Kim Jong Un during visit to North Korea. Russia’s Security Council Secretary, Sergei Shoigu, has paid another official visit to North Korea, where he held talks with the country’s leader, Kim Jong Un. According to Russian state media, the visit focused on the implementation of bilateral agreements reached during Kim’s earlier visit to Russia. Notably, Russian sources also reported that Shoigu delivered a personal message from President Vladimir Putin to Kim, though no further details were disclosed.
    • The timing is significant. Since the Kremlin began active negotiations with the Trump administration, Moscow has notably stepped up its engagement with allies who either directly or indirectly support its war effort. Against this backdrop, renewed talks with North Korea come as no surprise. It is highly likely that the two sides discussed the state of Russia’s dialogue with Washington. Shoigu’s selection as envoy again signals the strategic weight of the discussions — particularly with regard to military cooperation.
    • Shoigu has emerged as a key interlocutor for Pyongyang. Following his last visit to the North Korean capital in September 2024, North Korean troops began to appear on the battlefield in Ukraine. While the full scope of their involvement remains unclear, it is evident that some form of military technology or equipment is flowing from Moscow to Pyongyang. Shoigu’s return visit, then, likely served to coordinate further steps in this opaque but deepening defence relationship.
  • FSB chief visits Beijing as China watches Moscow–Washington thaw with concern. As with North Korea, Russia continues to maintain frequent and layered contacts with China, engaging across multiple levels — from security agencies to diplomatic channels. It recently emerged that Alexander Bortnikov, head of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), made an unannounced visit to Beijing, where he met with Wang Xiaohong, China’s Minister of Public Security — effectively the country’s top police official. While the meeting was officially framed as a discussion on bilateral cooperation, the significance lies in Bortnikov’s presence itself, as he seldom undertakes such trips.
    • Meanwhile, Russian state-controlled media have reported that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is considering a visit to Moscow in April, potentially as part of preparations for a planned trip by President Xi Jinping to Russia for Victory Day celebrations on 9 May. Yet, while Moscow’s renewed dialogue with Pyongyang appears to be yielding tangible results for the Kremlin, its engagement with Beijing has proved more complex. Despite the flurry of diplomatic activity, signs suggest that Russia’s relationship with China is not advancing as smoothly as its ties with North Korea.
    • It is worth recalling that immediately after the official launch of US-Russia negotiations in Riyadh on 18 February, there was a marked uptick in contacts between Beijing and the Russian government. Just days after the first round of consultations, Vladimir Putin held a phone call with Xi Jinping, followed by a meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov at the G20 summit.
    • In this context, China has begun to actively promote the idea of peace negotiations, repeatedly highlighting its own initiative — the “Friends of Peace” platform — and stressing the need for European participation. This approach stands in stark contrast to Moscow’s, which has sought to limit talks to direct engagement with Washington. The continuation — and even expansion — of these high-level contacts between Beijing and Moscow suggests a deeper underlying concern in China: that a potential rapprochement between the Kremlin and the Trump administration could sideline Beijing from a process it sees as central to its geopolitical interests.
  • Indian Prime Minister’s proposal to mediate peace talks: Russia’s likely response and Ukraine’s opportunity. Amid renewed contacts between Washington and Moscow and a broader revival of discussions around potential peace negotiations, another player has begun to assert itself with growing confidence — India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has issued several statements regarding the war and the prospects for peace talks, declaring that India is ready to serve as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia. This marks a notable departure from New Delhi’s previous position, which had largely been confined to the role of a neutral conduit for relaying messages between the two sides.
    • Modi’s intervention places the Kremlin in an awkward position. Back in the autumn of 2024, Vladimir Putin personally named India — along with China and Brazil — as a suitable candidate to mediate any eventual peace talks. However, following Donald Trump’s election victory in the United States and the subsequent launch of direct Russian-American consultations, Moscow has adopted a markedly different tone. The Kremlin has since claimed that it no longer requires any mediators — a shift that reflects its strategic aim of deepening ties with Washington while seeking to detach peace talks from broader U.S.-Russia relations.
    • India’s initiative, then, cuts directly across the Kremlin’s narrative. Moscow must now decide whether to ignore Modi’s offer or reject it outright — an option that carries diplomatic risk. This opens a tactical opportunity for Kyiv. A public show of support for Modi’s proposal would place Russia in an uncomfortable position, exposing its inconsistent messaging and forcing the Kremlin either to contradict its own earlier stance or to dilute its efforts to keep the peace process firmly under bilateral U.S.-Russia control.

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