For decades, Armenia was regarded as Russia’s closest ally in the South Caucasus. The country hosted Russian troops, depended heavily on the Kremlin for arms supplies and became deeply integrated into Moscow-led political and economic structures. But Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s push toward the European Union — and what could become Armenia’s biggest geopolitical shift since the collapse of the Soviet Union — has added to already strained ties with Moscow.
A European summit held in Yerevan and attended by Volodymyr Zelensky particularly angered the Kremlin. In the aftermath, Russia banned imports of Armenian flowers, while Russian officials described Armenia’s actions as “unfriendly.” Moscow is now threatening to raise the issue of Armenia’s continued membership in the Eurasian Economic Union — a customs bloc of former Soviet states — at a summit in Kazakhstan on May 29.
Putin recently commented on the worsening relations with Armenia, saying the country should settle the issue through a referendum and that Russia was ready for a “reasonable and mutually beneficial divorce” if Armenian voters chose the European path. He also drew parallels with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. “How did it start? It started with Ukraine joining or trying to join the EU,” Putin said. Pashinyan responded by saying that only Armenia could decide the future of its membership in the EAEU.
The politician also plans to skip the summit in Kazakhstan in order to campaign for his Civil Contract party ahead of Armenia’s parliamentary elections on June 7. Several opposition groups are campaigning for closer ties with Russia, including the Strong Armenia alliance led by Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, the Prosperous Armenia party of oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan, and the Armenia alliance headed by former president Robert Kocharyan, who ruled the country for a decade until 2008.
“This confrontation recalls 2013, when then-president Serzh Sargsyan abruptly abandoned plans to sign an association agreement with the EU and instead joined the EAEU under pressure from the Kremlin. Tensions began escalating rapidly after Azerbaijan’s military victories in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and 2023, which exposed the limits of Russia’s security guarantees for Armenia. In Yerevan, the value of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation — the Moscow-led military alliance once considered a cornerstone of Armenia’s security doctrine — increasingly came into question,” Bloomberg writes.
In a comment to The Ukrainian Week, Svante Cornell, political analyst and expert on the Caucasus, Central Asia, Turkey and Eurasian security, as well as co-founder and director of the Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP), said the main obstacle to deeper ties between Armenia and the European Union remains a peace agreement with Azerbaijan.
“Without a peace agreement, Armenia remains vulnerable to joint pressure from its nationalist opposition and Russia, which are visibly coordinating efforts to undermine the Armenian government. Once a peace deal is reached, Armenia will be able to normalise its economic relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan and gradually reduce its dependence on Russia,” he says.
Svante Cornell also says Armenia has struggled to balance relations with Russia, Iran, the EU and its neighbours, after placing itself in a difficult position by relying on Russia for “security” for 30 years — in practice, relying on Moscow to maintain control over territories in Azerbaijan that it had occupied. As a result, Armenia paid a high price politically, as it was forced to align with Russian priorities, and economically, with Russia gaining control over a significant part of its economy through debt-for-assets deals.
“However, that policy collapsed dramatically once Armenia ended up with a government that did not align with Moscow’s priorities, and during the 2020 war the country was effectively left to fend for itself. That war reflected a geopolitical reality: for Russia, Armenia was a secondary ally, while Azerbaijan and Georgia hold far greater geostrategic importance in the South Caucasus,” Svante Cornell told The Ukrainian Week.
Armenia has long tried to complement its relationship with Russia by building ties with other countries, including Iran, the United States and the EU. In recent years, cooperation with Iran in particular has become a significant risk factor.
“I would say that balancing so many relationships while remaining such a vulnerable country requires extremely careful statecraft. Unfortunately, Armenia has not managed to demonstrate the level of political skill needed to make such a strategy viable,” Svante Cornell told The Ukrainian Week.
Russian media and narratives still carry a lot of weight in Armenia. “Russia has deep ties with the Armenian opposition, including parts of the former ruling regime, as well as even closer links with the political elite from Karabakh — and the two groups partly overlap. We continue to see signs of extensive Russian economic and political connections with the Armenian opposition, whether through reported contacts with the FSB or links to people close to Putin. As a result, Armenia has a government trying to distance itself from Russia, while the media environment remains heavily shaped by Russian narratives, and the political scene includes figures — particularly business magnates and oligarchs — effectively ‘parachuted in’ from Russia who play a highly influential role in Armenia’s political life,” he adds.
