The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden, in collaboration with the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism,’ presents an in-depth overview of Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine and its broader impact on foreign relations, including Russia’s ties to the international community, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and beyond, through the weekly #aggressoranalysis.
This week’s highlights: the ratification of the defence agreement with Belarus, the potential for Russia to keep its military bases in Syria, and no signs of concessions from Russia in the peace talks.
- “Peace negotiations”: Russia has shown no willingness to make concessions. The prospect of peace talks has recently gained traction in the media, driven largely by the new US administration under Donald Trump, who is pushing to fulfil a key campaign pledge—ending Russia’s war against Ukraine. Until now, such discussions seemed unlikely, primarily due to Moscow’s rigid preconditions for negotiations. But the landscape appears to be shifting. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has acknowledged that Russia and the US are in contact through certain channels, with dialogue intensifying in recent weeks. This suggests that some form of negotiation is already underway.
- Despite the fact that dialogue has begun, there is little reason to expect meaningful progress anytime soon. The main obstacle remains Moscow’s uncompromising demands, which in recent months have hardened into what amounts to a veiled capitulation for Ukraine. Beyond Kyiv, the Kremlin is also pushing for a broader security agreement with the US—echoing the proposals it unsuccessfully sought to impose in December 2021. So far, Russia has shown no willingness to make concessions. In fact, the terms Donald Trump is reportedly considering—such as a ceasefire and the potential deployment of European peacekeepers—have already been flatly rejected by the Kremlin.
- Russia’s ambassador to France, Alexei Meshkov, has made it clear that Moscow sees any ceasefire as a Western ploy to rearm Ukraine and establish a foreign military presence—something Russia will not accept. Meanwhile, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, a key figure in Russia’s engagement with the US and EU, has framed Moscow’s stance as one of readiness for “tough negotiations.” However, his comments also reinforced long-standing rhetoric about “realities on the ground” and Russia’s “historical and geographical” interests—clear signals that the Kremlin has no intention of relinquishing occupied Ukrainian territories. Other conditions, such as restricting Ukraine’s military, reinstating pro-Russian political forces, and reversing language policies, remain firmly on the table. Putin’s position leaves little room for flexibility. The demands are so extreme that even the slightest compromise would risk being seen as a sign of weakness. As a result, there is little chance of a shift in Russia’s approach to negotiations in the near term.
- Azerbaijan bans Russia’s Rossotrudnichestvo agency over Moscow’s refusal to admit fault for downing an AZAL aircraft. Tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan have resurfaced over the downing of an Azerbaijani AZAL plane by Russian air defences in Chechnya in December 2024—an incident that triggered a diplomatic crisis and remains unresolved. With no formal apology or compensation from Moscow, Baku has now taken concrete steps to signal its determination to secure justice.
- Within a week, a series of pointed measures followed. First, Azerbaijan summoned Russia’s ambassador, Mikhail Evdokimov, to its foreign ministry, where officials voiced concerns over what they see as disinformation in Russian state media and statements by Russian officials. Shortly after, Azerbaijani broadcaster Baku TV aired a report accusing the Russian Information and Cultural Centre—a local branch of the Kremlin-linked Rossotrudnichestvo agency—of espionage under the cover of humanitarian work. Days later, Baku formally notified Moscow that Rossotrudnichestvo’s operations in Azerbaijan would be shut down.
- Moscow’s response—or rather, its near-total silence—has been the most striking aspect of the fallout. Despite reports that the investigation uncovered signs of “external influence on the aircraft” and claims by a senior Azerbaijani official, cited by Reuters, that fragments of a Russian Pantsir-S missile were found, the Kremlin has remained conspicuously quiet. There has been no official statement, nor even the customary diplomatic rebuke from Russia’s foreign ministry over Azerbaijan’s latest moves.
- Russia’s Federal Air Transport Agency has downplayed the findings, insisting that the investigation’s report remains “preliminary” and does not confirm the cause of the crash. Instead, officials have pointed to reports from the downed aircraft’s crew, which cited a “bird strike” and an “oxygen tank explosion,” even as they acknowledge signs of “mechanical impact.” The inconsistencies in Moscow’s messaging suggest an effort to avoid outright admission of responsibility—something that carries clear political implications.
- Analysts at Ukrainian Prism previously noted that the Kremlin would never explicitly admit guilt in such incidents, as doing so would undermine its authority and force it to take responsibility. Yet Azerbaijan appears determined to push for an official admission and compensation, regardless of the strain this may place on bilateral relations. This presents a real risk for Moscow. Baku serves as a key trade corridor, enabling Russia to bypass certain sanctions, and a continued refusal to acknowledge responsibility could have broader diplomatic consequences. By stonewalling, the Kremlin not only jeopardises its economic interests but also deepens mistrust among its partners, reinforcing the perception that Russia is unwilling to take accountability—even among its supposed allies.
- Ratifying the defence pact with Belarus. Putin has submitted a bill to the State Duma to ratify a security agreement with Belarus under the Union State framework, signed in December 2024. The agreement introduces provisions with direct implications for regional security, particularly regarding mutual defence. It allows for Russian military intervention in the event of an attack on Belarus—including the potential use of nuclear weapons against any country deemed responsible.
- A key point in the treaty is the vague concept of “threats to sovereignty,” which is also listed as grounds for nuclear deployment. Given Moscow’s highly flexible interpretation of such terms, this creates a constant risk of escalation. Any move by Ukraine or European states—such as troop deployments near Belarus’s borders—could be framed by Russia as an existential threat, heightening regional tensions.
- Beyond the nuclear dimension, the agreement paves the way for an expanded Russian military presence in Belarus. This comes as infrastructure is being developed to accommodate a long-term deployment of the so-called Regional Group of Forces of the Union State. The result is the accelerated militarisation of Belarus, reinforcing the threat to Ukraine and NATO’s eastern flank. Crucially, the treaty also enables Russia to use its military to “neutralise threats” to Belarus’s constitutional order—effectively giving the Kremlin a mechanism to prop up the government in Minsk and tighten its control over the country.
- The new Syrian government says Russian military bases may potentially remain in the country. The Washington Post has reported that Syria’s new defence minister, Murakhf Abu Kasra, has signalled that Russia may be allowed to retain its military bases in the country—specifically the air base in Hmeymim and the naval facility in Tartus. These sites are of strategic importance to the Kremlin, serving as key hubs for Russian military operations in Africa, as previously noted by Ukrainian Prism.
- According to Abu Kasra, the bases will remain as long as they align with Syria’s national interests. He also spoke positively about Russia’s improving relationship with the new Syrian government. Last week, a Russian delegation visited Damascus for the first time since the fall of the Assad regime, holding talks that included discussions on the future of these bases. It soon became clear that Syria was demanding financial compensation and reconstruction aid in exchange for allowing Russia to maintain its military presence. At the time, Ukrainian Prism suggested that Moscow would likely accept these terms despite the financial burden—a view seemingly reinforced by Abu Kasra’s latest remarks. Even if Russia retains its existing bases, Syria is expected to exert greater control over them in the future. As a result, Moscow is likely to accelerate efforts to establish new military footholds elsewhere, with Libya emerging as a prime candidate.
