Hanna Hopko Chair of the Board of the Network for the Protection of National Interests “ANTS,” Member of Parliament of Ukraine, 8th convocation

What the President of Finland keeps silent on – and what Ukraine must scream about

8 December 2025, 12:36

Finnish President Alexander Stubb wrote an article for Foreign Affairs on the transformation of the world order. The piece is well written, conceptual, and diplomatically measured. But that is also the problem. Stubb writes as the leader of a country that has just joined NATO and wants to preserve faith in the system. For Ukrainians who have been resisting the aggressor for 11 years, and, after the full-scale invasion, which became a genocide of the Ukrainian people – resisting the entire axis of evil – we must describe the reality truthfully. After nearly four intense years of advocacy, I want to write as an analyst who sees the system as it truly is – dead. As Garry Kasparov said, bluntly but truthfully, during a panel discussion at the Halifax Security Forum 2025: “NATO is weak. NATO does not exist. It’s a fake. The reason you are still sitting here celebrating (NATO’s anniversary) is that Ukraine is dying every minute. It’s a massive sacrifice! If not for Ukraine, if not for Ukraine standing, Russian tanks would already be in Poland.”

Most Ukrainians do not believe in Article 5. True security guarantees will come only through the de-imperialisation of Russia. I discuss this further in my speech at the Halifax Security Forum.

Earlier, after the disappointment in NATO’s capabilities following the Vilnius summit, I wrote about 10 reasons to act unconventionally: why Ukraine should offer Europe security guarantees of its own. To begin with, Stubb proposes a triangle of power: the Global West, the Global East, and the Global South. It’s a neat, elegant idea – clear, visually appealing, and perfectly pitched for Foreign Affairs. The trouble is, it simply doesn’t hold. He glosses over the actors who matter most: the so-called “in-between” countries, the geopolitical swing states. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Serbia, and the states of Central Asia are not on the periphery of the Great Game; they are the very playing field on which it is unfolding. Whoever controls these territories gains a strategic advantage. Zbigniew Brzeziński understood this perfectly when he described Ukraine as a “geopolitical pivot.”

These countries do not choose between the three poles – they are chosen by the great powers. They are defined not by agency but by geography. And it is on these lands, not in the offices of Brussels or at G20 summits, that the future of the world order will be decided. The President of Finland describes the Global South as the arbiter between West and East. But in reality, the true arbiters will be those who control the space between them. And that space is burning.

Their behaviour will always be shaped by those who show strength, not by those who offer elegant speeches about democracy, the rule of law, or reforming multilateral institutions.

Ukrainian diplomats and politicians have recognised this Western mistake for years. The most effective way to engage the Global South is not to convince it of the West’s moral clarity or to lecture it on decolonisation. The most effective way is to demonstrate victory over Russia. In a world where respect is won through strength, the defeat of the aggressor will send a clear signal that countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America cannot ignore. I reached this conclusion after visiting India’s capital ahead of the 2024 G20 summit.

Today, the West often appears weak: it buys Russian energy in greater volumes than it provides aid to Ukraine; it delays decisions on asset confiscation; and it continues to fear “escalation,” a threat Putin himself wields as leverage. For the Global South, this is a clear marker of unreliability. Strength draws far more than statements of values.

Then comes “value-based realism.” Stubb frames it as a blend of idealism and pragmatism, a kind of response to the challenges of the moment. It sounds convincing. But there is one point he quietly avoids. Value-based realism, when confronted with an opponent bound by no values at all, is not strength – it is weakness. And it ends in defeat.

Putin does not care about human rights, international law, or public opinion. He deports, kills, threatens with nuclear weapons, lies around the clock, and mocks anyone who still tries to play by the rules. This asymmetry has already shaped the terrain: the West fears escalation, and Putin counts on it. The West seeks compromise; Putin sees weakness. Stubb knows this – otherwise he would not warn about the danger of Finlandisation for Ukraine. Yet he stops short of saying the obvious: all else being equal, value-based realism loses to unprincipled cynicism. This should not be taken as a call to abandon values, but as a reminder to recognise their cost in a real war.

Russia and China are bound by nothing – neither human rights, international law, nor concern for their reputation.

This asymmetry is especially clear in the debate over Russian asset confiscation. Western diplomats continue to speak of “values” and the “rule of law,” refusing to recognise that they themselves could become the next targets of authoritarian regimes if they fail to show political will. It is yet another illusion: the West hopes to avoid direct confrontation, but history demonstrates that such an approach most often leads to larger wars.

The Finnish President’s most far-fetched proposals involve UN reform: permanent seats for Africa and Latin America on the Security Council, the abolition of the veto, and the suspension of aggressor states’ membership. Stubb himself concedes that this “may sound unrealistic.” May sound? It doesn’t sound – it is unrealistic. The permanent members of the Security Council will never voluntarily relinquish their veto. Never. Achieving such a change would require a new founding conference after a catastrophic war. And here the author edges towards the most frightening question – one he takes great care not to confront.

He outlines three scenarios for the future: the preservation of disorder, a complete systemic collapse, or a rebalanced order through cooperation. But where is the fourth scenario – an open war of revisionists for the global order? A Third World War? History makes this crystal clear: systemic change comes through major wars. Versailles followed World War I. Yalta followed the Second. There are plenty of triggers for escalation – Ukraine, Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Balkans. The list goes on, especially after recent talks in Seoul, Tokyo, and Taipei, where it has become clear that no one is immune to attack. Anyone could fire the first shot.

Stubb deliberately leaves things unsaid. Understandably so – no president can publicly speak of the inevitability of a major war. But such caution does a disservice. The West is unprepared for this scenario, neither mentally nor materially. And it is the most likely scenario.

Russia, China, and Iran seek to revise the existing order. North Korea’s ambitions, bolstered by its experience fighting alongside Russia in modern warfare, are also on the rise. The ANTS network presented its report Russian War in Europe as a Global Laboratory for Modern Warfare. The West is not ready to concede. The question is not if war will happen, but when and in what form. Both sides may believe time is on their side – a classic recipe for catastrophe.

Why hasn’t the genocide against Ukraine become a Rubicon? After serious discussions in capitals – Seoul, Tokyo, Taipei – and during the Halifax Security Forum in Canada, with officials at every level, defence ministers, generals, and experts, I have become increasingly convinced that a global war is unavoidable, and that it will engulf the European continent. Not a hybrid war, as we see now, but a hot one.

In the world’s leading democracies, the risks of simultaneous escalations—from Europe to the Indo-Pacific—are becoming ever clearer. Yet a dangerous gap remains between recognising the threat and taking meaningful action.

There is a noticeable tectonic shift in how Ukraine’s geopolitical role is perceived – from a recipient of security to a provider. At every meeting, our partners are keenly aware of their dependence on us and show a willingness to adopt our cutting-edge experience in drone warfare.

Russia’s genocide against Ukraine, with its daily toll, has still not pushed the democratic world to cross the Rubicon and prepare seriously for war. There is little resolve to change strategies or economic approaches that could help win the race for modern weaponry. And yet such measures could have served as a deterrent against a major confrontation.

The democratic world is still avoiding strategic self-determination.

Instead of shifting to a war economy, political inertia prevails.

A lack of political imagination.

Most governments cannot imagine a full-scale war on NATO territory, even though it is already partially happening – Russian drones over EU countries, attacks on critical infrastructure.

Dependence on short electoral cycles.

Authoritarian regimes plan for decades; democracies plan for one to four years.

The false belief in deterrence through weak, Western-economy-friendly sanctions and “crisis management.”

But authoritarian regimes read weakness, not deterrence.

The comparison with Helsinki-75 does not hold up. In 1975, there was a stable balance of power, two poles, clear spheres of influence and mutual deterrence. Both superpowers feared nuclear war existentially. Today, there is no balance. The U.S. is losing dominance but is not ready to acknowledge it. China is rising and seeking a redistribution of power. Russia is in decline and therefore acts aggressively; its weakness makes it more dangerous. There is no trust. No shared interests. No fear of nuclear war – Putin has normalised nuclear blackmail.

Stubb paints appealing pictures of the Global South as an arbiter between West and East. But he lumps Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria into a single category. They have nothing in common – neither interests, values, nor level of development. India plays its own game, Saudi Arabia focuses on its region, while Brazil is absorbed in domestic issues. Treating them as a single bloc is an analytical mistake.

And here comes the main paradox: these countries don’t want to defend the “liberal world order.” They want more power, more money, more respect. But why would they fight for a system the West built for itself? They will negotiate between West and East, taking whichever terms suit them best. Meanwhile, the West seems to think it can win them over with elegant words about democracy and the rule of law. Naivety.

As for international institutions, they are already dead. The UN did not stop Russian aggression because the aggressor sits on the Security Council. The OSCE has become a club of observers, powerless to prevent violations. NATO and the EU are evolving, but not in the way the author hopes. They are becoming transactional rather than institutional. Multilateral diplomacy no longer exists. It is ceremonial, a façade, like constitutional monarchies – beautiful, historical, but ultimately powerless.

For Ukraine, Stubb’s text is both encouraging and troubling. Encouraging because he recognises the unacceptability of Finlandization. Troubling because he still believes in reforms, dialogue, and gradual improvements. Ukraine is fighting for survival right now. A reformed UN in twenty years will not help us. What we need are weapons, sanctions against the aggressor, and clear security guarantees. Yet the West still thinks it can “manage escalation” and avoid direct confrontation. History shows that strategy does not work.

The President of Finland writes from the perspective of a small country that has just joined NATO and seeks peace. He projects the Finnish experience onto the global stage, where the logic is different. The U.S., China, and Russia are not playing at multilateral diplomacy. They are playing for geopolitical dominance. No rules. No morality. Only the balance of power.

Stubb calls for dialogue, cooperation, and reform. He speaks of the “last chance for the West.” But the last chance is not an opportunity to convince anyone of the merits of multilateralism. It is a chance to prepare for the inevitable confrontation with those who do not believe in dialogue. Putin does not compromise; he advances on Kyiv. Xi Jinping does not wait for UN reform; he builds military bases on reefs. Iran does not heed calls for restraint; it supplies drones to Russia.

And yet the West still believes it can get by without war, that agreements can be reached, that international institutions will save the day. Stubb is part of this illusion. He is more honest than many; he understands more. Yet he does not dare to say the central truth: the system is dead, war is inevitable, and we must prepare – not write memoranda about reforms.

Ukraine is now on the front line of this coming major war. We are not the periphery; we are the epicentre. Stubb understands this, but he does not say it outright. For us, there is no longer room for understatement.

Author:
Hanna Hopko

This is Articte sidebar