Ukraine’s decision to halt Russian gas transit through its territory on January 1 has added urgency to Europe’s efforts to diversify its energy sources. Unsurprisingly, the loudest objections come from Moscow’s European allies, Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. Meanwhile, Western media describe a brewing “diplomatic crisis” as EU member states struggle to accelerate their reliance on alternatives to Russian gas.
Despite Kyiv’s repeated warnings that it would not renew its transit agreement with Gazprom, Brussels was slow to adjust its timeline for phasing out Russian gas imports. The European Commission had set a 2027 deadline to end purchases, aiming to avoid economic disruption. Advocates of this gradual approach often argue that “sanctions are designed to hurt the Russian economy more than the West’s.” Yet revenues from gas and oil continue to fund Moscow’s war. By September 2024, Russia still accounted for 19% of the EU’s total gas imports—about 38 billion cubic metres annually.
As of January 1, Gazprom faces fresh losses, potentially the largest in 25 years. Economists estimate that Ukraine’s halt to gas transit will strip Russia of $6–6.5 billion in yearly revenues. This is a significant blow, considering that until recently, roughly a third of Russian gas destined for Europe travelled through Ukrainian pipelines. As Le Monde notes, this flow amounts to “just over 14 billion cubic metres annually.” Since 2022, Austria and Slovakia have been the largest recipients of gas via Ukraine’s pipeline, which also supplied the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, and Slovenia. Germany, too, has long depended heavily on Russian gas.
The current crisis has demonstrated the absence of a cohesive energy policy among European states. While France has largely safeguarded its energy security through nuclear power, Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia have long downplayed the risks of their heavy reliance on Russian gas. Even now, Hungary and Slovakia continue to seek separate deals with Moscow, sidelining broader European interests.
This collective understanding of security is emerging slowly and painfully. As in the past, Russia has deftly exploited Europe’s divisions. Gas revenues have long served as a tool for Moscow to exert pressure on Europeans and secure political favours. In a bold move, Russia has already cut off gas supplies to Moldova, forcing the country to declare a state of emergency. The international press has reported this grim turn of events with little fanfare, tacitly acknowledging that expecting a swift resolution is unrealistic.
The crisis has been building for years and did not materialise overnight. The fact that Europeans are once again caught unprepared highlights a painful truth: Moscow is waging war not just on Ukraine but on Europe itself—and not only through military means. Turning a blind eye to overtly hostile actions does not equate to safety.
“While the EU has been working for years to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, the prolonged reliance of several countries—primarily Hungary and Slovakia—has prompted a frantic search for alternatives in recent months,” writes the French publication La Croix. “One proposal on the table has been for the European Union and Ukraine to negotiate gas supplies from Azerbaijan.”
However, Ukrainian energy expert Mykhailo Honchar has repeatedly voiced doubts about the viability of this alternative. He argues that the gas would likely be Russian, not Azerbaijani, as Baku does not produce sufficient volumes. Additionally, there is no direct pipeline linking Azerbaijan and Ukraine.
Meanwhile, liquefied natural gas (LNG), which remains unaffected by sanctions, continues to be a reliable revenue stream for Moscow. “LNG forces Europeans to confront a certain hypocrisy,” noted Phuc-Vinh Nguyen, head of the Energy Centre at the Jacques Delors Institute, in an interview. For example, in France, TotalEnergies has not severed its long-term contracts with Russia’s Novatek.
As of now, Russia remains the EU’s second-largest gas supplier, behind Norway and ahead of the US. Three years ago, on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Moscow accounted for 45% of Europe’s gas market; today, that share has dropped to just 19%. This reduction in purchases demonstrates that political will can drive significant change. Yet, the persistent level of dependence underscores that this will remains neither fully sufficient nor cohesive.
For weeks, Slovakia and Hungary have been pressuring Ukraine to reverse its decision to halt the transit of Russian gas. Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico are actively lobbying for the lifting of EU sanctions against Russia, framing the issue in terms of national interests. Recently, the Slovak Prime Minister went so far as to accuse Ukraine of “harming the European Union.”
Fico’s stance has raised the ire of other EU members. Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský sharply criticised Fico’s recent meeting with Putin, saying, “It was the Czech Republic’s decision to take steps to reduce its energy dependence so as not to grovel before a mass murderer.”
Slovakia and Hungary are now pushing for Brussels to apply pressure on Ukraine to extend its gas transit contract with Russia. Although the European Commission has yet to take action, the situation remains far from ideal.
“By completely severing gas ties with Moscow, Ukraine has not only resolved the paradox of continuing a joint contract with a country at war with it,” notes the French publication Le Monde. “It has also exposed the delays and contradictions within Europe, with some countries dreaming of reopening Russian gas supplies the moment a ceasefire is reached. It is time to align actions with words. If we are serious about ending Russia’s war against Ukraine, we must fully sever its access to revenue from gas sales.”
