The UK Ministry of Defence said a British major general will head the planned Multinational Forces in Ukraine (MNF-U), a structure designed to prepare NATO and its allies for a potential ceasefire and an eventual stabilisation mission, according to the UK Defence Journal.
By pulling in senior command staff and rapid reaction units, London is casting itself as a central player in what could become one of Europe’s largest multinational operations since the 1990s. At the lieutenant general level, command of the headquarters will be split between Britain and France — an arrangement likely to be revisited once the shape of any ceasefire deal is known.
Defence Secretary Luke Pollard said the joint command is expected to hold even after the MNF-U headquarters is shifted from France to the UK. “The intention is for the Multinational Forces in Ukraine headquarters, at lieutenant general level, to remain a joint command between the two countries,” he wrote. With more than 30 nations expected to sign on, officials say interoperability has been the overriding priority in the planning.
The Financial Times reports that European capitals are facing mounting pressure to make concrete commitments to the planned deployment of multinational forces in postwar Ukraine. According to the paper, these forces are seen as a central pillar of the security guarantees under discussion by the so-called “coalition of the willing,” led by France and the UK with backing pledged by the United States.
Two people familiar with the talks told the FT that the coalition has effectively split into three groups: those prepared to send troops — including Britain; those that have already ruled it out — such as Italy; and the undecided majority, with Germany among them.
Speaking to The Ukrainian Week, Oleksandr Khara, director of the Centre for Defence Strategies, said the encouraging sign is that the UK is taking the lead. “It was the first country in Western Europe to recognise the danger from Russia back in 2014 and to begin helping us rebuild our navy. We remember the crucial role Britain played in the early months of the full-scale war, when it pushed the Americans and others to start assisting Ukraine — and was the first to deliver tanks,” he said.
However, he stressed that the initiative would hinge on a ceasefire or a peace agreement. “I think Ukrainians understand there will be no peace deal with Russia in our lifetime. And it doesn’t look like Putin is ready for a ceasefire either, knowing he has the strength to keep advancing and bombing Ukrainian cities, while the US drags its feet on sanctions and other measures that could stop Russia. All the more so if Putin realises that NATO troops — even if not formally under the Alliance’s flag — would be stationed in Ukraine. That would certainly make life harder for him. But without other elements, the whole framework may not hold,” Oleksandr Khara told The Ukrainian Week.
In his view, the real issue lies elsewhere. “Our government keeps insisting this is part of security guarantees, but that’s simply not the case. Even if there’s a ceasefire and a small contingent — say 10,000 troops — is deployed in our western regions, in practice you’d need 30,000. Some would be on duty, others resting, others preparing — and that’s a heavy burden for Europeans, who have grown complacent and are not ready for war. Another problem is that they’d be stationed in western Ukraine, not between us and the Russians. So what role would they play if the ceasefire is broken? We don’t even know their mandate. It’s hard to imagine they’d be ready to fight on our side against Russia. That would effectively mean a war between Russia and NATO, with the possible use of nuclear weapons — something they are clearly terrified of,” Khara said.
The director of the Centre for Defence Strategies argues that what is now being discussed and sold as security guarantees is, in reality, the implementation of bilateral security agreements.
“What we’re really talking about isn’t security guarantees, but sanctions on Russia, investment in Ukraine’s defence industry, arms transfers, joint production, troop training, intelligence sharing, and so on. These are all security assurances — less formal and without the obligations of collective defence. Of course, it’s positive that Europeans, finally in the 11th year of the war, have recognised the threat to themselves and are willing to act. But this does not solve our problems,” Oleksandr Khara stresses.
Meanwhile, Pavlo Lakiychuk, head of security programmes at the Centre for Global Studies Strategy XXI, notes that European allies are trying to get ahead of events.
“Why are our partners talking about peacekeeping forces while sidestepping the question of stopping the fighting? Because they simply can’t influence a halt to hostilities. Neither they, nor Trump. With no way to tackle the real problems, our partners are trying to at least do something. And this isn’t really about us — it’s about them. It’s a marker of what different states are actually capable of. Some are ready for collective defence, others would rather help with ammunition, and some are willing to shift positions depending on the circumstances. That doesn’t make things any easier for us, but it does mean Europeans would be wise to start thinking seriously about this now,” he told The Ukrainian Week.
