How does a professional historian, who’s also on the frontlines defending his country, see the war unfolding? Why does Russia keep laying claim to Ukrainian territories, and what historical parallels can we draw? Why are any agreements with Russia always temporary? How should Ukraine define its strength moving forward? What determines the success or failure of the Armed Forces operations, and what should Russia look like after Ukraine’s victory? In an interview with The Ukrainian Week, historian and soldier Borys Cherkas shared his insights on these crucial questions.
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– As a historian who’s on the frontlines, how do you see the fighting and the situation as a whole?
— For a historian, the key is finding parallels with the past. It helps me immensely because whenever I’m faced with a problem, my instinct is to look for historical analogies—whether that’s in military tactics, technology, or human behaviour. In one way or another, something like this has happened before, whether in terms of weapons, strategies or even the way societies respond. From these parallels, I can predict behaviour—whether it’s of an individual, a group, or the course of events.
But it’s also crucial to remember that this is part of a much larger, ongoing war. Mobilisation will continue, soldiers will hold the line, and there will be defensive actions in some areas and offensive ones in others. The real question is how effectively we can manage all of this.
As for what the Russians will do, I already have a pretty clear picture. The only thing they haven’t resorted to yet is nuclear weapons, but apart from that, there’s nothing surprising in their actions.
The bigger question is how we, as a state, will continue to fight. Ultimately, this is about our survival. Russia wants to destroy us—as a nation, as a people. We have nowhere to retreat. We must hold firm, no matter what.
– The South and East are where the fighting is most intense right now, and whenever there’s talk of potential negotiations, it often seems to revolve around Ukraine giving up these territories. But what would Ukraine look like without them?
— In a broader historical context, we’re seeing a repeat of past events. Just like the Antes were pushed back by the Varangians, or Kyivan Rus expanded only to be pressured by the Cumans, then the Mongols, and so on—today, we’re facing an invading force that has pushed us out of certain territories.
But above all, these lands are ours. If we’re part of the Western European world, then according to international agreements, this territory belongs to us. That’s something that’s been confirmed in all international documents.
A state, by its very nature, is defined by core principles—one of the most fundamental being its borders. And it’s essential that we all recognise this as our fundamental space: Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. So why is the front line there? Because this is a war, and in war, such things happen. The enemy has managed to push forward in some areas, while in others, we’ve driven them back. Some parts of the front stabilise, but elsewhere, the situation remains fluid, shifting rapidly.
Eventually, agreements will be reached—that much is inevitable. Wars can pause at times, but they always come to an end in some form. How this particular war with Russia will conclude is hard to predict—there are simply too many unknowns.
But one thing is clear to me: no matter who is in charge, Russian leaders are incapable of making genuine agreements. They see everything around them as inherently Russian and refuse to acknowledge Ukrainians as a distinct people. Any agreement with them will always be temporary.
Looking at history, it’s clear: Russia has always violated treaties and consumed its neighbours. That pattern has never changed. As long as Russia exists, it will remain a threat. Given the opportunity, the enemy will try to destroy us. That is the harsh reality.
– For Russia to stop acting the way it does, it has to change fundamentally. So, the key question is: what should Russia become?
In the 1990s, the West—whether intentionally or not—conducted a unique experiment. It gave Russia the opportunity to thrive. The world opened its doors to them, they gained access to cutting-edge technology, and even the health crises highlighted the need for substantial investment in healthcare.
Logically, a rational nation would have seized that moment to build hospitals, recruit top doctors, and establish hubs for technological innovation. But instead, Russia chose to build tanks, invade Georgia, and then turn its sights on us. War, it seems, is what truly captivates them.
We all need to face the harsh truth: Russia will keep fighting. No matter how you run your business, how you vote, or how you engage with the world, always keep in mind that Russia will, sooner or later, return with aggression. Once you fully grasp this, you can begin to shape your country’s policies—both domestic and foreign—with that reality in mind. Only then will you be truly safeguarded.
– From what I’ve seen, there seems to be a real lack of understanding of what you’re talking about in the rear. There are too many failures in areas like humanitarian aid, education, funding, and fostering scientific progress. If people in the rear aren’t getting it, do the military?
– It comes down to the human factor. In the circles I move in, yes, they understand.
The real question is: why have we failed ideologically? Why are we caught in these contradictions—one moment we’re at war, the next we’re not? The country isn’t fully mobilised for war. Many businesses and industries don’t have military contracts to ensure the economy is fully aligned with the war effort. One day, we announce mobilisation, the next we hesitate. We swing between extremes—from dreaming of “coffee in Crimea” to declaring that “all is lost.”
The problem is that several generations have grown up in peace. Life was good, even indulgent. War felt distant, almost unreal. But it’s not. It’s been here since 2014, and mobilisation should have been continuous from the start. So why was it paused? Why has the military been cut off from society?
Even in the rear, people should be undergoing training—learning how to shoot down drones, involving high school students in hospital work to assist the wounded. Everyone needs to grasp that, sooner or later, they’ll likely end up in the army.
But our society—from ordinary citizens to politicians—still acts as if it’s peacetime. There’s this lingering hope: just one more year, maybe six more months, perhaps it will all resolve itself, someone will negotiate, maybe Russia will collapse, maybe Putin will die, maybe Trump will intervene… But the war goes on. This process has already been set in motion, and it can’t just be stopped. We have to prepare for a long struggle. There’s nowhere to retreat.
– Those who refuse to fight die. Surrendering, throwing your hands up in the air, only increases the chances of being killed, leaving no chance of survival. Yet, some of our people are still willing to do that. Is there a risk that the country could split into those willing to fight, those already fighting, and those ready to surrender?
— We need to remember that in democratic countries, as we saw during World War II, mobilisation crises typically begin in the third year of war. Canada, the UK, Australia, and the United States all went through it. They had to tighten measures and track down draft dodgers. The state’s role is to implement the necessary enforcement mechanisms properly. The issue is that, as post-Soviet people, when we hear “enforcement,” we immediately think of executions. But in reality, there are many other ways a state can carry out this function.
Secondly, we’ve already seen what happens when people grow weary of war and start seeking compromises—negotiating with one side or the other just to end it. That led to the collapse of Ukraine’s Hetmanate and the fall of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, and in their place came famine, repression, terror, and genocide.
Another point to consider: we need to remember that on Russian talk shows, they openly say, “We will come, and Ukrainians will be exterminated.” And when they finally arrived on our land, they proved those words true—through rape, murder, and countless atrocities.
In other words, we need to have an honest conversation with people and periodically remind them: if we lose, it will only get worse. As for this moment of crisis… we should look at how the British or Canadians handled it in the past. After all, this is just another challenge on our path.
It was disheartening in 2023 to see that mobilisation wasn’t happening because there were enough people. I couldn’t understand that, because when we are sent to areas where reinforcements are needed, we’ll need those who have already learned to fight. Otherwise, we’ll have to start from scratch, just as we’re delicately doing now.
Right now, we’re in a stage of war and survival. In this stage, new people are born—people who may not even realise it yet, still living in the old paradigm. The problem is that our ideology is lagging behind, and the country’s propaganda is weak. But why should it be any different? Our politicians are the same people from the general public. They think in terms of historical agreements, believing everything can be solved. But some change, and some do not. Some help the front, while others engage in criminal disputes. Some give everything to the front, while others profit. But still, today, there’s an overall process of our survival and gradual purification from slavery.
– If we imagine the ideal scenario where, tomorrow or the day after, we return to the borders of 1991, are we truly ready to define our Ukrainian space within those boundaries? And what should Russia look like after our victory?
— First, from a military perspective. For some reason, when our advances are successful, they’re often met with too much euphoria by people in the rear, as if to say, “Today the war will end,” when the Russians fled Kyiv, or when we advanced in Kharkiv, or entered the Kursk region and people were shouting, “Let’s take Kursk, let’s take Moscow.” This is the wrong mindset. Military personnel view things very differently.
In my view, the operation in the Kursk region, aside from any political gains, had a clear military purpose: to expose their reserves, understand the logic of their movements on their own territory, and figure out whether the troops there were genuinely Russian. And, in the end, it worked.
Secondly, we need to stop judging our troops’ actions and successes from the rear based on whether we’ve captured a settlement. From a military perspective, that doesn’t matter. I’m tired of explaining this.
For example, there’s a village — just a single street — that, from a military standpoint, holds little value because it’s located in a lowland. The priority should be holding positions elsewhere, where we have the advantage of higher ground and tree cover. But in the information space, it gets hyped up, with people declaring, “We lost the village — that’s it.” In reality, this could be a tactical move to stabilise the situation.
Politically speaking, in its current form, Russia will always be a threat to us. For the aggressor to cease being a threat, it likely needs to collapse into smaller states, leaving us with a more manageable set of borders.
So, first and foremost, those in the rear need to stop criticising the military’s decisions — what’s right or wrong. I always tell my fighters: “Never critique the actions of other units or soldiers; they are the only ones who understand the conditions they faced, what happened, and how it played out.” This brings us to the next point: things usually go better when the military acts strictly as the military, without political motives. Sometimes, we may need to give up a position, let the enemy advance, and then hit them with artillery. Afterwards, we reclaim the position. The military knows what it’s doing. We hold the front. The military must operate based on the logic of warfare, not political or social-political concerns within the country. “We won’t mobilise because it might upset people.” Are you out of your mind? If we don’t mobilise, they’ll end up conscripting us into another enemy army.
– How do you see Ukraine after victory, and what would a defeated Russia look like?
— Ukraine is a country where every citizen, above all, understands they are a citizen with both rights and responsibilities. They also recognise that the very existence of this state is central to our identity. There’s no alternative to this.
Once this understanding is firmly established, facing the various threats around us will be much easier — be it conflicts with other states, economic struggles, political tensions, or recurring health crises. Military nations have demonstrated that managing these ongoing challenges is easier, as they may change in form but remain constant.
As for Russia, it will always hate us and seek to conquer us. As long as it exists in its current form, nothing will change. “Carthage must be destroyed.” I don’t believe in the good or bad Russian, or in Russian democrats. They just change names, but the underlying strategy remains the same.
What does the future hold? Ideally, I’d like to see an ocean. Russia will break into smaller states, creating a buffer zone along our border — that would be ideal. If they don’t break apart, we’ll keep pushing forward.
