Nearly four years into the full-scale war, Ukraine has quietly become a drone state — a showcase for cutting-edge military tech and a front-runner in the use of diverse weapon systems. Until Russia’s full-scale invasion, no NATO platform had been truly battle-tested on these front lines; we cannot outfight the enemy by numbers alone. Our mobilisation pool is far smaller, and we are determined to spare as many citizens as possible, so Ukraine is placing its bets on technology and innovation that keep our defenders alive. Drones have entered the public imagination — even grandmothers and schoolchildren chip in to fund UAVs — yet one niche that still feels obscure to many is the backbone that makes those systems work: communications. That’s where we turn next.
“In peacetime, personal communications that don’t rely on mobile networks or the internet are a luxury — something only the wealthy or the savvy can afford. But war changes the rules, and every responsible citizen should know the basics of radio communication. Even the cheapest Chinese analogue walkie-talkie can become a powerful tool in the right hands, keeping you connected with neighbours and giving you a lifeline to emergency services when all else fails,” says Delirium, an instructor at the Kruk centre.
In the U.S. and Western Europe, civilian radio communication emerged in the 1960s, during the Cold War, dramatically improving civilians’ chances of survival in wartime. In the totalitarian USSR, however, civil defence radio was limited to licensed amateur operators who could be monitored. Letting ordinary citizens run their own personal channels was simply too risky for the regime.
Ukraine emerged from totalitarianism just as 27 MHz “Citizens’ Waves” radio was fading into history, giving Ukrainians little chance to benefit from it. Radio was soon replaced by mobile phones and then the internet — technologies that required no technical skill. But these systems are fragile, as some Ukrainians have already learned when shelling knocked out mobile towers. Thankfully, such outages have been relatively rare, though they have occurred.
This war has taught responsible citizens how to provide first aid, handle weapons, and take cover under fire. Now it’s time for all of us to master at least the basics of radio communication, so that in a crisis we can quickly set up a functioning network with even the simplest equipment.
Ask a regular person what “communications” means, and they’ll probably say something like “a walkie-talkie, talking, passing messages or commands.” And they wouldn’t be entirely wrong. But today, everyone carries a radio transceiver in their pocket — a device with a built-in computer and graphical interface that can transmit and receive across multiple channels: what we call a smartphone. In military communications, though, voice transmission from one station to another is just a small piece of the puzzle.
“Today, communications involve a range of systems and data transmission tools that can be integrated into a single network, with protection at every level, backup options, and the fastest, most automated operation possible,” explains Oleksiy, an instructor at the Kruk centre.
No signal, no strike: why drone communications matter
Even automated systems that use elements of artificial intelligence still need oversight from a remote operator. Fibre-optic drones work on the same communication principle — just transmitted through a cable. As drone technologies advance, so do the communication systems that make “unmanned” flight possible. The more channels a drone has, the better its chances of staying under control.
A little physics helps explain it. Every transmitter and receiver operates on a specific frequency — the channel where the radio exchange happens. Think of it like a voice: two people shouting instructions across a construction site. The sound of the voice is the “frequency,” while the ears and the voice act as the receiver and transmitter.
Now imagine an intruder shows up with a megaphone. He shouts whatever he wants or makes noise far louder than construction workers can. The work grinds to a halt because the flow of information is blocked.
That’s essentially how electronic warfare works — it drowns out and jams the useful signal. If a drone controller’s transmitter is pushing 5 watts — that’s our “voice” — and a nearby EW jammer is blasting 50 watts — our megaphone-wielding intruder — the drone only picks up the jammer’s overpowering noise. Control is lost, and the data link goes dark.
So what can be done?
The obvious solution is to use an unusual frequency for drone–operator communications — one the enemy’s electronic warfare hasn’t targeted yet. As more frequencies come into play, the list of bands a modern jammer needs to cover keeps growing. Alternatives include machine vision, where the drone makes targeting decisions on its own; fibre-optic links, which are wired and largely immune to EW; or satellite communications, much harder to jam and now widely used in both land and sea drones. There are other approaches, but for now, this gives a clear, practical overview.
It’s also worth mentioning that any modern communications specialist needs at least basic knowledge of networking and cybersecurity. Digital data-transmission systems today are vulnerable not just to jamming, but also to hacking and malware. To build on our voice-and-ears example: imagine you’re working in a field with your brother, while a neighbouring family works nearby. If your brother calls you, you instantly recognise his voice and won’t confuse it with anyone else’s — because his voice is familiar.
Every radio transmitter has its own “voice.” Sophisticated detection systems can pick up these voices on the air, distinguishing whether a signal comes from a friendly unit, an enemy drone, or another source. Less advanced detectors simply register that something is transmitting on a given frequency and alert an operator, who must then rely on additional information or tools to determine if the signal poses a threat.
One of the first effective systems in Ukraine is Tsukorok. It can identify enemy drones — primarily the Krylo type — by their characteristic signals. Enemy manufacturers churn out models like the Orlan, Lancet, and ZALA in large batches with standardised designs, rarely changing the drone transmitters. That means once a device has recorded the “voice” of a specific hostile UAV, it can later recognise that signature and accurately determine what’s in the sky.
Chinese spectrum analysers — amateur-level devices — are also used for detection. They display the “shape” of a signal on a screen, showing a spectrum and a “waterfall,” which an operator can interpret based on experience to identify what’s in the air.
The most common models are the TinySAultra and the SA6. In Ukraine, the TinySAultra has been fitted with military firmware that simplifies its use through preset configurations. Devices are also upgraded with custom housings, external antennas, and audible alarms. In skilled hands, a low-cost hobbyist tool can become a life-saving instrument, directly supporting combat operations. SDR (software-defined radio) receivers, which connect to a laptop and provide a visual readout, operate on a similar principle.
Lately, more and more FPV detectors for video signals have been appearing. The analogue video broadcast by a drone can be received not only by the drone’s operator but by anyone tuned to the relevant frequency.
Here’s a simple analogy: imagine the drone is a TV tower, and our “video interceptors” are televisions. The device scans the video channels, and when a signal appears on one of them, it alerts the operator and displays what the drone is seeing. If the local terrain is familiar, you can even determine from the drone’s video whether it is approaching you.

