From Donald Trump’s latest statements, his stance on Europe, Canada, and Russia is easy to decipher. He accuses some of “looting” the United States or outright labels them as “one of the most disgusting countries,” while persistently excusing Russia—even defending its bombing of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure during a pause in intelligence sharing with the U.S., arguing that any country in Russia’s position would have done the same.
Such rhetoric from an American president inevitably shapes public opinion, influencing not just his supporters but also citizens in the countries he repeatedly singles out. A recent poll conducted by The Economist and YouGov illustrates how rapidly attitudes among Americans, Europeans, and Russians are shifting.
Since Trump’s return to the presidency, Republican sentiment in the U.S. has undergone a stark transformation. Before the election, only 12% of Republicans viewed Canada as “unfriendly” or an “enemy.” That figure has more than doubled in the latest poll, rising to 27%. This shift began even before the vote. A similar pattern is evident regarding the European Union: last year, just 17% of Republicans considered the EU “unfriendly” or an “enemy”; today, that number has climbed to 29%.
What is even more concerning is that, unlike Canada and the EU, perceptions of Russia are shifting in the opposite direction. In the early months of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, Americans were largely united in condemning the aggressor. At the time, nearly 85% of voters saw Russia as “unfriendly” or an outright “enemy” of the U.S.—a sentiment that remained steady up until the election.
Since then, opinions have diverged along party lines. Today, 72% of Republicans still regard Russia as an enemy, down from over 85%. Meanwhile, the share of Republicans who now see Ukraine as an enemy has risen by ten percentage points, reaching around 30%.
Another troubling shift is that even Democrats, following Trump’s election, have begun to take a softer stance on Russia while becoming more sceptical of America’s long-standing allies. As The Economist notes, it is still too early to say whether these subtle shifts will solidify into lasting trends.
At the same time, Trump’s actions and rhetoric are reshaping how Americans are perceived abroad. Back in August 2024, half of those surveyed by YouGov across seven Western European countries had a favourable view of the U.S. But after Trump’s inauguration, that support dropped sharply. In Denmark, for instance, approval ratings plunged from 48% to just 20%—an unsurprising reaction after Trump once again threatened to seize Greenland.
The only exception to this trend is Europe’s far-right electorate. In the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, far-right voters have grown more favourable toward the U.S. While their opinions on Trump’s approach to Ukraine and his dismissive attitude toward Europe remain mixed, they broadly share his views on immigration and other domestic policies.
Meanwhile, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) has published new survey data on Ukrainian perceptions of Western policies and Trump’s stance on Ukraine. At present, a clear majority—62%—view the West as an ally and partner in securing a just peace. As for Trump, Ukrainian sentiment in December 2024 was cautious, even tentatively optimistic. But by February 2025, attitudes had shifted dramatically for the worse.
In December 2024, 31% of Ukrainians believed that under Trump, their country would likely face an unfair or entirely unjust peace. Few expected a fully just resolution, while a significant portion remained uncertain, hoping for at least some degree of fairness. By mid-February to early March 2025, however, the share of those anticipating an unjust peace had nearly doubled, reaching 58%.
At the same time, perceptions of Trump’s presidency have shifted dramatically. Before the New Year, 54% of Ukrainians thought his election was, on balance, beneficial for Ukraine. By March 2025, that figure had collapsed to just 19%. Meanwhile, the proportion of those who see Trump’s presidency as harmful to Ukraine has soared—from 21% in December 2024 to 73% in March 2025.
