Olha Kuryshko, the acting permanent representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, spoke with The Ukrainian Week about the ongoing efforts to free political prisoners from Crimea, the key elements of the peninsula’s decolonisation, the role of indigenous peoples in this process, and the steps that will be taken regarding Russians currently living in Crimea after its de-occupation.
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– A recent survey by the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory shows increasing support among Ukrainians for continued decommunisation and decolonisation policy. What should this policy look like when it comes to Crimea?
– Since 2014, decommunisation and decolonisation processes have gradually taken place in territories under Ukraine’s control. However, in Crimea, these efforts were halted and even reversed once occupied by Russia. Over nearly eleven years of occupation, Russian colonisation and propaganda—often rooted in communist narratives—have only deepened. Russification, repression, political persecution, the unchecked exploitation of natural resources and human potential, and population replacement have all become defining features of Russia’s colonial policies in the occupied peninsula. These issues have become even more pronounced in the past three years.
A sociological study by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on the cognitive de-occupation of Crimea, commissioned by the Representation, reveals that the ethnic composition of the population has changed significantly since the Russian occupation. The occupying authorities have orchestrated large-scale resettlement of Russian citizens to the peninsula and, since 2022, have forcibly relocated people from newly occupied Ukrainian regions. The number of new arrivals is estimated to be around one million. Meanwhile, thousands of Ukrainian citizens have been forced to leave their homes due to ongoing persecution, repression, militarisation, and their rejection of the occupation. For a region with a population of approximately 2.5 million, this means that over the course of the occupation, more than 35% of the population has been replaced, even by the most conservative estimates.
One of the most comprehensive policies for the decolonisation of Crimea is the Strategy for the Cognitive De-occupation of Crimea, developed by the Representation. This strategy covers all aspects of the humanitarian sector, including counter-propaganda efforts, the information space, and education. For example, we face the challenge of addressing the education of children who are ten years old or older and have spent their entire lives within the framework of the Russian educational system. The ultimate goal of cognitive de-occupation is to drive a transformation in how people on the peninsula perceive life, aligning it with Ukrainian values, and to reintegrate them into Ukraine’s informational, socio-political, and cultural spheres.
– If we dive deeper into these areas, which ones stand out the most?
– This includes the informational and cultural reintegration of Crimea, as over the past decade, a significant gap has emerged between the information space of mainland Ukraine and that of Crimea. Once Crimea is liberated, bridging this gap will be crucial. Our mission is to act immediately with practical steps that will help reintegrate our citizens into Ukraine’s broader informational, cultural, and social spheres.
It also involves ensuring information security and countering disinformation. Russia has completely isolated the peninsula from independent media, instead pushing its own internal narratives. People are forced to consume this content, allowing Russia to shape perceptions and create a new vision for Crimea’s future. Despite these challenges, some individuals in Crimea have managed to stay connected to events in Ukraine through the internet. Russia’s tactic of embedding its narratives and ideas into “apolitical” media outlets is widespread, and over time, this seemingly subtle campaign seeps into street conversations and everyday communication. Our response to this is to restore Ukrainian broadcasting, ensure access to accurate information, and safeguard the right to freedom of speech.
A memory policy is equally important, particularly in terms of decommunisation and decolonisation. This includes actions such as renaming places (cities, towns, streets), creating an online resource with thematic historical materials, dismantling monuments, and more. Equally essential is respect for diversity, which involves recognising and understanding the rights of Ukraine’s indigenous peoples and working alongside them. Since Russia uses religion as a propaganda tool, ensuring religious rights and freedoms also remains a priority. To address this, we are already consulting with religious organisations in Ukraine about the challenges posed by prolonged occupation, including the destruction of these organisations and their facilities in Crimea. Our goal is to create conditions for the restoration of their activities and to seek justice for those persecuted by the occupying authorities for their faith.
Another crucial area is educational reintegration. Over the past decade of occupation, a generation of children has grown up in Crimea—those who started school in 2014 have already graduated, and a new generation has been born, unaware of what an independent Ukraine, the country of their birth, truly represents. To engage them in the diverse processes taking place in Ukraine, we must implement educational reintegration for children and youth living in occupied Crimea. This includes developing new curricula, launching educational projects, and making Ukrainian education accessible to all.
– We’ve touched on this already. Over the centuries, Crimea has seen many geographical locations renamed, and this continues today. How can we restore historical names? When is it the right time to do so, and do we have the necessary legal framework in place to support it?
– With Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the decolonisation process gained new momentum. On 21 March 2023, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law of Ukraine “On Condemnation and Prohibition of the Propaganda of Russian Imperial Policy in Ukraine and Decolonisation of Toponymy.” Just a few months later, on 30 June, the National Commission on State Language Standards published a “List of Villages, Towns, and Cities Whose Names Do Not Comply with State Language Standards, and Recommendations for Bringing Such Names into Compliance with State Language Standards,” which included several names from Crimea.
To put this law into action, the relevant ministry at the time developed draft resolutions for the Cabinet of Ministers titled “On Renaming Certain Geographical Objects” and for the Verkhovna Rada titled “On Renaming Certain Settlements of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.” These efforts involved active participation from the Representation, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, and the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People. The first resolution proposes renaming numerous geographical objects with Russian names, such as railway stations, natural landmarks, and reserves. The second aims to restore historical names to about 120 settlements. However, the approval of these resolutions is still pending.
– Currently, two main institutions are handling cultural heritage: the Presidential Representation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which focuses on reintegration, and the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, which handles cultural matters. Ideally, how should the decolonisation of cultural heritage unfold? And is the Ukrainian Criminal Code ready to address this?
– The decolonisation of cultural heritage is a lengthy and intricate process. Under Russian occupation, the imposition of imperial ideology through monuments, buildings, art, and other forms of expression has been a constant. A sociological study by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on the cognitive de-occupation of Crimea highlighted the importance of distinguishing between monuments that hold historical significance for the region and those that serve purely colonial and propagandist purposes. As a result, an individualised approach is crucial for the decolonisation of cultural heritage.
While decolonisation efforts in Ukraine gained significant momentum following the Revolution of Dignity, they have accelerated even more during the full-scale invasion. It is essential to recognise that, at the height of this process, Crimea remained under Russian occupation. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, Ukraine continues its efforts to address the decolonisation of toponyms in Crimea.
In 2015, four key laws on decommunisation were adopted, and in 2023, the Verkhovna Rada passed the important Law of Ukraine, “On the Condemnation and Prohibition of Propaganda of Russian Imperial Policies in Ukraine and the Decolonisation of Toponymy,” which laid the legal foundation for decolonisation efforts in Ukraine. However, there is still a lack of sufficient attention to these processes. When it comes to Crimea, it is impossible to plan a perfect scenario or legislative framework until the peninsula is de-occupied. Nevertheless, we are doing everything we can to effectively prepare for reintegration despite the challenges we face.
– One of the key issues surrounding Crimea is its future legal status. What should that be?
– Changing Crimea’s status would require amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine. However, under martial law, no constitutional changes can be made. Looking ahead, there is still no unanimous decision or consensus on Crimea’s status.
Public opinion surveys indicate that various groups within the population have differing views on this issue. We believe further work is needed, as a broad range of citizens must be involved in the discussion. A series of parliamentary and expert debates should take place, with the participation of representatives from indigenous peoples, including the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People.
– When it comes to indigenous peoples, what role should they play in the process of decolonising Crimea?
– Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks are an inseparable part of the diverse Ukrainian society. All three indigenous peoples originated in the territory of Crimea, and the peninsula is their only homeland. The decolonisation of Crimea is impossible without the restoration of rights and historical justice for the indigenous peoples, as well as for other ethnic groups living in Crimea.
For centuries, Russia has treated Crimea and its inhabitants as a colonial appendage. As I mentioned earlier, representatives of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people have been involved in efforts to restore historical names to settlements and geographical landmarks in Crimea. The decolonisation of Crimea is directly linked to ensuring the rights of indigenous peoples, which have been ignored by the occupying administration for the past ten years. This includes not only the restoration of basic human rights but also renaming settlements to their historical names, restoring education (including in the Crimean Tatar language), and more.
The rights of Crimean Tatars can only be guaranteed within the borders of the Ukrainian state. It is crucial to understand that a significant number of Crimean Tatars remain under Russian occupation, and only deoccupation will allow them to fully realise their potential and contribute to the decolonisation and reintegration of Crimea.
– Since the occupation of Crimea began, several hundred political prisoners, mostly Crimean Tatars, have been persecuted on criminal charges. What should the process of their return look like?
– As of December 2024, Russia has illegally imprisoned 218 individuals in occupied Crimea on ethnic, religious, and political grounds, 132 of whom are Crimean Tatars. Russia continues to exert pressure on Ukrainian political prisoners, degrading their honour, dignity, and religious beliefs. In Russian prisons, their health deteriorates, detention conditions become increasingly brutal, and they have little to no opportunity to contact or correspond with their families. Over 40 Crimean political prisoners have been unlawfully transferred or deported to penitentiary institutions in Russia.
At the start of 2024, the occupying administration illegally relocated at least twelve political prisoners from Crimea to prisons in Russia. Additionally, at least twenty more political prisoners have been unlawfully moved from Russian prisons to colonies in remote regions of the Russian Federation. These colonies are typically located thousands of kilometres from Crimea, often in areas where conditions of detention are particularly harsh.
A serious violation of the rights of political prisoners is the systematic denial of medical assistance. Many prisoners report deteriorating health—some had chronic illnesses before their imprisonment, while others became ill due to torture, psychological pressure, and the harsh conditions of detention. Currently, more than sixty Crimean political prisoners urgently require medical care.
It must be understood that there are no systemic, effective mechanisms for the release of civilian prisoners. The exchange of military and civilian prisoners takes place along separate tracks. As a result, the process of releasing political prisoners from Crimea is exceptionally difficult. Ukraine is using every available national and international resource to free these prisoners, exploring new communication channels with each attempt. This year, for the first time since 2019, thanks to the efforts of Ukrainian authorities, intelligence services, and the international community, it was possible to free Nariman Celal and Leniye Umerova, who had been held in Russian captivity for years. Ultimately, the most effective way to secure the release of our political prisoners in Crimea is through the liberation of the peninsula from Russian invaders.
– The occupying authorities in Crimea are actively issuing various documents, including Russian passports, which Ukraine obviously does not recognise. So, what happens next?
– Immediately after the occupation, the Russian authorities began forcibly assimilating the Ukrainian citizens who remained in the occupied territories. One of the key elements of this process was the illegal and coerced issuance of Russian passports. The occupiers created conditions in which access to basic services became nearly impossible without a Russian passport. For example, residents could be denied medical assistance or social services. Without a Russian passport, people might even be unable to bury their loved ones or prove ownership of property.
Those who refused to obtain a Russian passport faced direct persecution, including filtration measures, torture, illegal convictions, or deportation from their native Crimea. A notable example is Leniye Umerova, who rejected the Russian passport in 2014. In 2022, when she attempted to visit her seriously ill father in occupied Crimea, she was detained and held in Russian captivity for over two years.
National Ukrainian laws, as well as international law, do not recognise Russia’s forced passportisation of Ukrainian citizens in the occupied territories. After the deoccupation of Crimea, we will face a long and complex process of reintegration, as more than ten years of occupation is a considerable amount of time. During this period, thousands of people in the occupied territories were unable to obtain Ukrainian documents. Given this, it is crucial to understand that the documentation of citizens who lived under occupation, which is still ongoing, may cover a lengthy period. Therefore, approaches and working algorithms for this process should already be developed in advance.
– Another question many Ukrainians are asking is what we’ll do about the Russians living in Crimea, who probably won’t leave right away after the peninsula is deoccupied.
– Under Ukrainian law, all foreigners who entered Crimea after 2014 by bypassing Ukrainian entry-exit checkpoints or who violated the terms of their stay are considered to be residing there illegally. The clear and lawful response to this situation is that individuals living illegally in Crimea must either leave the peninsula voluntarily or face forced expulsion. Ukrainian legislation also allows for the forced return of foreigners and stateless persons. While this is currently not feasible in the temporarily occupied territory, this legal framework will serve as the basis for the future expulsion of Russian citizens from Crimea once it is deoccupied.
After the liberation of the peninsula, plans are in place to facilitate the departure of all Russian citizens who are illegally residing in Crimea. Their future and the possibility of returning to Ukraine will be determined in line with current Ukrainian legislation. Each case will be considered individually, taking all relevant circumstances into account. Ukraine is committed to ensuring the protection of the rights and freedoms of its citizens, as well as those of foreigners and stateless persons who are legally present in Crimea.
In addressing this issue, the Representation is examining international examples, particularly that of Croatia. After enduring significant destruction and heavy losses due to the attack by Serbia and Montenegro in the 1990s, Croatia was able to restore its independence and carry out territorial reintegration. Similarly, Ukraine will develop its own reintegration strategy, tailored to the unique circumstances of Crimea’s occupation, while prioritising the interests of its citizens and current realities.
– The Crimean Tatar language and education are crucial for Crimea’s reintegration. Ukraine currently has a Strategy for the Development of the Crimean Tatar Language until 2032. But is this enough, given the current state of the language? What should state policy be regarding the Crimean Tatar language moving forward?
– Educational programmes and cultural projects play a crucial role in preserving the identity of the Crimean Tatars and other ethnic communities in Ukraine. The development of language and cultural centres, support for youth initiatives, and the encouragement of creativity all contribute to cultural diversity and social integration. Supporting the Crimean Tatar people and their language is a key priority for the President of Ukraine and the Representation, which is actively involved in the work of the National Commission on the Crimean Tatar Language.
The reintegration of Crimea after its de-occupation will require a long-term and comprehensive approach, with coordinated efforts from state bodies, civil society, and international partners. Preserving and developing the Crimean Tatar language will also demand significant efforts. Ukrainian law, particularly the “On Indigenous Peoples” law, guarantees the development of the languages of indigenous peoples.
Ukraine fully supports the Crimean Tatar people’s initiatives to preserve and develop their national language. After the de-occupation of Crimea, indigenous peoples will have access to education in their native language on the peninsula. In fact, Ukrainian universities already offer programmes dedicated to the study of the Crimean Tatar language.
Additionally, the Global Coalition for Ukrainian Studies has been established to bring together global initiatives and programmes that support the development of Ukrainian studies, including Crimean Tatar studies. The coalition aims to ensure the accurate and professional study of Ukraine’s history and culture. It is also focused on promoting the decentralisation and decolonisation of East European and Slavic studies, which were once dominated by a Russian-centric perspective.
