In May 2025, the influential think tank RAND Corporation released a report titled “Dispersed, Disguised, and Degradable: The Implications of the Fighting in Ukraine for Future U.S.-Involved Conflicts.” Commissioned by the United States Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa (USAFE–AFAFRICA), this study is part of a broader series of five reports exploring the far-reaching consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Founded in 1948, RAND is an independent, non-profit research organisation that has long stood at the crossroads of research and strategic security planning. Its work has historically shaped U.S. military doctrine, especially in the wake of conflicts like Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. What sets this latest report apart is its focus on Ukraine’s battlefield experience as a blueprint for future wars.
What the report sets out to do—and how
Employing an inductive approach, the report’s authors closely examined tactical and operational combat in Ukraine, pinpointing emerging or under-explored phenomena. From these observations, they extrapolated potential lessons for future conflicts involving the United States — whether in Europe against Russia or in the Indo-Pacific against China.
The report is organised into five chapters. The second chapter provides a detailed analysis of eight critical shifts in the nature of warfare as witnessed in Ukraine. Chapters three and four explore how these trends might shape future wars. The final chapter offers concrete recommendations for US and NATO military leadership. The report’s purpose extends beyond merely documenting changes on the battlefield. It seeks to anticipate how Western militaries must evolve to meet this new reality. It covers not only the technologies now in use — electronic warfare systems, drones, situational awareness platforms, and decentralised command — but also the fundamental shifts in the philosophy and paradigms of war.
In this article, I won’t venture into the specifics of potential future clashes between the US and China or Russia. Instead, I will focus on how military doctrine is evolving — what the transformation of warfare in the 21st century means, particularly for Ukraine.
Eight lessons from Russia’s war in Ukraine
Modern war no longer unfolds along clear front lines or hinges solely on territorial gains. Instead, it has evolved into a fluid process where success depends as much on the ability to adapt to constantly shifting conditions as on tactical prowess.
Ukraine has increasingly become a testing ground for new strategies that are likely to shape future conflicts.
War today is best understood as a form of managed chaos. Victory no longer hinges solely on defeating the enemy outright but on disrupting and disorienting them by controlling the flow of information. This demands relentless adaptation and a fundamental rethink of how military operations are conducted across every level.
According to RAND, the battlefield has become more decentralised and flexible, leaving traditional centralised command structures increasingly vulnerable. The report argues that the focus must shift to smaller, autonomous units armed with advanced technologies. The authors highlight eight emerging trends that are collectively reshaping the future of warfare:
1. The mass deployment of UAVs
Drones have rapidly become an indispensable tool for reconnaissance, fire correction, and direct strikes—redefining the very concept of fire support on the battlefield. This shift has established a new tactical norm: no ground operation now commences without drone assistance. What began in 2022 as auxiliary devices, mainly used to adjust mortar and artillery fire, has by 2025 evolved into drones serving as the primary strike weapon. Assault units are now expected to include dedicated drone operators as a standard component. Looking ahead, it’s likely that every soldier will need training in drone operation.
2. Missiles and long-range drones
Long-range drones have emerged as a defining feature of the conflict. For Russia, that role is filled by the Shahed-136; for Ukraine, by models such as the Liut and Bobry. These drones conduct deep strikes against critical infrastructure, leveraging GPS guidance to achieve high precision when targeting warehouses, power substations, and bridges. What makes them particularly impactful is their low cost relative to other munitions: a single Shahed drone costs roughly $30,000 to $50,000, whereas a Kalibr missile runs upward of $1 million.
Going forward, the distinction between “cheap drones” and “precision-guided munitions” is set to fade even further. RAND forecasts that Western militaries will soon field loitering munitions capable of striking far behind enemy lines—at distances spanning hundreds, if not thousands, of kilometres.
3. Battlefield transparency
Continuous surveillance from drones and satellites has rendered the battlefield more open and exposed than ever before. The traditional “fog of war” has all but lifted—concealing troop movements has become nearly impossible. Enemy convoys are frequently spotted long before they reach the front lines. Technologies like Starlink, commercial satellites, and software platforms such as Delta enable near-instantaneous information sharing. RAND emphasises that in future conflicts, hiding manoeuvres will be extraordinarily difficult, fundamentally shaping both the speed and intensity of strikes.
4. Lack of air superiority
In the Russian-Ukrainian war, neither side has secured air superiority. Russian aircraft are regularly downed by Western-supplied air-defence systems, while Ukrainian jets face severe operational restrictions due to threats from S-300 and S-400 missile batteries. Consequently, air warfare increasingly relies on stand-off weapons—drones, guided bombs, and missiles—diminishing the effectiveness of traditional large-scale airstrikes. RAND points out that in a potential conflict with China, this challenge would be even more acute given the density of its air-defence networks. Western militaries will need to adapt to fighting without clear control of the skies, developing new tactics focused on manoeuvre, concealment, and operating under the constant threat of aerial attack.
5. The rise of cheap, expendable (attritable) systems
Ukraine loses thousands of drones and pieces of equipment each month—most of which are supplied through volunteer initiatives. On the Russian side, this manifests as “meat wave” assaults, where human losses are viewed as an acceptable cost. But the critical factor in sustaining a protracted war, RAND argues, is the ability to rapidly replenish both personnel and matériel. Their recommendation is clear: invest in systems that can be lost without significant financial or operational impact—replacing costly assets with cheap, disposable alternatives. For example, unmanned vehicles can lead assault columns, drawing enemy fire and absorbing the initial strikes, thus protecting more valuable resources.
6. Decentralised command
The rapidly shifting nature of modern combat requires frontline commanders to make decisions in real time. Since 2022, Ukraine’s military has empowered company and platoon leaders with greater autonomy. When units operate independently, traditional centralised command structures become ineffective. RAND identifies decentralised command as a critical advantage for future wars, especially compared to top-down militaries where orders are handed down and rarely questioned. However, this approach demands deep trust, rigorous training, and seamless, real-time information sharing—enabled by digital platforms like Delta or Kropyva.
7. Integration of electronic warfare and air defence
Both Russia and Ukraine are actively deploying electronic warfare (EW) across the board—from fixed installations to mobile air defence systems mounted on pickup trucks that can swiftly relocate. This capability allows for effective targeting of aerial threats and protection of troops at every level, including near the front lines. RAND argues that success in future conflicts will hinge on automated systems designed to detect and suppress threats, relying on flexible, rather than cumbersome, air defence networks deeply integrated at the tactical level. For example, infantry units will need their own compact EW systems capable of countering enemy drones at the platoon or company scale.
8. The hybrid role of commercial satellites and digital networks
Modern warfare has elevated technological services to the status of critical combat tools. Ukraine has shown how commercial infrastructure—like the Starlink satellite internet network—provides vital battlefield connectivity. Satellite companies such as Maxar and Planet Labs supply frequent imagery that Ukrainian analysts use to identify enemy equipment, track shifts in positions, and calibrate artillery strikes. Platforms like Delta, GIS Arta, and Kropyva integrate satellite images, drone feeds, and field intelligence into unified decision-making interfaces. Volunteers and tech enthusiasts bolster this ecosystem by creating everything from frontline mobile apps to logistical tools. Meanwhile, Russia actively attempts to undermine this digital backbone through cyberattacks, signal jamming, and assaults on data centres.
RAND argues that future wars won’t be won solely on the ground by manoeuvres and firepower. Instead, they will be fought—and often decided—in the digital domain, where securing dominance in cyberspace may prove more decisive than sheer conventional strength.
The report concludes with a series of recommendations aimed primarily at the Pentagon, but its underlying message is just as relevant for Ukraine. If Ukraine is already serving as the proving ground for the future of warfare, it should seize that position to shape its own strategic approach. The report stresses that future wars will be prolonged campaigns rather than short, decisive operations. This means that logistics, armaments, and training must be restructured to support sustained conflict over time.
A key priority is investing in the mass production of inexpensive yet effective strike systems, such as FPV drones and loitering munitions. The United States should scale up serial production of these technologies to prepare for a long-term war effort, while Ukraine would benefit from aligning its standards and engaging in co-production efforts to maximise efficiency and interoperability.
Maintaining informational superiority amid rising cyber threats requires accelerating the deployment of hybrid satellite architectures. At the same time, building a robust counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) framework is essential. This should integrate electronic warfare, cyber defence, kinetic interceptors, and automated detection to counter the growing drone threat effectively.
Training junior commanders to make independent decisions in the field is another vital recommendation. Militaries need to simulate scenarios where contact with higher command is lost and actively cultivate tactical initiative. Countries and armies that can rapidly adapt, decentralise command, and maintain control under pressure will hold a decisive edge over larger but slower forces. Achieving this demands a cultural shift towards flexible, risk-aware leadership within the military.
The report also highlights the importance of developing uncrewed maritime systems, which have already demonstrated their effectiveness in the Black Sea theatre. This points to a broader trend of integrating autonomous platforms across different domains of warfare.
On the logistical side, RAND advocates for a modular approach that allows rapid, local manufacturing and repair of critical systems—like drones, air defence, and electronic warfare equipment—without reliance on complex, vulnerable supply chains. This flexibility could prove decisive in sustaining long-term operations.
Digital front-line tools are another area of focus. Investing systematically in tactical maps, real-time data-sharing software, and intelligence and navigation platforms is crucial. The speed at which data is processed and decisions are made increasingly determines success on the battlefield.
The authors emphasize the importance of staying active in the information space. Responding quickly with sharp analysis and media pushback against enemy disinformation isn’t just optional anymore—it’s crucial for maintaining support at home and internationally.
Finally, supporting the development of digital infrastructure in partner countries will be critical. A nation’s ability to conduct modern warfare increasingly depends on the strength and resilience of its digital backbone—a fact that makes this investment a strategic imperative.
New strategic paradigm: war without victory?
The most valuable insight in the report goes beyond simply describing the evolving battlefield. Instead, it lies in how the authors perceive a fundamental shift in the paradigm of “future war.” They emphasise that the West must prepare for prolonged conflicts where “victory” is no longer defined as a definitive end state. Rather, success will hinge on managing the enemy’s vulnerabilities over time. The Russian war in Ukraine is framed not as a temporary incident, but as the new standard for future wars—where control over how events are perceived and interpreted becomes a critical strategic factor.
So, what does this really mean, and why does this section warrant a close reading of the entire, nearly 100-page report? The authors argue that the conflict in Ukraine is more than a contest of tactics and weaponry; it represents a shift into a new era of military thinking. This is a multidimensional, pixelated war without a clear beginning or end, marked by an ongoing struggle for initiative and advantage.
Wars of the future, authors contend, will no longer be confined by geography. Instead, they will unfold across multiple domains—cyberspace, outer space, the information sphere, logistical networks, and economic infrastructure. This complex, layered competition demands a comprehensive, long-term strategy that spans years, if not decades.
Victory will no longer be defined by capturing a capital city or forcing an enemy to sign an act of capitulation. Instead, the objective shifts away from “winning forever” toward rendering the enemy incapable of further aggression or resistance.
This is achieved by targeting their vulnerabilities across logistical, technological, social, and informational dimensions. The process is prolonged and complex—a multidimensional state of “managed instability” where success depends less on territorial gains and more on controlling escalation, wearing down the opponent, manipulating internal crises, gaining information superiority, and fostering societal adaptability.
In this context, the West needs to move away from aiming for quick, decisive battles and instead focus on long-term campaigns that wear down an enemy’s economy, social unity, resilience, and the legitimacy of its government over years—or even decades. RAND points out that, perhaps for the first time in history, the information space is as critical as the physical battlefield. The side that shapes the narrative first—and wins global acceptance of its version of events—gains a decisive strategic edge. Democratic militaries that embrace flexible command, rapid adaptation, and decentralised decision-making are better positioned to succeed in this evolving landscape. Still, authoritarian regimes often prove more aggressive and adaptable in the information domain, giving them a significant advantage over their democratic rivals.
RAND analysts argue that the US and NATO allies must come to terms with the fact that “victory” in modern warfare is no longer a singular, decisive event but a complex, multifaceted process. Rather than aiming for a clear-cut final triumph, the focus shifts to a prolonged campaign of attrition and careful escalation management, where maintaining advantage while avoiding critical strategic errors becomes paramount.
Central to this approach is controlling the information space—constantly shaping narratives and counter-narratives, interpreting events, and countering enemy propaganda. This control over perception is not only vital for building and sustaining international coalitions but also crucial for preserving internal cohesion and societal resilience.
In fact, how the war is perceived domestically, among allies, and on the global stage now holds more significance than control over physical territory. Information operations, emotional imagery, and the crafting of compelling narratives have emerged as a new kind of “precision weapon,” capable of influencing millions of minds far beyond the battlefield.
Perhaps one of the most important conclusions for Ukrainian society to acknowledge is that war no longer follows a clear beginning and end. Instead, it unfolds in cyclical waves of escalation, where periods of peace serve only as temporary pauses before the conflict reignites in a new phase.
This approach demands relentless adaptability, strategic endurance, and above all, political unity within societies. Any internal political divisions, attempts to sideline opponents, or the weakening of institutions risk handing a strategic defeat to democratically governed nations.
In response, RAND has outlined a new framework for understanding and conducting warfare in an era defined by global instability—one where chaos, technology, and information have become the most critical resources.
We must come to terms with the reality that 21st-century war is no longer a straightforward “combat operation,” but a managed, multidimensional process with no clear beginning or end. Tragically, Ukraine stands at the forefront of this transformation—not only as a combatant but as a blueprint for the future of warfare, effectively serving as the “testing ground” for a new military era.
While Ukrainians exemplify remarkable resilience and capability even under the most critical battlefield conditions, that alone is no longer sufficient. In the realms of information and beyond, Ukraine’s performance lags behind that of Russia, which has rapidly consolidated its economic and military resources, forging internal unity and societal cohesion in an impressively short time.
If we want to hold firm, the authorities must undergo a radical shift in both approach and behaviour. The information space needs to be cleansed of hostile tools like Telegram and TikTok, while prevailing narratives must be reshaped. Economic policies require urgent revision, and the destructive targeting of political opponents—whether at the central or local level—must cease, especially as the country prepares for elections that may never take place if we fail to endure this war.
What Ukraine truly needs is internal consolidation, not a torrent of internal information attacks launched from anonymous Telegram channels—many of which are reportedly controlled by the FSB. Without a fundamental change in strategy, our chances of surviving a prolonged, new-generation war against an authoritarian adversary are slim at best.
