Every week, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: the Oreshnik missile, Moscow’s new blackmail tactic, and an analysis of the Kremlin’s stance on negotiations and missile deployment in Asia.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Current developments after Russia’s Oreshnik missile strike: Moscow’s latest blackmail tactic. The central topic of the past week was Russia’s deployment of a new medium-range hypersonic ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, which Putin referred to as the “Oreshnik” during his national address. The official justification for this move was Ukraine’s use of Western long-range ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles against military targets in several Russian border regions. However, it is evident that this does not represent a new military threat. The Russian army has previously deployed units capable of carrying nuclear warheads against Ukraine. Moscow’s real objective appears to be escalating intimidation, particularly targeting European nations. This was the focal point of Putin’s speech, where, for perhaps the first time, the dictator publicly and explicitly threatened to use ballistic missiles against European countries. To bolster this threat, he claimed that the Oreshnik cannot be intercepted by any modern air defense system. The motives behind this blackmail are clear. As before, Moscow seeks to exert pressure primarily on EU societies, aiming to halt their governments’ military support for Ukraine.
- To counter this Russian strategy, the Ukrainian leadership must present arguments to neutralise this blackmail. For instance, throughout the war, Russia has repeatedly threatened the West with dire military and political consequences to deter further aid to Ukraine. Early in the war, Moscow claimed it would destroy weapon convoys in Europe, a threat it never carried out. The same pattern applies to strikes on military targets in occupied Crimea, the Belgorod region, and across Russia. Each time, Moscow issued warnings of severe repercussions yet consistently failed to follow through. A striking example is the United States and several European nations eventually granting Ukraine permission to use long-range missiles against Russia. For months, Putin publicly warned that such authorisation would signify NATO entering a direct war with Russia. This delay in Ukraine acquiring such capabilities reflected the effectiveness of Russian blackmail despite clear evidence undermining Moscow’s ability to carry out its “threats.” Today, the situation is telling. The use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles on Russian territory has not triggered any concrete retaliatory actions by Moscow against the United States or the EU. In fact, officials from Russia’s Foreign Ministry have shifted their stance, now suggesting that only the deployment of NATO troops in Ukraine would constitute an act of war.
- Moscow’s latest method of blackmail should be viewed in this context. Over the past week, following the Oreshnik missile strike, several Russian officials have intensified their use of “nuclear” rhetoric, referencing Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine and the deployment of a ballistic missile. As before, it is important to recognise that these statements are simply rhetoric aimed at a single objective: to weaken support for Ukraine by exploiting fears of Moscow’s actions.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Update on Russia’s stance on peace negotiations: Naryshkin’s remarks and Lavrov’s meeting with foreign ambassadors. Last week, Ukrainian Prism published an article suggesting that Russian authorities may have reverted to their earlier stance on peace negotiations. This refers to a return to the blackmail tactics initiated in June 2024, where Russia insisted it would only negotiate an end to the war if Ukraine ceded all territories in the four regions and abandoned its pursuit of NATO membership. Until the BRICS summit in Kazan last month, this stance remained entirely inflexible. However, following the summit, where Putin held bilateral meetings with leaders from India and China, several developments suggested Moscow might be softening its “ultimatum.” Notably, last week saw Putin’s first conversation with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in the two years since the war began. Subsequently, Russian authorities issued a statement that directly referenced the “June” ultimatum.
- It is now evident that Russia has resumed its ultimatum rhetoric. For instance, Sergey Naryshkin, head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service and a key figure among the siloviki, Russia’s so-called security forces, stated that Moscow is completely opposed to freezing the war under any circumstances. He also made it clear that Russia is only willing to negotiate under the terms outlined by Putin in June 2024, which include Ukraine relinquishing claims to four regions. Given that high-ranking Russian security officials rarely make public foreign policy statements, Naryshkin’s remarks should not be dismissed as mere propaganda.
- We also know that on November 29, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov plans to host a roundtable with foreign ambassadors to discuss “Russia’s assessment of the situation around Ukraine.” This high-profile meeting signals that Moscow intends to reaffirm its negotiation stance ahead of the inauguration of the new U.S. president, Donald Trump. All recent developments suggest that Russia has no intention of retreating from its ultimatum, which is expected to be reiterated during Lavrov’s meeting with the ambassadors.
- Russia may deploy intermediate-range and short-range missiles in Asia. Last week, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, widely regarded as a key negotiator with Western countries, announced that Russia is considering deploying medium- and short-range missiles in Asia. This, he stated, would be a response to the presence of similar American systems in the region. However, such Moscow’s move appears rather short-sighted.
- Firstly, deploying these systems is likely to strain Russia’s bilateral relations with several Southeast Asian nations, including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia. Additionally, tensions could emerge with China, as these systems may also pose security concerns for Beijing. Ukraine could leverage this potential instability in the region to bolster political ties with Southeast Asian countries, advocating for collective efforts to counter Moscow’s threats. This could also pave the way for military aid from some of these nations, with South Korea being a particularly notable candidate.
