On 25 April, Mali entered a new phase of its war as anti-government forces in the north launched a coordinated offensive against the pro-Russian government of Assimi Goïta. The main groups involved — the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), an al-Qaeda-linked Islamist organisation, and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) — are seeking greater autonomy for the Tuareg population in northern Mali and, ultimately, an independent state on Tuareg lands, including areas that stretch across neighbouring countries. At the same time, Islamist militants linked to the global ISIS network have stepped up their activities, although they remain at odds with the main opposition forces.
The offensive scored a series of early gains, raising the prospect of a Syrian-style scenario — a rapid collapse of the ruling regime similar to that of Bashar al-Assad. For now, however, the government has managed to slow the opposition’s advance, though likely only temporarily. In the opening days of the campaign, Tuareg forces took control of the northern city of Gao, while fighting erupted around the strategically important cities of Kidal and Mopti. Rebel units also pushed towards the capital, Bamako, with clashes reported in the suburb of Kati.
A contingent of Russian mercenaries from the Russian Defence Ministry’s Africa Corps, which backs Malian government forces, was based in Kidal. After clashes with rebels, Russian mercenaries were forced to withdraw from the city, suffering losses in the process. It sparked accusations that the government had stood by and done nothing, while dealing a significant blow to Russia’s image as a security guarantor in the region.
Bakary Sambe, director of the Senegal-based Timbuktu Institute, described the events as a “significant reputational blow” to Vladimir Putin in Africa. “The fall of Kidal and the humiliating Russian retreat, captured on video, have dealt serious damage to Moscow’s reputation and its ambitions in Africa,” he said. Mali-based analyst Ulf Laessing added that confidence in the Africa Corps could suffer as a result, arguing that the image of Russian forces retreating under pressure may deter potential future partners.
On 27 April, Mali’s defence minister, Sadio Camara, was killed in an explosion near his home. Junta leader Assimi Goïta took over the defence portfolio, while authorities launched a hunt for suspected spies within the government and carried out a wave of arrests. At the same time, the FLA and JNIM expanded their territorial gains, taking control of Tessalit near the Algerian border, Intahaka in a gold-mining area, and Ber, not far from Timbuktu. The situation in Tissit, Labbézanga and Ménaka remains unclear due to the presence of ISIS-linked militants.
In May, Mali’s army managed to hold on to key cities in the centre of the country, partially break the blockade of Bamako and recapture several northern settlements, including Labbézanga. The situation remains fragile, however. The junta continues to pursue a military solution to the conflict while seeking additional support from abroad. Reports on social media said a large Russian aircraft carrying military instructors and weapons arrived in the country on 6 May.
Support from Mali’s partners in the Alliance of Sahel States — the pro-Russian military governments of Niger and Burkina Faso — has also helped bolster the regime. On 1 May, Niger’s government said the joint anti-jihadist forces of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali had carried out “intensive air campaigns” in Mali following attacks by al-Qaeda-linked jihadists and Tuareg separatists. In response, Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, a spokesperson for the Tuareg rebels of the Azawad Liberation Front, urged Burkina Faso and Niger “not to interfere in the events unfolding in Mali”.
At the same time, reports of war crimes have once again increased. On 17 May, at least 10 civilians preparing to celebrate a wedding were killed in a drone strike carried out by the Malian army in the central San region.
Why the opposition is gaining ground
The alliance between the FLA and JNIM is tactical in nature, with the two groups pursuing very different long-term goals.
JNIM seeks to establish a Salafist Islamic state, while the FLA calls for self-determination for Azawad. Over the past year, however, during a period of relative calm in the fighting, the groups have reached a working consensus built around a shared opposition to the military junta. The junta has further damaged its standing through its reliance on Russian mercenaries, who have repeatedly been accused of abuses against civilians in rural areas. The alliance is likely to fall apart once the current authorities are removed, though that remains a distant prospect.
A key factor in the formation of the opposition alliance has been the role of the JNIM leader, who brings significant organisational and diplomatic experience. Iyad Ag Ghaly, also known by the nom de guerre Abu al-Fadl, is ethnically Tuareg.
In 1988, he became one of the founders of the Azawad liberation movement, and in 1996 took part in negotiations on autonomy agreements with the Malian government. In 2008, President Amadou Toumani Touré appointed Ag Ghaly to Mali’s diplomatic mission in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. According to researchers, it was during this posting that he embraced a radical form of Islam and established ties with jihadist circles.
Following the outbreak of a new phase of the conflict in Mali, Ag Ghaly founded the Islamist group Ansar al-Din. In 2017, JNIM was formed from this group through a merger with other jihadist organisations, with Ag Ghaly at its head.
Government and Russian propagandists have accused Ukraine of backing the rebels, although no officially confirmed evidence has been published. Alongside Ukraine, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are also seen as having an interest in the situation, as both seek to restore influence in the western Sahel.
Algeria, Mali’s northern neighbour, has taken a more ambiguous position. For decades, it supported the Tuareg movement, with rebel bases operating on its territory. At the same time, Algiers maintains a relatively pro-Russian stance and remains locked in a long-running rivalry with pro-Western Morocco. As a result, the issue of support for the Tuaregs has not been raised publicly in recent years. However, if the opposition continues to strengthen its position in northern Mali, Algeria could offer itself as a mediator or even provide direct support to the rebel alliance.
For now, the central government has managed to contain the rebel offensive, but a collapse of the regime in the coming months cannot be ruled out. Such a development would significantly weaken Russia’s position in the region and call into question the stability of pro-Russian governments in neighbouring Niger and Burkina Faso.
