More than 28,000 mercenaries from 136 countries have fought on Russia’s side in its war against Ukraine since 2022. The figures do not include North Korean troops, who number more than 14,000, according to the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War — a total that would, if added, put the contingent above the size of some European armies.
How they end up in Russia’s ranks varies widely, as do their motivations: from financial or ideological incentives to deception and outright human trafficking. The Kremlin has drawn on a broad mix of methods to replenish its forces while avoiding a wider mobilisation at home. The result, researchers say, is a system of what they describe as “predatory recruitment” of socially and economically vulnerable foreigners, which has become an increasingly important source of manpower for the Russian army.
The findings are laid out in a new report, “Combatants, Mercenaries or Victims of Human Trafficking: How Does Russia Exploit Foreign Fighters in the War Against Ukraine?”, published by Truth Hounds, an international non-governmental organisation that documents war crimes and human rights abuses, in cooperation with the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law (KIBHR). It is the second such report the group has published in as many months on fighters from countries of the so-called Global South in the Russian army. The previous study focused on mercenaries from Bangladesh.
At a Kyiv event last week marking the report’s release, officials and experts zeroed in on a question with growing urgency: how to stop Russia’s global recruitment drive. The discussion, titled “Foreign Fighters in the Russian Army: How Can the Global Recruitment Scheme Be Stopped?”, brought together Ukrainian officials, diplomats, human rights advocates and representatives of countries that have emerged as major “donors” of recruits to Russia, alongside the report’s authors. Speakers unpacked why foreign fighters sign up and the often coercive, opaque schemes the Kremlin uses to draw them in. They also compared how governments are responding, from prosecutions to prevention, and what more can be done to protect their citizens.
The trend line, they warned, is moving in the wrong direction. Five years into the full-scale war, the number of foreign recruits is rising sharply. Just 34 foreigners signed contracts with the Russian army in 2022; by 2026, that figure is projected to reach 18,600. The estimate was cited by Brigadier General Dmytro Usov, secretary of the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
The picture is far from uniform. Some countries that once ranked among the largest sources of recruits for Russia are now trying to stem the flow, as domestic pressure and closer coordination with Kyiv begin to yield results. Nepal, Cuba and Sri Lanka stand out as the clearest examples.
In Nepal, outrage from families caught up in the Kremlin’s aggressive recruitment drive forced the government’s hand. In January 2024, Kathmandu barred its citizens from travelling to Russia or Ukraine for work. Nepali media reported that the country’s newly appointed foreign minister, Shishir Khanal, spoke by phone last week with Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, with the fate of Nepali prisoners of war among the issues raised. The report also notes that Nepal bans its citizens from joining foreign armed forces, except in countries with which it has long-standing agreements.
At the same time, recruitment has surged from other parts of the world over the past two years — above all from Central Asia. Citizens from the region now make up the largest group of foreigners in the Russian army. According to the report’s authors, their number exceeds 10,000, though the real figure may be higher.
To compile the report, researchers conducted, among other work, 16 semi-structured interviews with foreign prisoners of war currently held in Ukrainian detention facilities. As the report notes: “The cases documented in this report span a wide spectrum — from individuals who voluntarily enlisted in search of financial gain to those who were deceived or coerced into joining the Russian army. This potentially makes them victims of serious human rights violations, including human trafficking, servitude, and forced labour.” In seeking out recruits, Russia has focused on countries facing acute economic hardship. Nepal, Cuba and Sri Lanka — all marked by high levels of poverty — were among the biggest “donors” in the early years of the full-scale war. According to the latest data, extreme poverty in Cuba stands at 89%, while in Nepal one fifth of the population lives below the poverty line.
Speaking at the presentation in Kyiv, Alexis Deswaef, president of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), put it bluntly: “The report debunks the myths that Russia is a friend of the Global South.” The evidence, he suggested, points to something far more cynical — the Kremlin exploiting poorer countries in the region for its own ends.
According to the report, Russia had already begun targeting migrants for recruitment before launching its full-scale invasion. Within just over a month of the war starting, between 400 and 500 migrants had signed contracts. Financial incentives remain the main driver for most foreign fighters who have joined Russia’s ranks.
Kazakh lawyer and report co-author Artur Alkhastov said during the presentation that ideology is also playing a noticeable role among recruits from his country. “In at least one third of the cases, we identified clear ideological motives,” he said. “Unlike other Central Asian countries, where financial incentives or promises of citizenship dominate, Kazakhstan shows a significant group of individuals driven by political or ideological reasons. This suggests that recruitment is shaped not only by economic vulnerability but also by narratives and Russian propaganda in Kazakhstan.” According to Alkhastov, around 2,000 Kazakh citizens had been recruited by Russia at the time of his presentation.
The findings also point to numerous cases in which foreign nationals were effectively coerced into signing up, with passports and phones confiscated and individuals held in detention until they agreed to join the Russian army. One such case involves a Moroccan medical student who was detained on the street in Ryazan by Russian security forces and taken to prison after authorities said his actual place of residence did not match the address listed in his documents. After being held and beaten in a pre-trial detention centre, he agreed to sign a contract with the Russian army. The authors mention that foreign students in Russia are emerging as a particularly vulnerable group for what the report describes as “forced” recruitment into the Russian army.
The report also notes that the Kremlin’s recruitment drive is not limited to men. The number of women among foreign fighters is steadily rising, with hundreds of migrant women reportedly recruited as cooks, cleaners and medical staff — and in some cases deployed in combat roles. It further cites reports of the Central Asian bureau of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, which says the Uzbek rights group Ezgulik has received letters from relatives of dozens of Uzbek women who claim they are being pressured inside Russian prisons to join the war against Ukraine.
Beyond documenting the scale and routes of recruitment into the Russian army, the report also lays out recommendations for governments in countries of origin, non-governmental organisations, the international community, transit states, Ukraine, and Russia itself.
