As Donald Trump steps up his criticism of Europe and questions mount over the durability of Washington’s long-standing promise to shield European allies from Russia’s nuclear arsenal, EU leaders are increasingly looking inward — weighing how to bolster their own deterrence instead of continuing to depend on the United States for protection.
Moves by some of America’s closest allies to chart their own security path without relying on U.S. support reveal just how unsettled European leaders have become by Donald Trump’s increasingly hostile stance toward the continent and the rising threat from Russia, NBC reports. The talks also signal a shift in Western security dynamics that could threaten decades of global efforts to limit — rather than expand — nuclear arsenals.
Across Europe, governments are exploring a broad menu of options. These range from upgrading France’s nuclear arsenal and deploying French nuclear-capable bombers beyond national borders to reinforcing French and other European forces along NATO’s eastern flank. More controversially, some discussions have even touched on whether countries without nuclear programmes could be given the technical means to develop them.
Speaking to The Ukrainian Week, Jack Crawford, a research fellow with the Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy group at the UK’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), argued that the idea of a European nuclear deterrent operating independently of the US nuclear “umbrella” is not only unlikely, but so far-fetched that treating it as a serious option runs against Europe’s own security interests. In his view, the debate risks pulling focus away from a far more achievable goal: building up conventional military superiority over Russia.
“It is difficult to imagine any European deterrent that would not rely on the British and French nuclear arsenals — even though the UK’s deterrent itself is technologically dependent on the United States,” Crawford says. “If any other European state were to pursue its own nuclear programme, it would breach its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and could actually make a Russian attack more likely. It is much easier to eliminate a nuclear programme in its early stages than to deal with one that is fully developed,” he told The Ukrainian Week.
He adds that any such scenario would immediately raise thorny questions about command and control, as well as who would actually make decisions for a European deterrent. A new UK–French nuclear steering group could, in theory, provide a template for how a European deterrent might be put into practice, but only with a clear roadmap for overcoming major financial and industrial hurdles.
“The combined stockpiles of the United Kingdom — roughly 225 warheads — and France, with around 290, look small next to Russia’s estimated 5,460 nuclear warheads,” Crawford says. “Without the US nuclear ‘umbrella,’ would Britain and France need to expand their arsenals to maintain a credible threat against Russian targets? The UK is already struggling with the financial and industrial demands of modernising its current force. Increasing Britain’s nuclear stockpile would mean a fundamental rethink of how the government approaches its nuclear industrial base, along with major shifts in its ‘minimum credible’ deterrence strategy,” he told The Ukrainian Week.
Russia’s edge is not just about the sheer number of nuclear warheads it possesses, but also about its non-strategic delivery systems, which give Moscow tools for limited nuclear signalling. As Darya Dolzikova, a senior research fellow with the Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme at RUSI, tells The Ukrainian Week, Britain has committed its nuclear deterrent to NATO, while France has long argued that its own deterrence carries a “European dimension”. In practice, this means Europe already relies on a measure of nuclear deterrence based on its own capabilities — not only on the United States.
“Nuclear deterrence is an exceptionally sensitive national asset. The United States, France and the United Kingdom each approach cooperation with allies on nuclear issues differently, but all three continue to guard decision-making over nuclear weapons as a strictly national responsibility — and that is unlikely to change any time soon.
That said, there is clear scope — and appetite — in both the UK and France for discussions on how to work more closely with allies on nuclear matters. The UK–France declaration at Northwood and the creation of the Nuclear Steering Group are examples of Paris and London’s willingness to deepen coordination on nuclear deterrence. There may also be room for more meaningful engagement with non-nuclear allies, whether bilaterally or in multilateral settings,” she says.
France has greater room for manoeuvre, thanks to a mix of sea- and air-based delivery systems. Britain, by contrast, is far more constrained: its submarine-based deterrent can deliver a retaliatory strike, but leaves little space for gradual, calibrated escalation without risking the exposure of its limited second-strike capability.
Beyond the UK and France, analysts are also casting their gaze northwards, to the idea of a Scandinavian nuclear deterrent. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden could begin to weigh what it would take to secure their own nuclear protection.
“Taken together, the Nordic countries would rank 12th in the world by economic size, with a combined GDP of $1.9 trillion,” says Norwegian Lieutenant Colonel Johannes Kibsgaard. “They also have the technology, industrial base and fiscal discipline needed to build a fully independent nuclear production chain comparable to France’s. A Nordic framework could offer both external legitimacy and internal reassurance. The Nordic states are already seen as stable democracies with no expansionist ambitions. A nuclear deterrent rooted in that tradition would be highly controversial, but it could be viewed as exceptional rather than revisionist.”
Jack Crawford tells The Ukrainian Week that while the latest US National Defence Strategy is more ambiguous than earlier versions about Washington’s commitment to extended nuclear deterrence, a second Trump administration has repeatedly said it intends to keep US nuclear weapons in Europe. For now, that makes any serious conversation about an autonomous European nuclear deterrent not just premature, but counterproductive.
“Europe should focus on turning its considerable untapped potential into a real, practical advantage over Russia. In her recent report, my colleague Darya Dolzikova argues that NATO’s non-nuclear allies should prioritise investment in ‘advanced systems such as missile defence, precision strike capabilities, and air defence.’ Unless the United States signals a potential withdrawal of its nuclear weapons from Europe, this approach is by far the most effective way for Europe to bolster its defence against Russia,” Jack Crawford says.
