In Warsaw, during a meeting of experts and representatives of the Polish government preparing for the URC 2026 recovery conference scheduled for June in Gdańsk, it was mentioned for the first time that serious political challenges unrelated to Ukraine must also be taken into account. However, unlike previous conferences, this time the environment has changed fundamentally – for both NATO and EU unity. The Greenland crisis, and the peak of its discussion in Davos, have confirmed this new reality. The events surrounding the Danish island are a litmus test of systemic changes in the world order that had been accumulating for years and suddenly became visible in a single, vivid episode.
No matter how this particular crisis ends – whether through a de-escalation of rhetoric, a revision of the 1951 Danish–American agreement, or yet another compromise – the macrotrends it has exposed will not disappear. Even if Trump backs down. Even if Denmark keeps Greenland. Even if NATO formally remains intact. Fundamental shifts in the nature of the international order have already occurred. The genie is out of the bottle.
What is happening around the Danish island reveals ten fundamental macrotrends. Understanding these trends is of existential importance for countries whose security has traditionally relied on transatlantic guarantees and the liberal international order. For Ukraine, the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania, the lessons of Greenland are not an academic discussion. It is a question of survival, a question of the ability of European civilisation to endure in a world of predators.
Foundations destroyed
Macrotrend 1: Death of universalism
After 1945, the world operated on a fundamental assumption: that there are universal principles – territorial integrity, human rights, the self-determination of peoples, the rule of law. Even when Great Powers violated these principles, they acknowledged their existence. Violations required justification. And those justifications, in turn, confirmed the legitimacy of the norms themselves.
Greenland breaks this assumption. The world’s most powerful democracy is openly demanding foreign territory from an ally and blackmailing its partners with tariffs for daring to show solidarity.
This is an outright rejection of the very idea of a universal order. The United States no longer speaks of universal values; instead, it speaks of a “civilisational alliance.” The new U.S. State Department strategy for 2026–2030 attacks “pan-humanism” as a threat to national sovereignty. Russia is building its identity around “traditional values” in opposition to “Western degradation”. China is promoting “Asian values” not as an exception, but as an alternative system.
This is no longer a multipolar world – many centres of power within a single coordinate system. It is a multi-centred civilisational world – parallel systems with incompatible basic principles. If there are no universal principles, everything else becomes possible. Sovereignty becomes a commodity. Imperial logic returns. Power triumphs over law.
Macrotrend 2: Erosion of trust
Trust in international relations has always been a fragile commodity. But for seven decades, the transatlantic alliance was built on a basic confidence: promises would be kept, commitments mattered, and predictability was more important than short-term gains. The sacrosanct Article 5 of the Washington Treaty signified an unconditional commitment in the spirit of Dumas’ novels – one for all, all for one.
After the Greenland episode, restoring trust has become virtually impossible. Public economic blackmail of the oldest allies for showing solidarity with another member of the same alliance was unprecedented. Trump may have “backed down” in Davos from the harshest rhetoric about the possible use of military force and partially retracted the tariff threats. But broken trust cannot be restored.
Now every European capital knows this: American guarantees are conditional. Promises are temporary. Support depends on the president’s mood that week—or even on which foot he gets out of bed with.
When the guarantor of the system shows that its word is worthless, every state in the world draws conclusions. China watches and sees that the West does not even protect its own. Russia takes it as confirmation that force matters more than treaties. Medium powers understand clearly: relying on others’ promises is a strategy for suicide.
For Ukraine, it is critically important to recognise that American “guarantees,” now openly tied to demands to surrender the non-occupied Donbas, are a fiction. What else Trump and Putin may have agreed on behind our backs in Alaska, or perhaps even earlier, remains unknown. Either way, Trump’s “guarantees” – promises of $800 billion in loans and investments instead of sanctions against the aggressor, justice, and reparations – are a sham. They are an attempt to sell defeat.
Macrotrend 3: Dismantling of democratic safeguards
The system of checks and balances is collapsing globally. Not in a single country, but as a structural phenomenon across different political systems simultaneously.
The Venezuelan vote in the U.S. Senate is a striking example. The legislative branch, which has the exclusive constitutional right to declare war, cannot even hold debates on limiting the president’s ability to initiate military action. Special Forces abduct the president of a sovereign state. Congress tries to discuss it and fails. The question is simple: if the legislative branch cannot stop something that has not yet happened, how will it stop what is already underway?
In Europe, institutions prove structurally incapable of resisting coercive pressure. The European Union has tools to counter compulsion: a common foreign policy and united economic power.
But using these tools against the U.S. risks a trade war, which would have a devastating economic impact primarily on Europeans themselves. And the U.S. president knows this very well.
Instead of sending Taurus missiles to Ukraine or taking other steps to demonstrate strength, Germany recalls the recently deployed contingent from Greenland (if 13 soldiers can even be called a contingent). The continent’s largest economy publicly avoids supporting one NATO member in a conflict with another. And let’s be honest – all because of the threat of tariffs. Even if this move is later reversed and no tariffs are ultimately imposed, Germany’s actions during the crisis are worth remembering.
And it’s not just about Germany. It’s a systemic inability to act. The European project is built on the assumption that rational actors, operating through institutions, are capable of delivering predictable results: all you need to do is create rules, build structures, and expect everyone to follow them — and that will guarantee stability and benefits.
The problem? Trump is not a rational actor in the way Europe defines rationality. European leaders are looking for a logic that simply isn’t there. Even in Ukraine, martial law creates a situation where speed of decision-making outweighs procedure, and effectiveness matters more than consultation.
The dismantling of safeguards does not mean formal usurpation. Constitutions remain. Parliaments convene. Courts function. But the balance of power shifts. The executive branch grows stronger. Oversight mechanisms weaken. The speed of decision-making increases — as does the likelihood of catastrophic mistakes.
Changes to rules and regulations
Macrotrend 4: Return of imperialist logic
The Congress of Vienna in 1815; the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885. Great Powers divided the world at negotiation tables, with no participation from the peoples whose lands were being traded. The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 introduced the principle of national self-determination. The San Francisco Conference in 1945 enshrined territorial integrity and the sovereign equality of states in the UN Charter.
Greenland offers a glimpse of a return to pre-Versailles-era logic. Public statements about buying another country’s territory. Economic sanctions against allies for refusing to sell land. Ignoring the will of the population as if it were irrelevant. And it is done openly, even demonstratively, as though it were completely normal.
The Venezuelan operation reinforces this trend. The abduction of the president of a sovereign state and their transfer to the U.S.; the establishment of temporary governance. Without UN sanction. Without an international court. Without diplomatic consequences. The conclusion is clear: if the force is sufficient and the domestic political cost is low, international law can be ignored with impunity.
What is the difference between Greenland and Crimea from the perspective of the logic of force? The U.S. uses economic blackmail. Russia used “little green men.” The difference in methods is important – the U.S. does not deploy military force, nor does it annex territory. But the underlying logic is the same: the strong take what they consider necessary for their security or national interests. And this provides Putin with a rhetorical justification.
Xi Jinping is watching the events closely – and the issue is no longer just Taiwan.
After the Greenland crisis, the South China Sea becomes a potential target for Beijing: its islands and waters, which China seeks to assert as its internal sea. As expert Mykhailo Honchar, head of the Centre for Global Studies, rightly notes, authoritarian regimes around the world are taking note. Territorial claims are being legitimised as a normal instrument of foreign policy.
Macrotrend 5: Commodification of sovereignty
Sovereignty ceases to be an absolute value. Instead, it becomes a commodity, a subject of trade, an asset with a price tag – at least in the security dimension.
Greenland is a commodity for purchase. Trump discusses the island in the same terms as real estate or a company. Price is the issue – a deal. The Venezuelan leadership is a commodity for abduction and replacement. Ukrainian territory in negotiations over “big deals” between Washington and Moscow becomes a subject of trade within spheres of influence.
But this is only the surface. The deeper process is that the sovereignty of small and medium-sized states is determined not by their rights, but by the willingness of great powers to respect those rights. And that willingness comes at a price – economic, geopolitical, transactional. Pay 5% of GDP on defence, and you get protection. If you don’t pay, you lose the “benefits of friendship.”
At the same time, the opposite process is underway. Economic sovereignty is becoming more important than economic efficiency. Just-in-time is giving way to just-in-case. Globalisation is reversing course, not out of ideology, but from a reassessment of risk. Two sides of the same coin: political sovereignty is being commodified – a commodity to be bought and sold. Economic sovereignty, by contrast, is sacralised – an absolute value for which efficiency is sacrificed. Both processes reflect a single narrative: the world is shifting from integration to fragmentation, from interdependence to autonomy, from universal rules to particular agreements.
Macrotrend 6: Normalisation of strong-arm tactics
The Overton window is shifting at an astonishing speed. The abduction of presidents of sovereign states. Territorial claims against NATO members. Economic blackmail of the oldest allies. All of this just in January. A year or two ago, such events would have sparked international scandals with unpredictable consequences. Today, they are discussed as a set of tactical options.
American media debate not the legitimacy of the Venezuelan operation, but its tactical effectiveness. Congress debates not the possibility of abducting other presidents, but whether prior consultations are needed. European analysts calculate the economic impact of the “Greenland tariffs,” rather than confronting the fundamental question: can one NATO member really blackmail the others?
This is not just a change in rhetoric. It is a transformation of the very ideas about what is acceptable in international relations.
Putin is watching and drawing lessons. If economic blackmail of allies has become a new normal, why should energy blackmail of neighbours be seen as abnormal?
What will become “normal” next year? Which tactics that seem unacceptable today will become standard foreign policy tools tomorrow? Just consider the spate of man-made accidents, power failures, and critical infrastructure breakdowns across Europe in January 2026 alone. The window is open – and it keeps shifting.
Macrotrend 7: Triumph of hard power over soft power
For 75 years, the international order has rested on a balance of hard and soft power. The concept of smart power combines coercion and persuasion – the carrot and the stick.
This balance is now being destroyed. Hard power is returning as the primary, and often the only, instrument of foreign policy. Soft power is being discredited as ineffective, naive, and weak.
Weaponisation is becoming a universal principle. Alliances turn into instruments against their own members – NATO is seen not as a guarantor of collective defence, but as a tool of coercion. Trade becomes a weapon – tariffs are imposed not for economic gain, but for political pressure. Humanitarian aid becomes a weapon – access depends on loyalty, not need. Technology becomes a weapon – artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and critical infrastructure are allocated according to political fidelity.
Migration is also becoming a weapon on both sides. Mass remigration is used as a domestic political tool. Refugee flows serve as a means of destabilisation. Energy remains a weapon – from Russian shelling of Ukrainian infrastructure at –20 degrees to the seizure of shadow fleet tankers.
The conclusion is clear: every area of cooperation can become a field of conflict. Even technical coordination now carries geopolitical risks. The world is growing more toxic because trust is impossible when anything can be turned into a weapon.
Structural consequences
Macrotrend 8: Fragmentation of global governance
This is not just a weakening of the UN or the World Trade Organisation. It is the deliberate creation of alternative structures that replace universal institutions with narrow, particularistic mechanisms.
Trump’s Peace Council in place of the UN Security Council. Ukraine and Russia are invited to the table without a ceasefire, without recognition of Russian aggression, and without the right to just punishment through reparations. The price of admission is a billion dollars. Bilateral agreements replace multilateral formats. Regional alliances replace global systems. Each major power creates its own platforms under its own rules.
China is not just competing with the West – it is building a parallel system. BRICS+ challenges the G7. A new development bank competes with the World Bank. The digital yuan challenges dollar hegemony. The authoritarian development model offers an alternative to liberal democracy.
Most importantly, China is becoming the hub for those challenging the West. Russia is under sanctions. Iran is under pressure. Countries are seeking alternatives to Western dominance. China is not just offering money – it is offering a whole system where Western rules don’t apply.
What does this mean? The world is no longer dividing into two blocs, as it did during the Cold War, but into multiple systems with different rules. Trade in one zone follows the WTO; in another, it’s governed by bilateral agreements. Technology in one zone is American, in another, Chinese. Security in one zone relies on NATO, in another on regional formats.
There is no single set of rules, making the world more unpredictable. What works in one zone often fails in another.
Macrotrend 9: Regionalisation of security
Instead of universal global security systems, the world is fragmenting into regional complexes. Different rules. Different guarantors. Different logic.
NATO is politically dead as an alliance of unconditional commitments, yet it survives as infrastructure. An alliance in which one member punishes others economically for showing solidarity with a third is no alliance at all. What remains are regional formats.
The Indo-Pacific has its own structures – AUKUS, the Quad, and bilateral U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea. The logic: containing China.
NB8+Ukraine forms a Nordic-Baltic axis. The logic: containing Russia without relying on the rest of Europe.
The Middle East is regrouping around new centres of power – normalisation between Israel and Arab states, and the isolation of Iran.
Africa and South America are fields of competitive struggle, where China currently holds a clear advantage.
Europe faces a choice it has been putting off for 75 years: is it capable of defending itself? Operation Arctic Resilience in Greenland is a rehearsal. Eight European countries are jointly sending troops to defend European territory from American pressure. Without American approval. Despite American threats.
Germany backs down first. In Davos, the U.S. opens the possibility of resolving the situation within NATO. But this is no longer about NATO. This is the seed of something else.
What does this mean in practice? If Russia strikes a Baltic state tomorrow – say, Lithuania – who will respond? Will Article 5 guarantees prove as hollow as those under the Budapest Memorandum? What will remain are regional coalitions of the willing. And if China moves against Taiwan, will the world respond, or will regional powers act in their own interests?
Macrotrend 10: Chaos as the new normal
The shift from predictability to controlled chaos is no temporary crisis – it is the system’s new normal.
Crises are multiplying. Attention is scattered. A sense of helplessness pervades. All of it paralyses opponents. While the West struggles to decipher Trump’s logic on Greenland, Putin seizes a window of opportunity. While Europe quarrels with America, China advances in the South China Sea. And while the world debates Iran, other autocracies take note, learning lessons about impunity.
Davos 2026 was meant to be a forum for supporting Ukraine. The Ukrainian delegation planned to highlight the weaponisation of winter by the aggressor as part of a genocidal war and to push partners toward decisive action. Instead, Greenland captured a significant portion of attention. European leaders are spending political capital on discussions about American pressure instead of coordinating aid to defeat a common enemy. Every day Europe’s attention is focused on Greenland is a day Russia can continue shelling Ukrainian cities with impunity.
Time becomes a weapon in this system. Europe is structurally slow – consensus, procedures, coordination among 27 states, vetoes from Orbán, Fico and Babiš. As Zelenskyy said in Davos, it’s a salad seasoned with enemies. Autocracies, by contrast, are structurally fast. Decisions in an hour, implementation in a day. This asymmetry in decision-making speed becomes a strategic advantage. Whoever controls the pace controls the outcome.
Events are outpacing Europe. A peace agreement is signed in the morning; by evening, the European Council meets to discuss its response – and leaves without a decision. European decisions take weeks. The structural slowness of democracies is becoming a fatal weakness.
Polycrisis as a multiplier
All 10 macrotrends do not exist in isolation. They overlap, interact, and amplify one another.
The world is grappling with overlapping crises: the technological decoupling of the United States and China, the climate emergency forcing millions to flee, demographic collapse in Europe and China, and the AI revolution reshaping labour markets faster than societies can adapt. On top of this, the transatlantic alliance is fraying, and great power competition is returning—now without the rules of the Cold War.
Each crisis on its own might be manageable. Together, along with the 10 macrotrends, they form a perfect storm. Systems designed to handle one challenge at a time crumble under the weight of multiple simultaneous shocks. Institutions built for a predictable world are paralysed by chaos. And leaders elected to maintain stability find themselves powerless in the face of turbulence.
Windows of opportunity are closing
One consequence of this system is the closing of windows of opportunity for democratic change. The West often fails to respond in time—or fails to respond at all. Once again, credit to the President of Ukraine for his speech in Davos, which highlighted vivid examples.
Iran, as of January 2026, is a case in point: nationwide protests, a tottering regime, and over 30,000 innocent people killed in the streets. Real potential for change existed. But Europe was celebrating Christmas, and America was preoccupied with Greenland. By the time politicians returned, the Ayatollah had killed enough people to cling to power. The window has closed.
Belarus in 2020 tells the same story. No one came to the aid of those fighting for freedom. The result? Russian Oreshnik missiles—like Russia’s nuclear weapons—are now deployed in Belarus, within range of most European capitals. As the President of Ukraine put it: “When you refuse to help a people fighting for freedom, the consequences come back, and they are always negative.”
These are not random failures. This is systemic incapacity. While attention is scattered, decisions are slow, and priorities mixed, autocracies consolidate. Opposition is crushed. Windows of opportunity close. And years later, the consequences return as security threats.
10 lessons from Greenland
The first lesson: Alliances are dead; only power remains. NATO, in the form it has existed since 1949, is politically dead—not legally. An alliance in which one member can punish others economically for fulfilling collective defence obligations is no alliance at all. Relying on transatlantic guarantees is like building security on sand.
The second lesson: Sovereignty is a commodity, not a right. Greenland illustrates this plainly. The sovereignty of small and medium-sized states is determined not by their rights, but by the willingness of great powers to respect them.
The third lesson: Broken trust cannot be restored. Even after Trump’s partial backdown in Davos, trust is gone. Every European capital now knows: American guarantees are conditional, promises are temporary, and support depends on the president’s mood.
The fourth lesson: European solidarity comes at a price. Germany’s capitulation in Greenland exposed the limits of European unity. The continent’s largest economy publicly refuses to support one NATO member against another. Why? A trade war with the U.S. would be economically devastating.
The fifth lesson: Europe’s division becomes normal. Greenland split Europe not in words, but in action. Eight countries sent troops to Nuuk, while Germany quickly capitulated. Italy and Poland openly stated they would not participate.
The sixth lesson: Economic weapons against allies are now legitimised. Before Greenland, sanctions were primarily aimed at enemies or authoritarian regimes. Now economic power is wielded against the oldest allies—and, increasingly, against anyone.
The seventh lesson: regional cores are replacing universal structures. The coalition of the willing in Greenland was not NATO—it was something new: a regional core willing to act despite American threats. The future of European security may depend on these ad hoc alliances, ready to pay the price for taking a stand.
The eighth lesson: “Security” justifies any claim. Trump frames territorial demands on an ally in the name of security – Russian and Chinese ships in the Arctic. When allies respond logically to this security threat with collective defence, it becomes clear that the real goal was something else.
The ninth lesson: Public humiliation replaces negotiations. In the old order, complex issues were settled behind closed doors. Greenland was different. The United States made public demands to buy an ally’s territory, issued public threats of tariffs, and openly humiliated Denmark and other European partners. This is not a failure of diplomacy—it is a new kind, where humiliation is a deliberate tool and publicity amplifies pressure.
The tenth lesson: Diversification is the only insurance. Relying on a single hegemon or security system is dangerously risky. Denmark trusted NATO for 75 years—and still found itself defenceless against a member of the same alliance. The solution? Build a network of bilateral and multilateral ties that do not depend on a single decision-making centre. In a world without rules, those with their own power—military, economic, technological—survive.
Choice of our time
Greenland marks a turning point. The world is choosing between two very different visions of the international order.
One model is built on rules, institutions, multilateralism, predictability, and long-term commitments—a system where trust is an asset and universal principles guide action. For 75 years, despite its flaws, it helped prevent global wars.
The second model is defined by autocracy, transactions, bilateral deals, unpredictability, and short-term calculations. Here, trust is treated as naivety, hard power trumps principles, and agreements are particular, not universal. It is a world that echoes the instability and catastrophes of the interwar period.
The balance is tipping toward the second model, but it is not too late to change course. Every day Europe spends debating instead of acting brings this new reality closer to normalisation.
Zelenskyy concluded his speech in Davos with the words: “The Groundhog Day must end. And yes, it is possible.” Possible. But only if those who have the power to change reality find the courage to act. Without action today, there is no tomorrow.
For Ukraine, the lesson is brutally clear: only the arena of force determines survival, where those able to defend their interests endure. We find ourselves among those whose interests will be ignored unless we are strong enough to command respect. It is not an optimistic conclusion, but a realistic one.
And it is realism – not illusions about the reliability of Western guarantees – that must define Ukraine’s strategy in a world that has chosen power over rules. A world where trust is dead. A world returning to imperial logic and normalising what was unthinkable just a year ago.
In this world, those who survive are able to use chaos as an opportunity rather than a threat. Those who understand that European weakness is a call for Ukrainian strength. Those who know that old alliances are dead, but new ones can be built. Those who recognise that guarantees do not exist, but that one can possess their own power – enough to be too dangerous to ignore and too valuable to lose.
These are the lessons of Greenland: harsh, but honest. Just like the world we will have to live in.
