By the summer of 2025, Russia’s Ministry of Defence was steadily tightening its grip on forces across the Sahel — in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic, all now led by Moscow-backed governments after recent military coups. For years, Russian influence in the region flowed through Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner network, but the once-feared private army is finally fading from power.
On June 6, one of Wagner’s Telegram channels announced it was pulling out of Mali after three and a half years on the ground. From now on, Russia’s military presence in the region is being handled by the African Corps — a force under the direct control of the country’s Ministry of Defence. Moscow’s partnership with the Malian authorities has also been officially recognised, marking a new phase in Russia’s effort to cement its influence in the region.
According to rough estimates, since mid-December 2024, around 1,500 African Corps personnel — including former Wagner fighters — have gradually arrived in Mali. The deployment has raised concerns within the country, partly because the process has been slow and partly because troops are waiting for clear instructions from command. Unlike Wagner, which could move quickly and strike decisively, the African Corps has so far avoided full-scale engagement in jihadist combat zones.
“Russia is not losing ground; on the contrary, it continues to support Bamako, now at a more fundamental level,” the African Corps said in a statement. Beyond the Corps itself, “Russian security advisers intervene where mercenaries operate,” reports Al Jazeera correspondent Nicolas Haque, based in neighbouring Senegal. Ulf Lessing, head of the Sahel program at Germany’s Konrad Adenauer Foundation, told Reuters that while “Russian military activity in Mali will continue… the focus may shift to training and supplying equipment rather than fighting jihadists.”
Meanwhile, open-source intelligence and exchanges on social media and Telegram channels suggest that 70–80% of African Corps personnel are former Wagner fighters, proving that the once-feared private army still holds significant influence.
African prisoners of war
One of the African Corps’ main goals is not just to maintain control over puppet regimes, but also to build up mercenary forces for Russia’s war against Ukraine. That is becoming increasingly clear in the growing number of cases where individuals from these countries — or their neighbours — have been captured by Ukrainian Armed Forces. Most claim they ended up in the Russian army by accident, though that is probably only true in some separate cases.
At the end of June, the Ukrainian Armed Forces captured two Cameroonian mercenaries on the Siverskyi front, according to the 20th Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment. The prisoners said they had been forced to sign contracts with the Russian military, insisting they had originally been travelling to Russia to work in shampoo factories and study dentistry. In the end, Metugena Una-na Jean Pafe and Anatole Frank were persuaded to join the Russian army, with a promised reward of 1.1 million rubles. The prisoners also reported that fighters from China and Zimbabwe are operating in the same area.
“I had no choice. I was forced into it. They offered me a spot in the army, then took my documents and belongings and made me change clothes.” In an interview, the African mercenaries said they, along with others, were detained by the Russian immigration authorities, had their fingerprints and personal data recorded, and were pressured into signing contracts with the Russian army. When they refused, they were locked in a cell — only to be “taken to the army” later. How much of these accounts can be verified, however, remains unclear.
This isn’t an isolated case. In early May, Ukrainian forces captured several Togolese citizens. And in early July, fighters from the “Freedom of Russia Legion” — a unit within Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence made up of Russians fighting for Kyiv — captured a foreigner, Kehinde Oluwagbemileke, on the Zaporizhzhia front. The Nigerian-born man had been a student at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics and was pulled into the war against Ukraine with promises of quick pay and a supposedly ‘safe’ service.
The geography of Russian recruitment is expanding. It’s no longer confined to countries seen as neutral toward Russia, like Cameroon — it now reaches relatively pro-Western states such as Kenya.
On September 17, Ukrainian forces reportedly captured a Kenyan citizen serving in the Russian army along the Vovchansk front in the Kharkiv region, according to the 57th Motorised Infantry Brigade.
The man, who identified himself as Evans and said he had been an athlete in civilian life, explained that he had travelled to Russia as a tourist and was deceived into joining the army. “I ended up in Russia without knowing I had been recruited into the Russian army. I had never served before,” Evans said in a video released by the brigade. Fearing for his life, he defected to Ukrainian forces, who provided him with food and water. He added that had he returned to the Russian army, he would have been killed immediately. Evans also noted that among the new recruits were Russians, Belarusians, Tajiks, and other Africans.
Still, questions remain over the veracity of his account — particularly whether his deployment was truly involuntary.
Cheap labour
For Russians, Africa is gradually becoming a new source of labour, at least in sensitive sectors. Workers are being recruited to fill roles in Russian defence enterprises, including the drone production complex in Alabuga, Tatarstan. Until recently, this work relied largely on migrant labourers from Central Asia, particularly Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
But rising Islamophobia and ethnic tensions in Russia have made migration from former Soviet republics increasingly complicated. At the same time, radical jihadism has been spreading among Central Asian diasporas amid growing Russian chauvinism — most starkly seen in last year’s attacks at Moscow’s Crocus Hall. Using Russian-speaking Muslims from neighbouring countries in defence factories is now considered risky, due to fears of terrorism and possible influence from Ukrainian intelligence.
By contrast, recruits from distant West African countries — mostly women — are seen as a safer option for Russia’s defence industry, both ethnically and culturally.
Women are being recruited through social media, intermediaries, and influencers operating across African countries. Some are tasked with assembling drones, while others work as cleaners, waitresses, or machinery operators. Even Russia’s and China’s partners view these recruitment drives targeting their citizens with concern.
For instance, in August, the South African government launched an investigation into reports that Russian companies were recruiting young women through TikTok and Instagram ads, under the pretence of BRICS-related cooperation and supposedly for jobs in hospitality and construction. Research indicates that up to 90% of these women are instead sent to Alabuga to assemble kamikaze drones.
