Lesia Orobets is a Ukrainian politician and public figure, a former member of the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, currently serving as Ukraine’s international advocate for the Sky Shield project. In this interview with The Ukrainian Week, she discussed the scale and quality of Western support for Kyiv, the threat of a Russian attack on the Baltic states, and how Ukrainian diplomacy has evolved throughout the war.
— Your trips across Europe focus on negotiating security assistance for Ukraine, particularly the Sky Shield project. Who’s actually listening, and how are they responding?
— Over the past few months, NATO countries in Europe have started to grasp that the U.S. is gradually pulling back its military footprint and involvement in European security guarantees. Take the recent NATO exercises in Estonia, for example—called “Hedgehog,” where every spike matters. Ukrainian drone operators participated, and the exercises exposed just how far behind many European nations are, particularly when it comes to understanding how warfare has evolved. With drones now a major factor on the battlefield, traditional assets like tanks have lost much of their edge. Tanks have become easy prey for those drones.
Ukraine was able to show just how vulnerable our European partners would be in a real conflict. And remember—they were still operating within the rules of war, unlike the Russians. At the very least, military leaders now realise that training and retraining aren’t optional—they’re essential. This also demands a fundamental rethink of defence budgets and priorities. My message is clear: focus on training. We can run exercises on our own ranges, share enemy tactics, and teach how to respond in different situations.
— The French press has reported warnings from German intelligence that Russia might be considering an attack on one of the Baltic states. How real is that threat?
— It’s very real. There’s a high chance something could happen within the next few months to six months. If it does, it’s absolutely in Europe’s interest to hold the line and remain a strong geopolitical player. That’s why retraining European troops is not just necessary—it’s urgent.
Regarding the Sky Shield program, we’re pushing to secure airspace, at least over the regions where training is underway. I truly believe this would be a win-win for everyone involved.
— And how’s that push going?
— It’s a bit of a balance—there’s definite progress, but plenty of challenges still to overcome.
— Let’s start with the progress!
— The good news is, there is a clear political will to activate the Sky Shield project if a frozen conflict emerges. The bad news? Many in Europe genuinely believed Putin might agree to a deal—largely because Trump suggested it. But for every master negotiator, there’s an equally shrewd opponent on the other side. In reality, Russia’s offensive campaign never stopped. Our partners’ hesitation and cautious “wait and see” stance during negotiations only gave Russia time to regroup, reorganise logistics, and prepare even more devastating strikes.
— Which countries are on board with Sky Shield?
— The UK, France, and about a dozen others are ready to support the project in various ways—some contributing aircraft, others funding or political backing. Planning is already underway, and there’s a military strategy on the table.
The downside is that Russia never intended to agree to any kind of ceasefire from the very beginning. And now we face new challenges—ones Europe is still struggling to address.
We’re encouraged by recent statements from German generals suggesting Europe is ready to step up and fill the gap left by reduced American support for Ukraine. And it’s clear that as long as the U.S. doesn’t block weapons sales, we’ll somehow manage to get by. But beyond funding and arms deliveries, what can Europe actually do? Right now, there’s no clear answer. Everyone’s anxiously awaiting the NATO summit.
There’s plenty of speculation—and concern—about how severe the situation might become. The official discussions will focus on defence spending targets, like the percentage of GDP to allocate. But what happens behind closed doors? I suspect the U.S. will make it clear that its resources will become a commodity to compete for. In other words, it will come down to which countries American troops are willing to defend—and which they won’t.
I expect the U.S. will also demand something in return: purchasing American weapons, making geopolitical concessions, or showing flexibility on trade and economic issues. After all, Europe is the world’s largest single market, and with Trump’s focus on balancing trade, the pressure could be intense. I don’t think the U.S. will pull out of NATO—that’s not in its interest—but things are definitely about to get tougher for Europe.
— So, can we say that, in a way, Trump is pushing Europeans to ‘grow up’? Almost an unintended side effect of America’s geopolitical self-interest?
— It reminds me of something Ivan Franko, a famous Ukrainian poet, once wrote: “Fear gave the poor man strength.” We sometimes joke that Trump isn’t a Russian agent, but rather a deeply embedded Ukrainian one. Honestly, though, I think we’ve hit a psychological turning point where, no matter what happens, we’ll find a way to turn it to our advantage.
When I was studying international relations and diplomacy, I used to look at Israel with envy—how they managed to combine incredible flexibility, creativity, and asymmetric tactics in both defence and diplomacy. It was something to aspire to.
And here’s the takeaway: be careful what you wish for, and be very precise when you do, because now we really are another Israel. We’re remarkably resourceful in defending ourselves and just as inventive in diplomacy. Not because Trump has helped us much—he hasn’t, at least not so far—but because we’ve learned to make the most of any situation. It’s become a kind of survival sport. Still, despite himself, Trump has managed to push Europe closer together.
But it’s not in his interest to paint everything in black and white. On the contrary, it suits him to keep things hanging in the balance—letting some countries cling to the hope that everything will be fine, that NATO’s Article 5 will come through. But that kind of game could come at a devastating cost—especially for the Baltic states. Unlike Ukraine, they lack operational depth. If Russia launches a coordinated wave of aggression, backed by hybrid and cyber warfare, I fear Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia might not even get a chance to respond.
The challenge for Western countries isn’t just military readiness—it’s that their political leaders haven’t developed the habit of making swift, decisive decisions and moving quickly to implement them. Simply put, they’re not prepared for the world as it is today.
Remember that infamous 7 a.m. call to Trump, when Macron and others tried to coordinate a response? Where are those sanctions now? Did Russia’s stance change? Quite the opposite. While that call was happening—as we now know—Russia was gearing up for an even larger missile strike. It was only thanks to Vasyl Maliuk and his “Spider Web,” along with the courage of dozens, hundreds of our brave men and women, that the plan was thwarted.
Why was the Spider Web operation launched? Because while Russia was pretending to negotiate and pushing a so-called memorandum—which, frankly, we’re walking away from anyway because it’s not a memorandum but a betrayal laced with humiliation—they were secretly preparing a massive missile strike on Ukraine. That’s why strategic bombers were massing at airfields, and missiles were being transported in truckloads. Satellites picked it up; Ukraine’s intelligence caught it. Thank God we managed to create a kind of “sky shield” to counter it.
— You talked about the need to frame personal hopes carefully. Since 2014, many have hoped that the millions of Ukrainians living in Russia would open a “second front” against Putin’s regime. Why hasn’t that happened? Or is there someone quietly supporting us after all?
— I have two answers. First, the Spider Web operation proved we do have agents inside Russia. But remember, there are about ten million Ukrainians living there, and back here in Ukraine, a large number of ethnic Russians are fighting alongside us. Second, it’s not about ethnicity or blood—it’s about personal choice. This is a war between the citizens of a free country and a state that wants to keep its people in chains.
Let’s look at the Chechen elite as an example. In the 1990s, Chechens endured two brutal wars of extermination. There isn’t a single Chechen family that didn’t suffer losses. The cruelty they faced was unimaginable. Back then, there was no Facebook or Instagram—no videos capturing the horrors. What we know comes only from the accounts of Chechens who managed to escape to Germany or France.
Yet, less than twenty years later, much of the Chechen elite had been reshaped into something like a palace guard for Moscow.
Moscow is a master at manipulating national elites—destroying some, co-opting others. That fear, the determination never to provoke a third Chechen war, has transformed into loyal service.
Still, the Chechens fighting on Russia’s side have proven highly ineffective in battle. Meanwhile, the Sheikh Mansur Battalion [Chechen unit fighting on Ukraine’s side – ed.] is fighting brilliantly.
— You mentioned the lack of geopolitical education in the West. How’s the situation in Ukraine?
— Ukrainians have paid a heavy price for this education, but now we’ve become experts in European electoral cycles. We watch the elections in the Czech Republic with concern, actively debate what the Polish vote might mean for us, and know the U.S. midterms are just around the corner. These conversations happen everywhere—even on benches outside apartment buildings. It’s a kind of real compensation for decades of neglect on these issues.
But this isn’t driven by goodwill. We understand just how dependent we are on our allies. That’s why we have to stay fully informed about what’s happening with them. It’s also easy to see why Europeans aren’t focused on geopolitics—when you’re not under fire, when missiles aren’t falling, and your biggest headache is rising chicken prices, daily life takes up all your energy.
Honestly, I’m genuinely surprised and heartened that, four years into a full-scale war, activists and organisations here haven’t fallen apart. Somehow, they still find the resources, funding, and strength to keep going.
— How has Ukrainian diplomacy changed throughout the war?
— We’ve become far bolder. Since 2022, I often catch myself thinking, “Wait, were we even allowed to say that?” Just plainly stating, “No, we won’t accept that; it doesn’t work for us.” And our partners are listening. They’re no longer trying—like back in 2014—to solve everyone’s problems at our expense. First and foremost, we now fully grasp the cost of those compromises. When we clearly lay out our negotiating position—that we won’t legitimise any territorial occupations, and we’re not open to restrictions on joining alliances—we pay for that courage in blood. I’ve studied diplomatic protocol extensively, and I understand its importance. But for us, this is about survival. The more effective we are, even if it means bending protocol, the better our chances.
In diplomacy, we’ve become boldly assertive and quicker to act, with many examples of successful collaboration between official and unofficial channels. That said, from my perspective, there’s still plenty of room to grow.
— You mentioned that the toughest counterparts in negotiations are those who are indifferent. What percentage of the people you deal with would you say fit that description?
— It’s more than just tough—it’s what leads to burnout. I remember one moment clearly. I was laying out the value of the “Sky Shield” strategy: how it helps the armies of the countries supporting us prepare for any likely attacks, how it could protect Europe from a migration crisis if, God forbid, we face another blackout, how it would make us stronger economically and energy-wise. Then, the very first question from a Canadian MP was: “But why don’t you say it will save your people?” That hit me hard. Because for the previous two months, I’d mostly been dealing with an American-style approach—basically, “What’s in it for me?”
I still get goosebumps thinking about it. After spending weeks and months trying to convince indifferent, deaf audiences who keep asking, “What’s in it for us?”—coming across someone who truly understands and sees far beyond the surface gives you a real boost. I remember pushing through that trip, utterly exhausted, sustained only by the energy that comes from engaging with someone who genuinely cares.
It’s in our interest that our allies have strong, persuasive arguments at their disposal. It’s in our interest that they’re convincing. And it’s in our interest to offer them solutions that let them demonstrate their own strength and capability—not weakness. Sky Shield is exactly that: a way for Europe to show real strength and send a serious warning to Putin against any escalation aimed at the destruction of Ukraine—the very thing the Russians want and plan for.
