Is Ukraine once again facing the threat of a halt to US arms supplies? Can the country cope without Washington’s backing, what role will Europe play, and how might this reshape the balance of power on the battlefield?
More grim news — once again
On July 2, Ukrainians were dealt another blow: a pause in U.S. military aid. Unlike the March suspension, which came amid a high-profile dispute between the White House presidents, this time no clear explanation was provided.
Some news outlets wrongly reported that sanctions on Russian banks had been lifted, misinterpreting a document related to Syria. Still, many interpreted the move as a full-scale “betrayal” by President Trump and his administration, believing Washington was abandoning Ukraine to the Russian aggressor.
Later that day, U.S. State Department spokeswoman Tammy Bruce addressed the situation, saying the U.S. was not ending weapons shipments but temporarily pausing to reassess stockpiles and defence readiness. “Our position has not changed. But its implementation will depend on the principle of America First,” she said, without specifying what that meant for Ukraine.
After the March suspension of US aid, The Ukrainian Week noted that while the situation would be challenging, it wouldn’t be catastrophic — thanks to two key factors. First, Europe’s defence capabilities are steadily growing, with a rising capacity to supply us with the weapons we need. Second, Ukraine is ramping up its own arms production. Now, let’s take a closer look at how far these factors could carry us if the US were to withdraw its support completely.
European efforts
Europe has a powerful military-industrial complex, but it is not yet capable of fully replacing all forms of American aid. The defence sector faces significant challenges: a lack of cohesion, fragmented supply chains across different countries, and chronic underinvestment. Together, these problems are slowing the continent’s military build-up.
Take artillery shells as an example. Since the full-scale war began, the US has supplied Ukraine with over 3 million 155mm shells. Europeans are trying to catch up — in February 2023, their annual production was around 300,000 shells, and today that number has risen to about 1 million. Brussels has set an ambitious target of 2 million shells per year, but it remains uncertain when this will be achieved.
Ukraine remains wholly dependent on the US for HIMARS systems and their ammunition, as well as ATACMS missiles. The crucial role these weapons play in targeting Russian logistics hubs, command centres, ammunition depots, and troop concentrations is widely recognised. Currently, Europe cannot provide a large-scale alternative.
One possible scenario is that European countries might provide funds for Ukraine to purchase replacements from South Korea, Israel, or elsewhere. Yet it remains uncertain whether these countries are willing—or even able—to sell us such weapons, particularly if they contain American-made components.
The most urgent concern is air defence. Only US-made Patriot systems can intercept ballistic missiles, so any halt in the supply of interceptor missiles would leave us more exposed to Russian strikes on our rear areas. This is especially worrying given the increasing focus of the aggressor on ballistic missile attacks against Kyiv and other major cities, often aimed at terrorising the civilian population. Europe is stepping up production of air defence systems that are at least effective against cruise missiles. Ukraine already has, and will continue to receive, more Italian-French SAMP/T systems, Norwegian NASAMS, and German IRIS-T.
Still, without a steady supply of Patriot systems, Ukraine’s air defences will remain incomplete.
Another critical area where Europe cannot fully replace the US is intelligence. American satellite data has been vital in Ukraine’s ability to locate and rapidly strike targets, both in occupied territories and deep behind enemy lines. Without this support, the effectiveness of our strikes could be severely diminished.
Ukraine’s progress
Since the war escalated into a full-scale conflict, Ukraine has rapidly increased its weapons production. According to BBC Monitoring, by early 2025, the country was meeting around 30% of its military needs with domestically produced arms, while President Zelensky has claimed the figure is closer to 40%. Beyond expanding its own manufacturing, Ukraine has also formed joint ventures with foreign companies like Germany’s Rheinmetall and France’s Thales.
Perhaps the most striking success has been in drone production. As far back as August 2024, Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported that 96% of Ukraine’s drone requirements were being fulfilled by domestic manufacturers. It is thanks to these homegrown designs that Ukraine was able to push the Black Sea Fleet out of Crimea and intensify strikes deep into Russian territory.
Between 2023 and 2024, Ukraine ramped up its artillery shell production from 1 million to 2.5 million rounds across all calibres—not just 155mm. The country’s defence industry now employs over 300,000 people across more than 500 state-owned and private enterprises.
Despite this significant progress, Ukraine remains dependent on foreign military aid for 60 to 70% of its defence needs. A substantial portion of its domestic production still relies on imported components. The country has yet to produce enough surface-to-air missile systems, which are vital for protecting both the front lines and rear areas. Ukraine also depends on Chinese parts for manufacturing drones and electronic warfare equipment. Meanwhile, Russia continues to launch near-daily strikes against Ukraine’s defence infrastructure.
Balance of power on the battlefield
If the US does go ahead and cut military assistance, Russia will probably step up its activity on the battlefield—especially as its own economy rapidly worsens. While a sudden breakthrough on the front line seems unlikely, defending territory without US-made systems will come at an ever-increasing cost for Ukraine.
That said, much like in the first half of 2022, when foreign aid was just beginning to arrive, Ukraine will find ways to adapt. The growing shift towards replacing manpower with drone capabilities is likely to play in Ukraine’s favour.
Any shortfall in US intelligence data could be partially made up for by the capabilities of the EU and the UK. It’s also possible the US might still be willing to sell some of the weapons Ukraine needs—either directly or through European partners.
If Washington chooses to cut off supplies entirely—whether as aid or through sales—Ukraine’s long-term prospects will depend on three uncertain factors: Europe’s ability to rapidly scale up its own production; Ukraine’s capacity to gain an advantage through innovation, especially in drone technology; and the pace at which both of these developments take hold.
If US assistance is suddenly halted, Ukraine would almost certainly face a temporary decline in its combat capabilities. The aggressor will seek to exploit this window of vulnerability before Ukraine can fully adapt. What follows will hinge on how successfully Ukraine can mount its defence during this crucial period.
Undermining recent gains
American journalist Noah Rothman argues that abandoning support for Ukraine would completely undermine the message Washington sent to the world after its strikes on Iran. In his view, Ukraine’s defeat would inflict far greater damage on the US’s global standing than any prestige gained from its declared success against Tehran. Crucially, he warns, the withdrawal of US backing for Ukraine would send a green light to China, which has so far held back from attacking Taiwan.
At the same time, the arguments of those opposing continued aid run counter to the narrative of US strength—a narrative President Trump often champions. They claim America lacks sufficient weapons stockpiles to defend itself against aggression from China or other adversaries, and insist the US should focus on its own needs rather than a distant Eastern European country that, as they frequently remind us, was part of the USSR just a few decades ago.
But somehow they forget that the aid package approved last year for Ukraine was designed primarily to replenish the US’s own stockpiles. Much of what we receive is outdated weaponry — like AIM-7 air-to-air missiles dating back to the Vietnam War. Such arms would hardly be decisive in defending the US itself against foreign aggression. Meanwhile, billions of dollars are being poured into producing cutting-edge weaponry that isn’t sent to Ukraine but stored in American warehouses.
Right now, the fate of US aid to Ukraine remains uncertain. Yet it’s clear to everyone that cutting support would greatly increase the risk of turning all of Europe into a battlefield — a conflict in which America stands to lose far more than the relatively modest sums it currently spends on assisting us.
