Russia’s full-scale war has prompted Ukrainians to pay closer attention to events unfolding in distant corners of the world. The positions countries take — to varying degrees — shape Ukraine’s diplomatic standing and determine the level of political backing it receives. That, in turn, influences how willing states are to provide military and technical support to Ukraine — or, on the flip side, to offer assistance to Russia, whether openly or behind closed doors.
‘African Corps’: building influence and recruiting for foreign wars
Recently, Ukraine’s Armed Forces captured several African nationals fighting as mercenaries for Russia. In Toretsk, soldiers from the 49th Separate Rifle Battalion “Carpathian Sich” detained a citizen of Senegal. According to his account, he had studied in Russia for two years and originally planned to emigrate to Germany. Instead, he was told to head to the front, earn some money, and then move on. He was even told that it would be easier to reach Europe through Ukraine.
Fighters from Togo have also been captured on several occasions. The Togolese government has confirmed that dozens of its citizens are serving as mercenaries in the Russian army. Both Senegal and Togo are officially neutral, pro-Western nations within the French sphere of influence. Still, Russia is clearly working to expand its recruitment and presence across West Africa.
Cameroon has been hit particularly hard. Since 2024 — and especially in early 2025 — reports have been mounting of Cameroonian citizens being recruited to fight in Russia’s war against Ukraine. The African Security Research Institute has flagged this trend, and Cameroon’s government has tried to push back. But intelligence reports suggest growing concern over rising desertion rates. Cameroonian soldiers typically earn about $85 a month, while recruits for the Russian army are promised $2,000 plus bonuses. British intelligence also notes that Russia offers recruits the prospect of citizenship and guaranteed medical care.
On March 7, 2024, Cameroon’s defence minister, Joseph Beti Assomo, denounced what he called the “illegal involvement” of Cameroonian troops in the war. A small number of Cameroonians have joined Ukraine’s ranks as foreign volunteers, but the vast majority have signed up to fight for Russia. The situation is especially troubling for a country already contending with Boko Haram insurgents in the north, rebels from the Central African Republic in the east, maritime piracy along its coast, and Ambazonian separatists in the west. Over the past decade, Cameroonian soldiers have effectively deserted to work as mercenaries, many of them previously employed in the United Arab Emirates. One key reason: Cameroon’s military operates on a contract basis, and most enlist primarily for financial reasons.
Cameroon holds strategic value for Russia thanks to its location, offering direct logistical access to a swath of territory now under Moscow’s military and political sway. That influence has grown following the arrival of Russian mercenaries—first Wagner, then the so-called African Corps—who have backed a series of coups and helped form a bloc of Russia-aligned, landlocked states: Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and the Central African Republic. Russia’s footprint in these countries depends on supply routes through Libya to the Mediterranean and through Sudan—though both corridors are increasingly unreliable.
Routing through Cameroon would give Moscow a chance to diversify its logistics via the northern border—Cameroon shares borders with the Central African Republic and a small stretch of Lake Chad with Niger—and carve out a direct path to the Atlantic. A stronger presence in Cameroon would also pave the way for further expansion south, especially in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where, amid mounting tensions with Rwanda, the government has shown growing interest in Russian support.
Failed attempts to weaken Russian influence
At the end of 2023, President Paul Biya’s government sought to distance itself from Russia’s orbit, notably ramping up ties with the United States. Cameroon also made a symbolic show of support for Ukraine by issuing a commemorative silver coin worth 2,000 CFA francs, titled “Incident on Snake Island.” This was the first in a new series called “The Ukrainian War.” The move may have been driven by concerns that separatists in the country’s west, in the Ambazonia region, were trying to enlist Wagner mercenaries — a claim supported by sources close to local journalist Rémy Ngono.
At the same time, Cameroon was eager to reopen grain exports through Ukrainian ports. In late 2024, the government tried to block the transit of 30,000 tonnes of Russian diesel fuel from the port of Douala to the Central African Republic. But by January 2025, it was forced to back down. The supplier, Neptun Oil, a Cameroon-registered company specialising in petroleum imports, plays a crucial role in powering the CAR and sustaining the Russian paramilitary presence there.
Diplomatic ‘success’: who showed up for the May 9 parade
So who from Africa actually made the trip to Moscow’s Victory Day parade? Leading the pack were the heads of some of the continent’s most influential states: Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali. Their presence was clearly aimed at securing Russia’s political and military support in their own regional struggles—namely the long-standing Nile water dispute and tensions with neighbouring Sudan, where Russia has a significant foothold.
Also attending were the presidents of Guinea-Bissau, Umaro Sissoco Embaló; Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso; and Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo. These long-serving autocrats depend heavily on arms deals and political backing. Russia recently deployed several hundred mercenaries from its so-called African Corps to Equatorial Guinea. Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa falls into this same camp. Together, these leaders form part of Beijing’s circle of allies, effectively acting as the entourage for the parade’s main star — Xi Jinping.
Burkina Faso’s President Ibrahim Traoré, whose regime has relied entirely on Russian military aid since the 2022 coup, represents the group of governments directly controlled by Moscow. Traoré’s administration is part of the so-called Sahel Alliance, which also includes Mali, Niger, and the Central African Republic—another close partner in the alliance.
Perhaps more striking was the absence of a South African representative—a key BRICS member and active partner to both Russia and China. South Africa seeks regional leadership while maintaining a stance of symbolic neutrality on the global stage, echoing China’s peace initiatives. Yet it’s grappling with rising public discontent and growing opposition calls to distance itself from Moscow. As a G20 member, it’s also cautious about jeopardising ties with Western countries.
Ukraine’s president may have influenced this stance. His recent visit to South Africa—the first of its kind at that level—came at a critical moment. In talks with President Cyril Ramaphosa, they covered economic cooperation, energy security, fertiliser production, defence industries, and technology partnerships. Ukraine proposed creating a joint mineral hub to manufacture and transport fertilisers. Notably, Ramaphosa publicly supported Ukraine’s call for an unconditional ceasefire before peace talks—something Moscow firmly rejects.
Also absent was Algeria’s leader, a country both geographically close to and strategically important for Russia. This no-show hints at growing unease over Russia’s expanding influence to Algeria’s south, in the Sahel, and to its east, in Libya.
Moscow’s goals
Moscow’s activities in Africa are clearly aimed at expanding its global influence and solidifying its military and political presence. This effort revives the reach of the former Soviet empire, reinforcing Russia’s bid for global leadership. It also poses a direct challenge to Europe, which risks losing not only influence over former colonies but also access to critical resources. Take Niger, for example—key to France’s nuclear energy sector—where uranium reserves have been controlled by a Moscow-backed junta since August 2023.
Another key aspect is the potential to destabilise vast parts of the continent. The pro-Russian Sahel Alliance now includes Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, while Russia’s oldest military base in Africa—the former Wagner stronghold—is in the Central African Republic. This gives the Kremlin ample opportunity to fuel conflicts across the region and trigger a new wave of refugees heading for Europe.
It’s also about showing the nations of the so-called Global South that Moscow has solutions—whether it’s propping up autocrats or shielding regimes from U.S. and Western influence. Behind this is a vast propaganda machine that casts Russia as a defender against Western colonialism. This narrative strongly influences local elites’ willingness to support the West diplomatically. Even countries friendly to Ukraine often stay neutral or cultivate closer ties not with Russia directly, but with its main backer, China, while positioning themselves as potential “peacemakers.”
