“We have effectively switched sides in the Russia-Ukraine war,” wrote Jim Geraghty, a journalist for National Review, after returning from a trip to Ukraine. Many of his colleagues—along with politicians and ordinary Americans—are in shock. How did we so quickly find ourselves aligning with the Russian dictator?
I’ve often said about the expected shift in U.S. leadership: “With Trump, things could be worse, they could be better, but they certainly won’t be the same as under Biden.” Now, it looks like we’re heading for the worst-case scenario. Members of the new administration have already sat down with the aggressor, pushing Ukraine to accept an ill-conceived minerals deal without security guarantees. And now, reports suggest Trump has ordered a halt to military aid and is weighing the possibility of lifting sanctions on Russia.
With the prospect of losing U.S. military support, Ukraine’s leadership faces two pressing questions: how critical the halt in American arms supplies will be, and whether those shipments can be replaced by contributions from other allies or by ramping up domestic production.
According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, between January 22, 2022, and December 31, 2024, Ukraine received €114.2 billion in aid from the U.S., with an additional €4.84 billion pledged. European countries provided even more—€132.3 billion, with another €115.1 billion promised. However, there’s a key difference: more than half of Washington’s assistance—€64.1 billion—came in the form of weapons, whereas Europe, collectively, supplied a similar amount of military aid.
Under the Biden administration, a clear division of labour emerged: Europe primarily provided financial and humanitarian aid, while the U.S. focused on military support.
This division was partly driven by the fact that the U.S. possessed significantly larger stockpiles of weapons and a well-established arms production industry. In contrast, Europe, after years of scaling back military spending, lacked both substantial reserves and large-scale weapons manufacturing capabilities.
Over the course of four years of full-scale war, European nations have increased their defence spending. But the challenge isn’t just about quantity—it’s whether Europe can effectively replace U.S. weaponry. According to the Financial Times, Washington has been supplying Ukraine with arms that are difficult to source elsewhere, such as air and missile defence interceptors, as well as precision-guided munitions for HIMARS rocket systems. The U.S. also provides vital intelligence, including targeting data for strikes on Russian positions. Additionally, many countries rely on American logistical capabilities to transport weapons and military equipment into Ukraine.
Amid the chaos in Washington, European countries are scrambling to assemble new aid packages. The UK has pledged £1.6 billion for air defence missiles, while the EU is working on an €800 billion package to address a range of military needs—from supplying weapons to Ukraine to boosting production within Europe. But these efforts will take months to bear fruit, and in the short term, replacing the steady flow of U.S. arms will be a significant challenge.
Sources suggest Ukraine has enough American weapons to last until summer, but by late spring, it will likely face acute shortages of missiles capable of intercepting ballistic threats, as well as artillery shells. The loss of Bradley fighting vehicles and GMLRS rockets will also be felt deeply.
However, The Economist, citing discussions with Ukrainian military officials, argues that the sense of impending collapse is overblown. The first year of full-scale war, along with the early months of 2024 when U.S. aid nearly dried up, showed that Ukraine can hold the front lines for extended periods without American supplies. In 2024, it was Europe that stepped in to fill the gap left by the U.S.
Ukraine has since ramped up its own weapons production, nearly meeting the military’s demand for drones, which have become the primary weapon against enemy troops and equipment.
It’s unfortunate that Washington’s withdrawal comes just as Russia’s war economy begins to falter. What once seemed like an endless stockpile of Soviet-era equipment is running dry, while Russian troop losses are edging toward the one-million mark. The Kremlin is more eager than ever for a temporary ceasefire—and some of Ukraine’s supposed allies appear ready to give it to them, on Moscow’s terms.
But things could change quickly. Call Trump a scoundrel if you will, but he’s hardly an ideological admirer of Russia. His current stance is driven by two main factors: a desire to fulfil his campaign promise of swiftly ending the Russia-Ukraine war and his personal animosity towards Volodymyr Zelensky. The spectacle at the White House on February 28 was a carefully staged move to strengthen his negotiating position—to pressure Ukraine into accepting imposed terms, given that Washington is in no position to dictate anything to Moscow.
Yet, things could change in an instant. Remember how, during the Republican primaries, Trump was openly at odds with rivals like Ron DeSantis and Nikki Haley—only to turn around and embrace them as allies the second they dropped out and backed him.
The same could happen with Volodymyr Zelensky—relations could improve the moment the White House hears the right words. That, likely, was the point of the February 28 spectacle, followed by the suspension of aid. It’s no coincidence that Washington keeps repeating, multiple times a day, that it’s ready to welcome Zelensky back—just as soon as he changes his stance on negotiations.
But even if the worst-case scenario unfolds and the U.S. pulls out entirely, there won’t be an immediate collapse. Europe has the capacity to sustain a long-term fight against Russia—it just needs to be pushed into action.
