Oliviero Angeli, a political scientist and philosopher at Dresden University of Technology, is the coordinator of the MIDEM research centre (Mercator Forum Migration and Democracy), which analyses migration’s political and social dynamics in Europe—particularly the rise of far-right parties and their impact on democratic governance. He spoke to The Ukrainian Week about Friedrich Merz’s policies, the prospects for Alternative for Germany, the challenges of Russia’s hybrid war, and Germany’s support for Ukraine.
***
– Friedrich Merz, a leading contender for Germany’s next chancellor, recently reaffirmed that his CDU/CSU bloc will not cooperate with Alternative for Germany. Yet, he pushed through an anti-migration initiative with the party’s backing. What policies do you expect from him?
– Friedrich Merz’s stance on Alternative for Germany reflects a broader dilemma faced by many centre-right parties in Europe: maintaining formal distance from the far right—or even establishing a “cordon sanitaire”—while simultaneously pursuing policies that may attract far-right voters. I expect Merz to take a tougher approach to asylum and migration compared to the years following 2015, but still within the framework of traditional conservatism and the Christian Democratic Union’s pro-European stance. This remains fundamentally at odds with the rampant Euroscepticism and nationalism of Alternative for Germany.
– Germany will hold snap parliamentary elections in less than two weeks. Insa polls show the three leading parties have lost support, with Alternative for Germany at 21%. Do you anticipate any significant shifts in these projections, especially considering the ongoing protests in German cities?
– I don’t expect any major shifts. Protests against Alternative for Germany are unlikely to significantly impact its electoral standing. While minor changes are still possible, they will likely depend on which issues—migration or socio-economic concerns—mobilise voters in the final two weeks.
The Social Democratic Party of Germany could gain some ground from Olaf Scholz’s strong performance in the televised debate with Merz and the so-called “Kanzlerbonus” of incumbency. However, this effect is likely to be limited by widespread dissatisfaction with the ruling coalition. The key question will be whether smaller parties can clear the five-percent threshold. The Left Party (Die Linke) seems in a slightly better position than in recent months, but its chances remain uncertain.
– American businessman Elon Musk has openly supported Alternative for Germany, even speaking at the party’s campaign congress and calling it “Germany’s best hope.” How much does his endorsement strengthen the party’s position?
– Musk’s support for Alternative for Germany amplifies far-right narratives on key issues such as migration, gender, and opposition to mainstream media. His global influence could lend further legitimacy to AfD, energising its existing supporters.
However, Musk’s unpredictable and self-serving political interventions risk backfiring, particularly among voters concerned about foreign billionaires interfering in German politics or those who view him as a symbol of global capitalism and Big Tech. Additionally, AfD’s alliance with Musk may prove tenuous in the long term, especially if his “America First” economic policies conflict with Germany’s interests.
– A few days ago, Der Spiegel published an article claiming that Russia had carried out a large-scale sabotage operation in Germany to undermine the Greens’ approval ratings. There have also been other attempts to destabilise the country ahead of the elections. Is Germany taking this Russian hybrid war seriously?
Germany is becoming increasingly aware of and concerned about Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics, particularly as they intensify in the lead-up to the elections. German security agencies have repeatedly warned about Russian interference. However, while awareness is growing, the effectiveness of countermeasures remains uncertain.
Authorities have bolstered cybersecurity and stepped up monitoring of foreign propaganda networks, but Russian influence operations are often sophisticated, adaptive, and difficult to counter in real-time. Nonetheless, while these efforts to destabilise the political landscape are concerning, they are unlikely to significantly affect the election outcome, especially considering the pro-Ukrainian stance of most German parties.
– Given this, what can we expect in terms of support for Ukraine after the elections?
– Friedrich Merz, leader of the centre-right CDU and the most likely head of the next German government, has supported supplying Ukraine with cruise missiles, while Scholz has been more hesitant. During the campaign, Merz took a somewhat more cautious approach. However, his stance will undoubtedly remain security-focused and closely aligned with European partners.
If a CDU–SPD coalition emerges, we should not expect major policy shifts—instead, a balance between the CDU’s push for increased military aid and the Social Democrats’ more cautious stance. The key variable will be the position of the United States, as any significant change in Washington’s approach, particularly under a potential Trump administration, would likely influence Germany’s decisions regarding Ukraine.
