In the early stages of the full-scale Russian invasion, Kyiv pressed its allies for unequivocal guarantees of NATO membership—if not immediately, then certainly once active hostilities ceased. Yet, recent remarks by Donald Trump have cast doubt on this path, prompting a critical question: can alternative, reliable security guarantees for Ukraine be formulated, even on a temporary basis? These guarantees must be robust but stop short of offering explicit promises of swift NATO accession, while keeping the prospect open. The challenge is to placate Trump without giving Russia an opportunity to dismantle Ukraine.
It is vital to recognise the unparalleled nature of the crisis Ukraine—and the world—has faced since February 2022. Solutions have had to be improvised, tested in real time, and evaluated as precedents. Ukraine has become a proving ground for an array of experiments—military, geopolitical, economic, psychological, and beyond. Kyiv has no option but to defend itself to avoid being consumed, while the world, tacitly, hopes to avert a larger continental war by treating Ukraine as a buffer. For many foreign experts, when they invoke the idea of “peace,” what they often mean is their own sense of stability—though there are exceptions.
Is there an alternative to a clear NATO membership promise that could provide Ukraine with genuine security? Two relatively realistic options are currently emerging. The first is the establishment of a so-called “NATO-bis”—a shadowy “second NATO” for those in waiting, a term coined by former Polish President Lech Wałęsa—built on bilateral security agreements. The second involves deploying an international peacekeeping contingent, either along the line of contact or on the northern border. Both of these options are actively discussed in diplomatic circles and occasionally surface in statements by President Zelensky.
The idea of a “NATO-bis” centres on a coalition of countries willing to provide Ukraine with military assistance beyond just weaponry in the event of further Russian aggression. A potential model for this arrangement could be the United Kingdom’s Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), established in 2015. This multinational military formation includes nine northern European allies of the UK: Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway. When necessary, the Joint Expeditionary Force can deploy over 10,000 troops for both humanitarian missions and combat operations. It has the flexibility to operate independently, cooperate with NATO, or function within UN peacekeeping forces.
So far, the Joint Expeditionary Force has yet to be tested in combat. Similarly, NATO’s Article 5 has only been invoked once, in 2001, following the terrorist attacks against the United States. However, unlike Russia, Al-Qaeda, which carried out the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, did not possess nuclear weapons. If it had, who can say how the Alliance would have responded to calls for solidarity? As things stand, NATO is more of a symbol than a fully effective security mechanism.
The idea of deploying an international peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine seems more feasible. This concept was first raised nearly a year ago in Paris by Emmanuel Macron. France and the United Kingdom have since explored the possibility of stationing troops from both nations along the line of contact on two occasions—during meetings between President Macron and Prime Minister Starmer in December and January. The goal would be to monitor compliance with a ceasefire in the event of peace negotiations with Russia. The issue of peacekeepers was also discussed at the most recent Ramstein meeting in January.
On 2 January, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed support for France’s initiative to deploy peacekeepers. Hypothetically, the core of the contingent could be made up of countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom. According to Reuters, the mission could involve a coalition of five to eight nations, contributing a force of 40,000 troops. Under a rotational system, another 40,000 personnel would need to be trained and prepared.
“If we are talking about a serious contingent… For example, in the Odesa region or with France, the conversation should not just be about the troops but also the fleet—both air and naval. This kind of presence is not just about numbers; it’s about technology, ships, aircraft, and more,” the Ukrainian president remarked recently.
The concept is still evolving in the minds of Western policymakers. In Poland, leaders believe the idea has merit but contend that countries sharing a border with Ukraine should not be involved in its implementation. In Germany, public opinion broadly supports the notion, but only if carried out by others, without German soldiers, and with Russia’s consent.
European Council President António Costa is set to convene an informal meeting on 3 February at Lymon Castle, bringing together EU heads of state and government. The summit will focus on strengthening European defence, advancing joint security initiatives, and securing the necessary resources to support them. While concrete steps towards deploying a peacekeeping contingent have yet to take shape, joint military production facilities are already beginning to operate within Ukraine.
The established global order has long since fractured and is gradually fading into history. What the new world order will look like depends largely on the timing and outcome of the war in Ukraine. This reality is becoming increasingly clear to world leaders, not just Ukraine’s allies. Dictatorial regimes are mobilising and, as we can see, have no intention of relinquishing their ambitions. Will those who champion freedom be able to unite their efforts? The answer remains uncertain, but at least they have started to think in the right direction.
