Since 2022, decision-makers and commentators have dominated the conversation about Ukraine’s path, with opinions ranging from calls for immediate NATO membership to doubts about whether Ukraine deserves support at all. Three years on, this discord continues, offering reassuring signals to a Kremlin that thrives on its façade of unity.
The election of Donald Trump for a second term ignited a surge of theories and debates following his pretty equivocal campaign statements. During his first pre-inauguration international trip—to France for the reopening of Notre Dame Cathedral—President Trump, in a yellow tie and blue suit, held a brief meeting with President Zelensky just a short while after a tense September encounter in D.C.
On his Truth Social platform, Trump announced that “Zelensky and Ukraine would like to make a deal and stop the madness … There should be an immediate ceasefire, and negotiations should begin.” In this context, Trump referenced Russia’s defeat in Syria and called on China to assist in resolving the war.
There is, however, a risk that brokering a deal could be framed as a victory in itself: for Ukraine, it might signify its continued presence on the political map bolstered by Western support but leaving it vulnerable in the mid-term perspective, and for President Trump, it could represent an achievement in resolving a war where his predecessor fell short.
The foundation of Donald Trump’s campaign, according to Kateryna Shynkaruk, an associate researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is built on a strategy of doing the opposite of what the Biden administration has done.
Meanwhile, Andriy Yermak, President Zelensky’s chief of staff, met with Trump’s team this week. Officially, peace plans weren’t on the agenda. Instead, Ukrainian officials sought to convey their assessment of the situation and build relationships with J.D. Vance, the Vice President-elect, and Mike Waltz, the incoming National Security Advisor.
J.D. Vance’s pre-election stance on Ukraine was worrisome, to put it mildly. He was a staunch advocate for cutting aid, citing corruption accusations, and appeared largely indifferent to the broader geopolitical consequences of Ukraine’s defeat for the United States.
Waltz, known for his “America First” stance, strongly criticised Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and also fiercely critiqued the Biden administration’s handling of Ukraine. He claimed that the U.S. strategy is unclear and ineffective, leaving the country mired in a costly stalemate.
This view is shared by Sen. Marco Rubio, who was selected by Trump as Secretary of State. Rubio embodies a traditional GOP hawk yet shares concerns about prolonged involvement in Ukraine, calling for an end to what he also sees as a “stalemate war.”
Trump’s nominee for defence secretary, Pete Hegseth, will probably be a case study loyalist, as his nomination raised many eyebrows. Known to viewers as a co-host of Fox & Friends Weekend and previously serving as an Army National Guard infantry captain, Pete Hegseth also held leadership roles in advocacy groups such as Vets for Freedom and Concerned Veterans for America.
Pete Hegseth’s foreign policy views, particularly regarding Ukraine, downplay the global stakes of Russia’s war, framing it as less significant than what he described as the “existential threat” of American “wokeness.” A vocal NATO sceptic, Hegseth has criticised European allies as self-righteous and ineffectual, questioning the relevance of maintaining what he terms outdated defence arrangements.
What’s being discussed?
A former national security official from Donald Trump’s team outlined three key plans for addressing the war in Ukraine: Vance’s, Grenell’s, and Kellogg’s. Vance advocates for the creation of a heavily fortified demilitarised zone along the existing front lines to prevent further Russian incursions. This will require more Ukraine-related expenditures, which Republicans are currently willing to cut.
Grenell proposed establishing autonomous zones in eastern Ukraine, though he did not provide detailed explanations. He also expressed that NATO membership for Ukraine is not in the U.S. national interest.
Back in July, retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, as a special envoy for Russia and Ukraine, presented a peace plan that included ultimatums for both Kyiv and Moscow: the U.S. would continue arms support to Ukraine only if it agreed to negotiate with Russia, and it would delay NATO membership in exchange for a security deal.
Earlier, Kellogg also outlined his views in a 2023 opinion piece, where he cited Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan’s proposal for a cease-fire agreement, suggesting limited sanctions relief for Russia in exchange for its participation in peace talks, adherence to a demilitarised zone, and a diplomatic approach to reclaiming occupied Ukrainian territories.
Sanctions would only be fully lifted following a peace deal acceptable to Ukraine, supported by a levy on Russian energy exports to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. Kellogg emphasised building Ukraine’s long-term defence with a bilateral security framework while maintaining leverage over Russia to prevent future hostilities.
Additionally, a tax on Russian energy exports would fund Ukraine’s reconstruction, but Ukraine would be expected to pursue reclaiming occupied territories solely through diplomacy. Meanwhile, part of Trump’s team is rejecting the idea of deploying U.S. troops to secure an 800-mile (1,200-kilometre) buffer zone between Russian and Ukrainian forces, hoping European countries will carry it out.
What could go wrong? Quite a lot, actually.
For starters, security guarantees. It is abundantly clear that the U.S. prioritises avoiding direct confrontation with Russia at all costs. While Ukraine marks the 30th anniversary of the Budapest Memorandum, it is absurd to argue that the agreement’s primary role was to prevent nuclear strikes and that it was not designed to guard against conventional aggression.
This raises the question: beyond its current commitments, what more can the U.S. realistically promise without crossing its own red line?
Kellogg’s focus on Putin’s fears of NATO expansion, particularly regarding Ukraine, overlooks a critical reality. Long before the invasion, it was evident that there could be no consensus among NATO allies on Ukraine’s membership, and the West largely used the promise of accession as a dangling carrot. Ironically, it was not Ukraine’s potential membership in NATO that triggered the invasion but rather the absence of such.
The reluctance to fully guarantee Ukraine’s security underscores why NATO membership remains out of reach for Kyiv, despite Zelenskyy’s claims to decline any substitution to the membership in the Alliance. This hesitancy towards Ukraine aligns with accusations that the Biden administration viewed the war primarily as a means to weaken Russia rather than securing a definitive Ukrainian victory.
The prolonged war has significantly impacted U.S. defence resources, raising concerns about its ability to address other strategic threats, notably China. The U.S. has sent over 2,000 Stinger missiles and more than 2 million 155mm artillery rounds to Ukraine, yet replenishing these supplies will take years due to limited production capacity. The Ukrainian army often depletes a monthly production of 155mm ammunition in just several days of intense combat.
As for other security formats, the 2024 U.S.-Ukraine Bilateral Agreement seems to cover all the points the U.S. is ready to offer, such as building Ukraine’s defence capabilities, ensuring long-term resilience, and enhancing NATO interoperability. It also emphasises support for defence industry growth and the fostering of economic and energy security.
However, the only real deterrent to another Russian invasion would be immediate military intervention. Without such provisions, any agreements risk becoming just another round of expressing deep concern during a new crisis sparked by Russia, even with European peacekeeping forces on the ground.
The idea of arming Ukraine has already raised concerns, with some European voices questioning how the West could arm a country on its borders without knowing its future leadership or whether it would remain a reliable partner. If the West continues prioritising verbal support for Ukraine without substantial action, it could ultimately result in a much longer Russia-NATO border.
Still, the most important obstacle is Russia. The recent interview of Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov with Tucker Carlson highlights Moscow’s unwillingness to compromise. Russia’s demands, which include Ukraine’s official abandonment of Russia-claimed territories, renouncing NATO membership, becoming neutral, guaranteeing rights for Russian speakers, and demilitarising and “denazifying,” effectively amount to Kyiv’s capitulation. Despite Russia’s ongoing economic strain, no sign of compromise emerges.
Why do some Western decision-makers think Ukraine’s neutrality could bring peace despite the country losing 30% of its territory and enduring heavy casualties and millions of refugees being neutral? Such a mindset, it seems, is driven purely by short-term political goals and the hope that Putin’s rule will eventually end—when it’s no longer their problem.
Amid mounting challenges, Ukraine is ready to negotiate, but the starting negotiating positions remain as polar as back in 2022. Moreover, Ukraine has not rescinded the 2022 Presidential decree declaring negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin “impossible,” which aligns with a decision made by the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council.
More importantly, while some laud Donald Trump as a skilled negotiator, his track record with North Korea shows little meaningful change in U.S. relations despite heavy political investment. There is no clear evidence to suggest that talks with Putin would lead to better results.
Fitch predicts that the war in Ukraine will continue into 2025, maintaining its current broad parameters. While the incoming U.S. administration has signalled a desire to end the war, a ceasefire might be achievable, but a peace agreement is unlikely due to the challenging concessions required from both sides.
Speculation about Trump’s team flooding Ukraine with weapons to pressure Russia into a deal faces the harsh reality that even with increased production, U.S. arms factories are operating at full capacity. While there is clear potential for improvement in military support for Ukraine, the “too little, too late” approach to weapon deliveries has severely strained Ukraine’s human resources. If the trend continues, boots on the ground may soon become the last resort for defending against Russian aggression.
While Ukraine’s return of temporarily occupied territories by force seems increasingly unlikely, it is equally improbable that Kyiv will officially acknowledge the loss of these territories. The idea of lifting sanctions is a clear shot in the leg—Russia has already demonstrated resilience to the existing sanctions and found ways to bypass some of them.
Attempting to coexist with Putin while prioritising American security interests may seem pragmatic, but the failure to make bold, decisive actions could lead to Ukraine’s gradual subjugation under Russia. If these challenges continue to be inadequately addressed, the long-term consequences could ultimately harm U.S. interests more than protect them as the balance of power in Europe shifts and Russia re-emerges as a European hegemon with non-European values.
