Every week, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Ramzan Kadyrov publicly clashed with several federal security officials, Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Tucker Carlson and visit to the OSCE meeting, Russia is losing the Indian arms market, growing criticism of Rosatom’s activities in Namibia.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Ramzan Kadyrov publicly clashed with several federal security officials. Last week, Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of Chechnya, made an unexpected series of antagonistic remarks targeting senior Russian security officials. His criticisms were aimed at Alexander Bastrykin, head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, and Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev. Kadyrov accused the investigative and law enforcement agencies of failing to fulfil duties assigned by Putin, claiming that both officials were unfit for their positions.
- The remarks were prompted by the arrest of a Chechen teenager in Moscow who, along with friends, had assaulted individuals. Using this incident as a springboard, Kadyrov criticised Russian law enforcement for persecuting migrant workers—whom he described as “brothers in faith” essential to the country’s needs. He blamed officials for being out of touch with domestic realities, linking this incompetence to broader issues such as deteriorating relations with other countries and the “loss” of Ukraine and Georgia.
- Kadyrov’s statements mark a stark departure from his usual behaviour; he has rarely, if ever, directly criticised high-ranking officials in such a manner. It appears he is positioning himself as a defender of Islam within Russia, including its migrant population, potentially to build significant political capital at the federal level. However, it remains unclear whether Kadyrov has the influence necessary to realise such ambitions.
- This public confrontation among senior federal figures is unprecedented since the conflict between the assassinated Wagner PMC leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and former Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu. The fallout from that power struggle significantly impacted the Kremlin, making it unlikely that Putin would tolerate a repeat of such a scenario. Kadyrov’s actions could backfire, exposing him to severe repercussions. A strategic retreat from this controversy in the near future seems highly likely.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Tucker Carlson. Tucker Carlson, a prominent American journalist, recently interviewed Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The discussion served as a platform for Moscow to reiterate its foreign policy narratives and the Kremlin’s stance on key issues. The primary focus was on negotiations to end the war. As previously highlighted by Ukrainian Prism, Russia’s position has reverted to issuing ultimatums. Lavrov repeated points from Putin’s June 2024 speech, where the Russian president outlined conditions for ending the war: Ukraine’s abandonment of its NATO aspirations and the full annexation of territories from four Ukrainian regions. Lavrov also reiterated the possibility of negotiations only after returning to the “Istanbul agreements.” However, he specifically highlighted select conditions, such as the repeal of laws concerning the “ban” on the Russian language, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, “Russophobic policies,” and restrictions on Russian media and culture.
- Notably, Lavrov omitted another earlier demand tied to the Istanbul talks—the limitation of Ukraine’s armed forces. This omission suggests that Russia’s negotiating position is now firmly set ahead of potential talks with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump. Ukrainian Prism underscores the risks associated with these “cultural” conditions for ending the war. It appears Moscow aims to reestablish its influence over Ukrainian society and politics through cultural means in the long term. This approach would enable the Kremlin to expand its influence in Ukraine via political channels after some time. For Ukraine, a realistic approach to negotiations would involve a firm rejection of Russia’s “cultural” demands while reinforcing the stance that future NATO membership remains non-negotiable, even if its realisation is delayed.
- Beyond the “negotiation” conditions, which dominated Lavrov’s remarks, the Russian Foreign Minister also addressed other topics, with U.S.-Russia relations taking centre stage. In characteristic fashion, Lavrov placed the blame for all issues squarely on the United States. Simultaneously, he showcased the Kremlin’s strategy of doublespeak. Lavrov claimed that Russia seeks normal relations with the U.S., sees no grounds for confrontation, and recognises that a nuclear war is against the interests of both nations.
- However, this rhetoric contrasts sharply with the actions and statements of other Russian elites and government-linked oligarchs, who have taken a more radical stance against the U.S. and President-elect Donald Trump. A notable example is Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, a key sponsor of militants in Crimea and Donbas. Malofeev recently dismissed the possibility of negotiating with the Americans to end the war, bluntly rejecting Trump’s current plan. His comments have already drawn a strong rebuke from Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg. These developments highlight that the Russian authorities have little genuine interest in resolving their confrontation with the West. Instead, they appear to be employing a strategy of calculated ambiguity, publicly projecting a willingness to settle the conflict while continuing to pursue an adversarial agenda.
- Lavrov visits the OSCE meeting. In addition to his interview with Tucker Carlson, Sergey Lavrov attended an OSCE meeting in Malta. This marked the Russian foreign minister’s first visit to an EU country since the start of the full-scale invasion.
- Lavrov’s speech at the meeting provided further evidence of Russia’s unwillingness to de-escalate its confrontation with the West or end the war with Ukraine. As is typical of Russian officials, Lavrov used his address to blame Western countries for nearly all major security challenges of recent decades. He accused EU and NATO member states of “capturing” the OSCE and contrasted the organisation with others such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Eurasian Economic Union, which he claimed took a more favourable view of Russia.
- Following his speech, Lavrov promptly left the meeting. Meanwhile, representatives from several countries, including Ukraine, Poland, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, walked out during his remarks. Overall, the meeting, along with the reactions to Lavrov’s address, underscored that there is no movement toward resolving the war, and Russia remains steadfast in its confrontational approach.
- Russia is losing the Indian arms market. Bloomberg, citing its own sources, reported that India has significantly scaled back its purchases of Russian weapons despite Moscow historically being one of its key arms suppliers. Currently, Russia only fulfils contracts signed earlier, including maintenance agreements. Indian officials told Bloomberg that plans for joint development and production of helicopters and advanced fighter jets were shelved some time ago. Instead, India has been turning to Western military equipment, ramping up its purchases as an alternative to Russian arms.
- The most plausible explanation for this shift is not a political decision by Indian authorities but a practical one. Over recent years, Russian arms exports have plummeted by a staggering factor of 15. In 2021, exports were valued at around $15 billion, but by 2024, they had dwindled to just $1 billion. Even Russian officials, including the head of Rostec—the company responsible for military equipment production—have openly acknowledged that the decline is due to the prioritisation of domestic military needs.
- In this context, Russia is steadily losing its foothold in the Indian market. During the summer of 2024, it was revealed that New Delhi and Washington had signed a contract to replace 2,000 ageing BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles. Instead of relying on imports, India plans to establish domestic factories to manufacture American Stryker wheeled armoured personnel carriers. This move comes despite Russian media in 2023 claiming Russia was a contender in the tender. Compounding these losses, internal documents from Russia’s Rosoboronexport were recently leaked online, exposing significant issues with military exports to India. These include defective components and delayed deliveries for Indian Navy vessels and fighter jets. Given these challenges, Russian officials’ claims that military exports will resume post-war appear increasingly unrealistic. Other countries are already securing long-term contracts, edging Russia out of its traditional markets. As a result, the outlook for Russia’s military exports appears bleak.
- Growing criticism of Rosatom’s activities in Namibia. Al Jazeera published an article examining the Russian nuclear energy corporation Rosatom’s involvement in a major uranium mine in eastern Namibia. The focus of the article is on the threat that uranium mining poses to the livelihoods of local communities, whose existence depends on one of the world’s largest aquifers supplying their water needs.
- After the Namibian government lifted its moratorium on uranium mining in January 2017, companies such as Headspring Investments, Uranium One, and Green Mining received nine licenses to drill wells for mining this strategically significant resource. However, in November 2021, two of these licenses were revoked. According to Namibian Minister of Agriculture Kalle Schlettwein, the wells drilled under these permits failed to meet proper sealing and cementing standards. The article highlights that the drilling methods employed by Russian contractors risk contaminating water sources essential to daily life in local households.
- In November 2022, Kirill Komarov, First Deputy Director of Rosatom, claimed at the Atomexpo-2022 International Forum in Sochi that the project was “safe and eco-friendly.” He projected a 1–2% increase in Namibia’s GDP and the creation of about 600 jobs at the uranium mine, along with approximately 20,000 jobs in related industries. However, the Russians appear to focus on the potential economic benefits for Namibia while disregarding the long-term health and well-being of its population.
- The Russian government is also seeking to control the entire nuclear energy supply chain. There are reports of corruption among Namibian officials, with Piju Nganante, the head of the Ohameke region, admitting that some of his trips to Russia were funded by the Russian energy holding. Considering the growing involvement of China and Iran in mining activities in Namibia, it becomes clear that while the focus remains on the Russian-Ukrainian war, Russia is quietly strengthening its position in other areas. Specifically, the Russian authorities are using non-military means to reinforce Russia’s presence in the global energy market, where the country still holds considerable influence.
