In late January, the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) released a report titled “Containing Russia, Securing Europe”. This study delineates a complex strategy aimed at curbing Russia’s aggression both presently and in the foreseeable future. It presents a strategy that comprises four components:
- Securing Russia’s ultimate defeat in Ukraine;
- Enhancing collaboration among NATO member states and bolstering the Alliance’s eastern defences;
- Harmonising efforts to counter Russian influence globally, with a particular focus on Western societies;
- Thwarting Russia’s aggressive efforts to claim regional dominance.
What is needed to defeat Russia in Ukraine?
According to the authors of the report, the first step is to transition from a mentality of “as long as it takes” (or, the most recent variation of this phrase, “as long as possible”) to achieving victory “as quickly as possible.” This involves ramping up the pace of weapon supply and removing barriers to Ukraine’s ability to reclaim its territory. It should be noted separately that the discussion should focus not only on the pace but also on the volumes of supplies, as well as the exploration of new technological solutions, as General Zaluzhny wrote in his article for CNN. At Davos, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis emphasised that to defeat Putin, the West must supply Ukraine with not just 40 HIMARS systems but 400, and not merely 80 tanks, but 1000.
A dramatic saga is currently unfolding in Congress over the aid package to Ukraine, casting doubt on the United States’ readiness to uphold leadership in countering Russia. It was precisely with this call that British Foreign Secretary David Cameron visited Washington at the end of last year.
Debates in the US about Ukraine are raising eyebrows, to say the least. In 2023, sales of American military equipment to foreign governments, who are restocking their arsenals after supplying old weapons to Ukraine and gearing up for potential conflicts, hit a record $238 billion. That’s double the $113 billion that constituted all American aid at the beginning of 2024. It’s worth noting that a significant chunk of these funds stayed in the US economy, boosting job creation and economic growth.
The CEPA report also underscores the pressing necessity for Ukraine to join NATO soon or secure equivalent security commitments, with clearly defined milestones for Ukraine’s integration into collective defence.
The highly anticipated 75th summit of NATO leaders is scheduled for July 9-11, 2024, in Washington. After the letdown of last year’s summit in Vilnius, where Ukraine didn’t receive an invitation to commence the membership process, conveying a “strong message to Putin,” as it’s often phrased, should involve a clear declaration of Ukraine’s inevitable accession to the Alliance within a well-defined timeframe.
Yet, Julianna Smith, the US Permanent Representative to NATO, has already pointed out that the discussion will centre on enhancing Ukraine’s ties with the alliance: “First and foremost, I would say our goal is to celebrate and applaud the many achievements of the Alliance over many decades. But we’re also obviously going to be focused on our friends in Ukraine.”
In essence, a very pragmatic assessment suggests that NATO membership will likely remain a distant aspiration for Ukraine for the foreseeable future. The missed opportunity in 2008 is proving to be a costly outcome for Ukrainians, primarily due to the West’s lack of action rather than actions taken by Kyiv. However, only a shift in the geopolitical landscape will probably create opportunities for substantial progress in this regard. Waiting for Russia’s influence to wane until the West deems Ukraine’s membership less risky could span decades.
Two other crucial elements of the outlined strategy involve a firm political commitment to swiftly integrate Ukraine into the European Union, signifying a return to the European family, and making investments in Ukrainian resilience, reconstruction, and recovery, particularly in the modernisation and productivity of the defence industry sector, starting immediately.
While Ukraine’s trajectory toward Eurointegration appears more promising compared to NATO, the unstable security situation will pose challenges to investments and the country’s rapid economic recovery.
The authors of the CEPA’s report haven’t overlooked the critical need for swift justice – establishing tribunals to address Russian war crimes and aggression. Although discussions about an international hybrid or alternative tribunal format have somewhat subsided, a judicial process conducted even in the absence of the accused would demonstrate the international community’s commitment to justice and serve as a stark reminder to those orchestrating or presently involved in aggression. They’ve also stressed the importance of recognising the collective responsibility of Russian citizens for crimes committed in their name.
Another crucial aspect highlighted in the strategy is the issue of war reparations. This involves redirecting frozen assets to Ukraine and maintaining the current sanctions regime. Additionally, there may be calls for Russia to provide a specific quantity of energy resources free of charge to Ukraine and other nations impacted by Russian aggression.
Regrettably, the strategy outlined in the report overlooks the precedent set earlier by Kuwait. After the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990, Kuwait continued to receive a portion of Iraq’s income from the sale of energy resources. Only in 2021, Iraq completed the payment of $52 billion to compensate for its 1990-1991 aggression against Kuwait. If such a mechanism were to be considered, it would be imperative to ensure the preservation of the price ceiling imposed on Russian oil.
In essence, the most durable assurance of Ukraine’s security would be a Russia that no longer harbours imperialistic ambitions. However, this prospect is too ambiguous to be seriously considered. The most probable trajectory of Russia’s political development in the short and medium term will likely continue to be the reinforcement of authoritarianism, aggressive policies toward neighbours and Western partners, and endeavours to assert dominance in the post-Soviet space.
Moreover, even achieving a decisive victory in the current war will not fundamentally change the asymmetrical nature of the conflict. Russia will always maintain superior human and financial resources and could potentially regroup over time for another assault.
What does enhancing NATO cooperation and securing the Alliance’s eastern flank entail?
Several crucial steps deserve closer examination in this regard:
- Ramp up America’s strategic commitment to Europe and intensify dialogue on strategic coordination actions to counter Russia, confront China, and tackle other challenges;
- Bolster bipartisan consensus in the US regarding geopolitical challenges and NATO’s role;
- Roll out extensive and coordinated investments in defence industries on both sides of the Atlantic, guided by anticipated demands to bolster the long-term containment of land warfare in Europe, recognised as a core interest of the US and NATO;
- Guarantee regional and global energy security, especially by developing a transatlantic energy security doctrine and decreasing reliance on Russian oil, gas, and nuclear fuel.
The Eastern flank of NATO represents a critically vulnerable area in European security, making it imperative to effectively deter Russia from any adventurism in the region to thwart future aggression.
In 2023, the European Parliament allocated €500 million from the EU budget to finance the bloc’s industrial production capacities for ammunition, ensuring the implementation of the adopted Act on Supporting Ammunition Production.
European defence companies are also experiencing a surge in orders and record revenues. Germany’s largest arms manufacturer, Rheinmetall, has expressed its intention to invest €200 million in establishing a tank production plant in Ukraine, with a capacity of 400 tanks per year. This signals that defence companies foresee sustained high demand for the foreseeable future.
However, only a third of NATO member countries have succeeded in contributing 2% of their GDP to collective security, while Russia’s budget for 2024 allocates 6% of GDP to the military, surpassing social spending for the first time in modern history. Despite Russia’s GDP being smaller than that of NATO member countries, the authoritarian regime’s pivot of the economy towards military priorities, with the tacit approval of the population, is much simpler and faster than all the discussions in democratic societies.
Furthermore, EU countries with well-established defence industries are pursuing their interests in the competition for funding, leading to delays in reaching agreements. For instance, France and Italy are keen on selling the SAMP-T system and the Mistral anti-aircraft missile system, while Germany has unveiled plans to execute the Sky Shield European air defence project involving the procurement of the American Patriot system and the Israeli Arrow 3.
In addition, there is concern in Europe about potential shifts in US policy regarding leadership within the Alliance and even membership. Given Donald Trump’s history of making numerous provocative remarks, the possibility of a future US president contemplating withdrawal or, at the very least, a revision of the Alliance’s strategy has prompted American lawmakers to introduce a bill mandating the approval of two-thirds of the Senate or an act of Congress to make any decision to withdraw.
What does effective resistance to Russian influence look like?
The strategy encompasses:
- Bolstering national financial management and monitoring institutions to mitigate the influence of financial inflows from Russia or other countries posing a threat to the West and its allies;
- Combating disinformation and intensifying counterintelligence activities;
- Rebuilding trust from the Global South towards the West through a resurgence of diplomacy, trade, investment, and conflict resolution to offer a long-term alternative to opportunistic endeavours by Russia and China.
Relying solely on a military approach for containment proves inadequate. Thus, it’s imperative to fortify Western vulnerabilities alongside enhancing the defence sector.
How can we thwart Russia’s aggressive push for regional dominance?
Key to lasting peace is undermining Russia’s influence as a former empire. Therefore, the strategy outlines the following steps:
- Backing the aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia to join the EU and ramping up the EU accession process for the Western Balkans;
- Supporting the democratically oriented opposition and civil society in Belarus while increasing pressure on the puppet regime in Minsk;
- Giving priority to NATO presence in the Black Sea and reinstating freedom of navigation;
- Assisting in peacebuilding efforts in the South Caucasus after Russia’s failure to prevent conflicts;
- Expanding trade options in Central Asia by providing regional governments with alternatives to Russia and China.
The unfolding events in Ukraine aren’t just shaping its own future. We’re witnessing the emergence of a new power axis comprising China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, with the strategic aim of undermining American influence and reshaping the global order, escalating conflicts in various regions to further fuel destabilisation and advance their agenda.
Despite significant losses in both equipment and manpower, Russia may only need about seven years to rebuild its military. Possession of nuclear arms has already deterred Western responses to Russia’s ongoing aggression. Russia’s economy is skillfully weathering the storm of war and sanctions. Their cyberattacks, covert operations, and sophisticated disinformation campaigns extend their influence globally.
Implementing this strategy will guarantee not only the safety of Ukrainians but also that of American and European citizens in their homes, enabling us to keep forging a world characterised by peaceful interaction among sovereign nations. The true question is whether there will be adequate leadership and common sense to prioritise what some may still perceive as a distant threat over short-term political and financial interests.
