The Ukrainian Week sat down with Lieutenant General Oleksandr Skipalskyi, a respected military leader and statesman who has been instrumental in shaping Ukraine’s security landscape.
After Ukraine’s independence, General Skipalskyi was at the forefront of building the country’s security structures, earning a reputation as one of the key figures in establishing an intelligence system free from Soviet control. In the early 1990s, he was appointed head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defence, a pivotal role in Ukraine’s security transformation.
Skipalskyi also served in parliament from 1994 to 1998 as part of the Defence and State Security Committee and held the position of Deputy Head of the Security Service of Ukraine twice—first between 1997 and 1998 and then again from 2006 to 2007. Today, he is the Honorary Chair of the Board of the Association of Ukrainian Intelligence Veterans.
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– What role did security agencies and military intelligence play in the USSR?
– The history of the Soviet Union’s Committee for State Security (KGB) is marked by its repressive and bloody actions. It wasn’t just about silencing dissidents who opposed the Communist Party; the Soviet repressive machine even turned against those who led it. One lesser-known fact is that Feliks Dzerzhinskiy, whom modern Russia holds in high regard, took his own life after becoming disillusioned with Stalin’s policies towards Poland. Contrary to popular belief, his death was not natural.
I firmly believe that the creation of Ukraine’s independent intelligence services, in the context of the Soviet Union’s repressive structures, owes much to perestroika. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev began attempting to dismantle this system. The mood of that time is captured perfectly in the words of Yevgeny Yevtushenko: “It’s easy to be brave when you’re allowed to be.”
Personally, back then, I sincerely hoped that President Gorbachev and KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov could find common ground. At the time, as a KGB colonel, I naively decided to write a letter to Kryuchkov. I passed it through the late Soviet People’s Deputy Vilen Martirosyan, fully aware of the fact that it would otherwise not reach him through regular mail channels.
In my letter to Kryuchkov, I brought up three specific issues. First, I called for transforming the KGB into an agency with narrowly defined counterintelligence functions, focused purely on security and not on repression, persecuting dissent, or oppressing its own people. Second, I urged that national issues should not be resolved through bloodshed, like what had already happened in Georgia and the Baltic states. And third, I emphasised the need for an understanding with Gorbachev on domestic policy matters. In his speeches, Gorbachev referred to those advocating for change as constructive democratic forces, while Kryuchkov, in secret KGB directives and communications, had labelled them as destructive forces that needed to be opposed.
At the time, I wrote to him, “Mr. Chairman, if you fail to see this contradiction, you’ll end up like your predecessors from the 1930s.”
If you look through the KGB archives, you start to notice an interesting pattern: the person who, not long ago, took satisfaction in torturing a colleague to force a confession would, just a year later, find themselves replacing that very same colleague.
– Were there other intelligence agencies in the USSR besides the KGB and GRU?
– The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had its own Committee on Intelligence. There was also a separate group tasked with monitoring and investigating the misconduct of Politburo members and regional committee secretaries, though this was mostly an administrative function. But in reality, the KGB and the ruling authorities were more focused on consolidating power and avoiding unnecessary duplication of efforts, making it easier to keep everything under constant surveillance. For example, the First Chief Directorate of the KGB was responsible for foreign intelligence, which included technical surveillance, ideological propaganda, and suppressing the national liberation movement in Western Ukraine.
– Is it correct to say that Ukraine’s security agencies could only have emerged from the USSR’s security structures? Was there no other source because, naturally, the only professionals were available in these institutions?
– That is indeed very true; there was really no other source of professionals, and their expertise was crucial in those early years. Ukraine did manage to retain the personnel of the Security Service, but was this always a good thing? Not necessarily. One clear benefit, though, was that the five-year period of Gorbachev’s perestroika meant there was no organized, decisive opposition to the course of an independent Ukraine.
However, I can point to several instances where, just a year or two after Ukraine gained independence, certain leaders would quietly admit, “It’s time to end this experiment with independence.” What can you expect from professionals like that? Re-educating them took enormous effort, but they remained vulnerable to the weight of their past actions.
There’s no question that those who had persecuted dissidents or had blood on their hands from suppressing Ukrainians fighting for independence needed to be removed. But in Ukraine, that didn’t happen. Many of these people were allowed to stay, and over time, they managed to secure positions for their children in the Ukrainian security services. Rather than working to build economic independence and strengthen national security, they openly embraced communist ideology and turned to business for their own gain.
This helps explain why it seemed, at times, Ukraine’s state structures were quick to exploit what the country had inherited from the Soviet Union. In fact, a special slogan was coined for President Kuchma, promoted through foreign sources: “The sooner we privatise everything, the faster the economy will take off.”
Had the majority of the Security Service’s personnel been made up of individuals truly committed to defending the national interests of Ukraine’s newly formed government and its citizens, it could have played a constructive role in the country’s development. Unfortunately, this was not the case. That said, there were exceptions. A few individuals stood out for refraining from engaging in business ventures. Take, for example, Valeriy Malikov. Though he came from the ranks of the former Communist Party, his moral integrity ensured that he did not take part in the plundering of Ukraine during its transition to independence.
– Why did law enforcement officials lack a sense of the country’s national interests, focusing instead on securing personal business gains?
– The problem here lies in the fact that even within the framework of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the administrative bodies, there was always a process of filtering out those who weren’t fully loyal to the ideology of the Soviet Communist Party. Leadership positions were reserved for those who showed the most allegiance to that ideology. This process was especially thorough within the security forces.
Colonel Mykola Selyuk, in his characterisation of defence ministers (in the book Spirit and Will Against Tyranny — Ed.), partially quoted a report I submitted on May 8, 1992, to the head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Yevhen Marchuk. At that time, I was heading Ukraine’s military counterintelligence. In the report, I made it clear that Russia was seriously considering the possibility of war in the Donbas and could act on those plans in the near future. Kostiantyn Morozov, the Minister of Defense at the time, agreed with my assessment. He issued a directive to deploy a military corps to the Donbas, with the goal of Ukrainianising it and encouraging the local population to embrace a more pro-Ukrainian stance.
In response, Russia, particularly through its agents of influence, worked hard to portray Morozov as having taken an overly radical stance toward President Leonid Kravchuk on the issue of the Black Sea Fleet. This smear campaign ultimately led to Morozov being pushed out of his leadership role in the Armed Forces. After him, a series of professional leaders took over, but they lacked the conviction to stand firm on their own. Instead, they followed the directives of those who were already inclined to maintain a loyal relationship with Russia at the time.
— And what happened to your report?
– Imagine this: the head of military counterintelligence within the SBU warns that Russia might start a war in the Donbas, but the head of the Security Service of independent Ukraine chooses not to even discuss it. Instead, they simply sign off on the report, and it ends up filed away in the archives. I know for a fact that, in the years that followed, the leadership of the Security Service backed Medvedchuk, not Morozov and his policies.
Take, for instance, the 1994 parliamentary elections. After Morozov’s resignation, he decided to run for office, but the SBU leadership was instructed to obstruct him in every way possible while actively promoting Medvedchuk. By that time, Medvedchuk was already well-known for his character and methods. He couldn’t have been anything else—his actions during the Stus trial had already firmly aligned him with those opposed to Ukraine’s independence.
– When the USSR started exposing mass repressions in the late 1980s, Oleksandr Yakovlev, a member of the Politburo and a close associate of Gorbachev, was a key driving force. Reactions to this varied. Did these attitudes toward the repressions affect the behaviour and policies of the security agencies and the military?
– The policy of repression and the directives for setting execution quotas were determined by the Politburo in Moscow. In Ukraine, there were mainly enforcers or those pushing for even higher quotas to show their loyalty. In Russia, Yakovlev did play a part. He recognised the horrors and tried to prevent them from happening again.
But the reality is, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and even modern Russia were all built on aggressive wars. Their existence depended on maintaining control and subjugating the territories they conquered. Just remember: as soon as Yeltsin declared, “Take as much sovereignty as you can handle,” Russia started falling apart.
At that time in Ukraine, mass repressions were less exposed. The archives of the Foreign Intelligence Service weren’t declassified until 2021–2022. In fact, several years before 1991, Ukraine destroyed eight truckloads of materials at the Obukhiv pulp and paper mill. There was also a clear policy of silencing former agents about their past actions. In 1998, I spent a year and a half overseeing political rehabilitations. During that period, I signed a petition on behalf of the SBU to rehabilitate Yuriy Tyutyunnyk. Before doing so, I carefully reviewed the materials related to his legal persecution. However, I faced difficulties accessing the operational files stored in the archives of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Security Service, as the head at the time, Volodymyr Radchenko, had given an unofficial order preventing me from reviewing them. Although I didn’t have access to the full set of materials, I was guided by a human approach, knowing that Tyutyunnyk had truly been a victim of Russia’s imperialist policy. Based on this, I submitted the petition, and he was eventually rehabilitated.
Here’s another case that sticks with me. A man from Novovolynsk came to me, asking for help for his brother, who was terminally ill. He wanted his brother’s rehabilitation before he passed. I took the time to go through the documents. This was just an ordinary guy from Ukraine’s Volyn region who had once been involved in guarding a Jewish camp near Shatsk. Back then, no one thought anything of it. Later, he was drafted into the army, fought, was wounded near Berlin, and even earned medals. But when the Soviet machine kicked into gear, pushing for numbers, all of his achievements were wiped out. I submitted a petition for his rehabilitation on behalf of the SBU, but the head of the Supreme Court rejected it on purpose. He said the matter should’ve been dealt with by an investigator in the 1940s, not by us now, referring back to the time of Beria.
– Why was it so difficult to shake off the Soviet mentality and values within Ukraine’s security services?
– In Ukraine, it was impossible to create a structure, model, or mechanism that would operate independently of the shifting policies of those who came to power, whether in the Verkhovna Rada or as president.
The Security Service should be focused on ensuring security within the law, not making decisions on a whim or over the phone. There’s the Constitution, the Law on the Security Service, and the Criminal Code to follow. If there are signs of hostile activity, it needs to be addressed, not decided by who to convict, pardon, or show loyalty to.
Take, for example, the embarrassing leniency shown toward Derkach and his remarks. As far back as 1998, he was already talking about wanting to replicate the scenario of Putin coming to power. It was clear that Derkach, like Medvedchuk, was anti-Ukrainian. For years, they operated freely, with so many enemies still seated in the Verkhovna Rada. And the Security Service was powerless to act. A citizen who undermines Ukraine’s statehood violates the Constitution, or poses a threat to the country should be held accountable—this is non-negotiable.
When Ukraine first gained independence, I had two big worries. First, I wasn’t sure if Ukrainians could handle the loss of gas and oil, especially when it hit them in their wallets. But, in the end, they made it through. Second, I kept telling people, “Don’t worry, every day we live in an independent Ukraine makes us stronger.” I came to this conclusion by looking at the Baltic states, where, after 20 years of independence, people really started to feel what freedom tasted like. Sadly, Ukrainians didn’t get that experience right away—they lived through the horrors of the Holodomor. But after 30 years of independence, we’ve buried much of the old Beria-era mentality. A new generation has stepped up, and most of them are fighting today. Our national idea has won out, and now thousands of intelligence service workers are giving their lives to defend Ukrainian culture, history, and nationhood. That’s why Russia has come to realise it lost the battle for the past it tried to force on us, and that’s why it went to war.
