EU leaders met in Brussels for another summit, with one of the main topics on the table: whether to open negotiation clusters for Ukraine’s EU accession. These clusters — thematic blocks of European law — cover the full spectrum of core policy areas, from the fundamentals of the accession process and the internal market to competitiveness, inclusive development, the green agenda, sustainable connectivity, resources, agriculture, cohesion policy, and external relations.
Despite the positive political signals, there’s still no clear decision on when or how the process will actually move forward. EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos said all clusters tied to Ukraine’s accession should be ready to open after November 1. Liubov Akulenko, executive director of the Ukrainian Centre for European Policy, told The Ukrainian Week that three different timeline scenarios are now being weighed.
The next window of opportunity could open in the first half of November — if the European Commission takes the right decisions and member states signal their support. Another possibility is to find a way around — or at least soften — Hungary’s veto through talks with Viktor Orbán or by offering certain concessions. For instance, the issue of the Hungarian national minority could be placed in a separate first cluster, or assurances could be made that Ukraine and Moldova would not have veto power for a certain period, and so on.
“In that case, the opening could take place during the next European Council summit on 18–19 December, alongside other key decisions concerning Ukraine. The third option would be to delay the start of negotiations until 2026, if a political consensus cannot be reached in the coming months. Formally, no one wants to admit such a delay at this stage, and the European Commission is publicly pushing to avoid it — but the risk remains if Hungary refuses to budge and no alternative procedure is agreed,” says Liubov Akulenko.
In fact, Marta Kos pointed out that, were it not for Hungary’s obstruction, the negotiations could have begun much earlier. “Progress on the clusters in Ukraine’s EU accession talks has been blocked for over six months. This is unfair and serves no one — neither Europe nor Ukraine. Ukraine has done everything necessary to open the clusters on time. This is an artificial blockade, and we need to find a way to move forward,” President Volodymyr Zelensky said in his address to the European Council.
Liubov Akulenko, executive director of the Ukrainian Centre for European Policy, notes that there is political will to challenge Hungary’s veto, but it can realistically be pursued in only two ways: either through direct political pressure on Viktor Orbán, or by introducing a change to the QMV (qualified majority voting) system. Under such a system, the decision to open the negotiation clusters would be made by a qualified majority, while all subsequent steps — from closing the clusters to evaluating progress — would still require unanimity.
“Such an approach could neutralise Hungary’s position: the negotiations would move forward without its consent, while its veto would still apply during the closing of chapters. But the challenge goes beyond Hungary. Introducing QMV in the enlargement process also raises concerns among smaller member states that are reluctant to give up their leverage. The Netherlands, in particular, has been extremely cautious about the idea. An alternative could be setting up an arbitration mechanism, allowing these disputes to be taken out of the EU’s political arena and handled within an independent procedural framework,” says Liubov Akulenko.
There’s also a middle-ground option, known as front-loading. In this scenario, the negotiations wouldn’t be officially opened, but 26 member states would give their informal consent, allowing Ukraine to effectively start the process de facto, even though it would remain unofficial de jure.
“The principle of unanimity applies only to the negotiation framework set up individually for each country. The EU’s founding treaties don’t include such provisions and require unanimity only for the final accession decision. But in practice, changing the negotiation framework itself still requires a unanimous vote, meaning every member state effectively holds a veto over switching to QMV,” Liubov Akulenko told The Ukrainian Week.
Right now, there’s no straightforward way to overcome the blockade imposed by a single member state. Each potential path — whether QMV, an arbitration mechanism, or front-loading — comes with its own political risks and limitations. Ultimately, the outcome will hinge on the EU’s ability to balance institutional flexibility with political unity.
The summit also delivered a string of positive signals. EU countries pledged financial support for Ukraine for 2026–2027 and greenlit the Readiness 2030 plan — the bloc’s strategy for defence preparedness, which envisions closer integration of Ukraine into European defence institutions and industry. Just as notable was the approval of the 19th package of sanctions against Russia, underscoring the deep link between backing Ukraine and safeguarding Europe’s security.
