Keir Giles, a senior research fellow in the Russia and Eurasia programme at the British Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), is one of the few European analysts who has consistently studied Russia and warned about its aggressive expansionist ambitions. He has long urged European governments to bolster their own defence and security capabilities. In autumn 2024, he published a new book on the subject, titled Who Will Defend Europe?, which he dedicated to the brave people of Ukraine.
The Ukrainian Week spoke with Keir Giles about whether the United States is now effectively an ally of Russia, Europe’s ability to defend itself without U.S. involvement, and whether we are witnessing the collapse of the old world order.
***
– The top story on Politico.eu today [interview recorded on 20 February – ed.] was headlined “Trump’s America is now Russia’s ally.” Given the statements from President Trump and his administration over the past week, as well as the talks in Riyadh, can we now say that Trump’s America is genuinely an ally of Putin? Or is that still an exaggeration?
— That headline has been everywhere this morning, as many outlets are still framing the Riyadh talks as peace talks for Ukraine or as a potential step towards ending the war, without recognising that this wasn’t what the talks were about at all. Instead, the real outcome was a reshaping of relations between Russia and the United States, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio openly calling Russia a partner.
European leaders and the public are clearly struggling to keep up with the speed of these changes. They’ve always seen the U.S. as the backbone of NATO and, by extension, the cornerstone of European security. But now they’re witnessing the U.S. working with the very country that poses the greatest threat to European security. It’s going to take time for them to come to terms with this new reality.
But we shouldn’t be surprised. This turn of events fits perfectly with Trump’s actions, political choices, and statements throughout his first term. A key feature of all those statements was his tendency to prioritise Russia’s demands over the security interests not just of Europe, but even of the U.S. itself. So, after a brief pause—during which he vaguely talked about pressuring Russia to end the war—Donald Trump is once again showing his true colours.
Now, he’s actively working with Russia. And we should expect him to try and present some sort of settlement, one that, with U.S. support, will impose Russia’s demands on Ukraine—and possibly on Europe as a whole.
– Do you think Europe is now ready to adapt to this reality and start looking for solutions?
– No, European leaders are still clearly in a state of panic and haven’t managed to find a unified position. They can’t even agree on what the challenge is, let alone how to tackle it.
Keir Starmer, the UK Prime Minister, will head to Washington early next week with the aim of trying to convince President Trump to abandon his current course of action, appealing to the importance of Ukraine for European security.
But this is absolutely the wrong approach, because Trump has made it crystal clear that European security means nothing to him.
And if we’re now in a situation where the Trump-Musk alliance is not only dismantling the US federal government and its ability to function but also targeting the Department of Defense and calling for cuts of nearly 40% over the next five years, it’s clear that the erosion of American power and influence globally is a project that’s already well underway. European leaders, who matter very little to Trump, won’t be able to change anything. It’s time for Europe to take care of itself, and that certainly includes ensuring support for Ukraine so it has everything it needs to avoid falling under Russia’s dominance.
– You’ve already mentioned plans to cut the defence budget over the next five years. If Trump insists that America should be “great again,” why is he pushing for reductions in defence spending? How should we interpret this?
– It’s important not to confuse what Trump says with what he and those around him are actually doing. Their agenda is clear – it’s the dismantling of the United States, both domestically and in terms of its global power.
This has been Russia’s main goal ever since America became a dominant global force. The United States has always stood firm against aggression and defended the rights of democracies around the world. That’s what Russia opposes.
So, in order to push its own power and influence forward, Russia must undermine Washington’s standing. And now, the Trump-Musk duo is doing this with remarkable effectiveness, all on Russia’s behalf.
– In your book Who Will Defend Europe?, you argue that European governments need to convince their voters that security comes at a cost. With the German elections just around the corner, where the far-right “Alternative for Germany” party is likely to secure over 20% of the vote, and given that Germany is the largest economy in the EU, has the EU failed to make the case to its citizens that security requires investment?
– The EU hasn’t “failed” because it hasn’t even attempted to do that. Some leaders in Europe have managed to “sell” this approach. And of course, they’re in countries that are directly at risk – frontline states. There, defence spending has increased, including for civil defence, due to the destruction brought to Ukraine following Russia’s invasion. But west of Warsaw, the picture is very different. There’s been no real attempt to explain to voters what’s coming and what’s needed to face the threat. In the UK, once again, the newly elected government flatly refused to increase defence spending, even just to maintain current capabilities, let alone meet new challenges. Yes, this is an entirely too-late reaction, and it explains the occasional panic that seems to overwhelm European leaders whenever this reality hits them. Unfortunately, so far, that panic hasn’t led to any genuinely constructive action.
– The West’s reluctance to confront Russia before the full-scale invasion led it to believe it could attack Ukraine without significant repercussions. With the current situation involving Donald Trump and the United States, doesn’t this give Russia confidence that it could now invade a NATO and EU member country? Or do you think it will stick to using hybrid warfare tactics as it did before?
– Russia will always try to achieve its goals at the lowest possible cost and will only resort to military action against a country when it’s certain that NATO won’t provide a unified and devastating response. But of course, we’re much closer to that point now.
The United States has always been seen as the backstop of security. This was the term Keir Starmer used when, after an impulsive promise to send British troops to Ukraine, he realised that, due to the reduction in defence spending over the past 30 years, the UK was actually incapable of doing this without American support. This is the harsh reality, where the burden of defence has been shifted to the U.S. and its “security blanket,” which is now being cast off, leaving Europe exposed.
– Like other historians, you draw comparisons between the 1930s and today. Do you think we’re on the brink of a new world order, or is it something entirely different from the one that followed World War II?
– Certainly, we shouldn’t underestimate the scale of the upheavals that will result from a successful state takeover in the U.S., as it plays a central role in international security and the rules-based global order. If that’s taken away, the situation will collapse very quickly.
So, we’re once again facing a dark and dangerous period in history. The difference for Western European countries is that this time, they’re entering it unprepared.
For example, the United Kingdom doesn’t have the rapid rearmament programme that existed in the late 1930s, including investments in forces and capabilities that allowed us to survive 1940, such as integrated air defence. The UK currently lacks integrated, unified, and effective air defence against the threats we see in the 21st century. And the country’s vulnerability makes it an attractive target for coercion or deterrence.
