Alicia García-Herrero is Chief Economist for Asia Pacific at Natixis and a Senior Fellow at Bruegel. She spoke to The Ukrainian Week about the growing asymmetry in the Russia–China relationship, the pressure it creates for the Kremlin, and how Europe should navigate its policy towards both Moscow and Beijing.
– There is a growing argument that the Russia–China partnership is deeply asymmetric, with Russia becoming increasingly dependent on China and, as a result, losing some of its strategic autonomy. Do you agree with that assessment? Is China taking advantage of Russia’s weaker position?
– The relationship is undeniably asymmetric. But precisely because the Kremlin is so aware of that imbalance, it works hard to preserve as much strategic autonomy as it can.
The clearest example is the Xi–Putin summit in May 2026. Despite all the rhetoric about good-neighbourliness, equality and mutual respect, Putin left without securing what he had been seeking: China’s approval for the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline. That suggests Moscow was unwilling—or unable—to meet Beijing’s terms. The biggest sticking point was price. China was pushing for gas at rates comparable to Russia’s heavily subsidised domestic prices, which would have made exports exceptionally cheap for Beijing. And that’s exactly where the asymmetry becomes visible. China knows it has leverage and is prepared to use it. But there are limits to how far Putin is willing to accommodate Chinese demands, because doing so would further erode Russia’s bargaining position.
The Arctic is another case in point. Beijing has long sought greater access to the region, and that, too, appears to be an area where Moscow remains cautious about making concessions.
I think that’s where Putin’s red line lies. He recognises that the relationship is asymmetric and that Russia depends on China more than China depends on Russia. But he is also unwilling to surrender what he sees as Russia’s remaining strategic autonomy.
In my view, that also helps explain why he occasionally tries to re-engage with the United States. It’s an attempt to avoid becoming completely boxed into an unequal relationship with Beijing. That’s also why the language of the Xi–Putin joint statement matters. It repeatedly emphasised equality, mutual respect and partnership between equals. For Putin, that symbolism is important. From China’s perspective, however, rhetoric is cheap. Beijing has little problem endorsing language about equality, provided it comes at no cost. What matters to China is the reality of the relationship.
And the reality is that Beijing did not budge on the issues that mattered most. It was not prepared to back the Power of Siberia 2 project unless Russia accepted China’s terms—most notably on pricing, and, more broadly, on expanding China’s access to the Arctic.
– Do you think there is growing backlash among Russian elites over Moscow’s increasing dependence on China? And is Putin facing pressure over the way he is handling the relationship with Beijing?
– Yes, I think the backlash is real. And I wouldn’t limit it to the political elite. It’s also increasingly visible across Russia’s productive sectors.
If you’re a Russian manufacturer producing vehicles—or any goods that now have to compete with a flood of Chinese imports—you’re naturally going to demand protection. That’s one reason Russia has imposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. Interestingly, those tariffs have at times been higher than the EU’s, although that often goes unnoticed. They’ve also been repeatedly adjusted, reflecting the constant push and pull between Moscow’s domestic pressures and Beijing’s demands. Every time China pressures the Kremlin to ease those restrictions, it only fuels resentment among parts of the Russian establishment.
That said, it’s important not to treat the elite as a single bloc. There is a powerful ideological current in Russia that sees the pivot to Asia as irreversible, arguing that there is no viable path back to the West. Even within that camp, however, there is growing interest in broadening Russia’s partnerships beyond China. Take relations with India and Prime Minister Modi. What we’re seeing is, in many ways, a pivot within the pivot—a deliberate effort to reduce dependence on China without abandoning Asia altogether.
I think that reflects a growing recognition in Moscow that the relationship with Beijing has become too asymmetric. And if rebuilding ties with the West is seen as politically impossible, then diversifying Russia’s partnerships across the rest of Asia becomes the next best option.
– Despite the surge in Russia–China trade since 2022, two things stand out: China has largely avoided transferring technology to Russia, focusing instead on supplying goods, and it has not invested in production inside Russia. What does this tell us about the nature of their relationship?
– Frankly, this is a pattern we see elsewhere as well. Russia is not Iran, of course. It has far greater capabilities and significantly more leverage. But the underlying dynamic is remarkably similar.
Technology transfer between Russia and China remains highly selective. What China has largely provided are dual-use goods—not the know-how or industrial capacity to manufacture them independently. That includes microelectronics, CNC machines and components for drones. These supplies help Russia sustain production in the short term, but they do not make the country technologically self-sufficient. If those supply chains were disrupted, Russia would still struggle to replace them domestically.
The caution runs both ways. Historically, Moscow has also been reluctant to transfer its most sensitive military technologies to China – be it advanced engines, submarine technologies or certain classes of supersonic weapons.
We know this has been a persistent source of tension, even if much of it remains impossible to verify publicly. There were reports that the purge within the People’s Liberation Army around 2024—not the more recent purge in early 2026—was linked, at least in part, to complaints from Putin to Xi that Russian military technology had been appropriated by elements within the PLA without Moscow’s authorisation. Whether those reports are accurate or not, they point to a broader reality: both sides remain deeply cautious about sharing their most valuable technologies. From China’s perspective, limiting technology transfers preserves Russia’s dependence on Chinese dual-use exports. If Moscow were able to fully absorb those technologies, Beijing would lose an important source of leverage.
At the same time, China continues to seek access to Russian military technology, while Putin is increasingly wary of handing over capabilities without receiving meaningful strategic concessions in return. That’s what makes this relationship more complicated than China’s ties with countries such as Iran. In Iran’s case, the flow of technology and dependence is largely one-directional. With Russia, both sides are trying to extract technological advantages from the other while simultaneously preventing the other from gaining too much. That’s a far more delicate—and competitive—dynamic.
In my view, Putin probably feels even more compelled to use whatever technological leverage Russia still has to become less dependent on Chinese dual-use technology. That’s what makes this game so different—and so complex. Yes, it’s asymmetric, but leverage still runs both ways. I’ve already mentioned the Arctic and supersonic weapons. In many ways, it’s like a poker game: each side is trying to play its cards better than the other to gain more.
That’s why I think the relationship is far less stable than it appears. On paper—as we heard, unfortunately, right before the invasion of Ukraine—it was presented as a ‘no-limits’ partnership. In reality, however, it is not a relationship built on trust.
China still wants strategically important things from Russia, and the US is watching closely. Russia understands that, ultimately, when it comes to Ukraine—but also more broadly its role in the world—the only country capable of fundamentally changing its strategic position is not China, but the United States.
For that reason, I think this is a very important point. Again, you mentioned technology transfer from China to Russia, but I just want to stress that this is a highly complex issue. It is not the same as Iran; it is not the same as Venezuela. It is a very different situation. This is a highly strategic relationship, but one that is also marked by a lack of trust and can change. I think the Xi–Putin meeting in May was quite striking in terms of Xi’s messaging on the war, particularly the suggestion that it had gone on for too long. But I don’t think this means that China is changing its position on the war. I think it means China wants to get more from Russia. Again, if China had nothing to gain from Russia, it simply would not do this. But because there are still things China wants from Russia, the relationship remains very, very complex.
– Let’s look at the European perspective. In your co-authored article for the Kiel Institute report, you argue that Europe needs to pursue a dual-track approach in its China–Russia policy. What does that framework look like, and why do you think it is necessary?
– In my view, Europe has almost always approached Russia and China as two separate issues. There have been some attempts to look at them through the Russia–China angle, but overall Russia has always been a much more difficult relationship than China. China is, of course, seen by some in Europe as an enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine, but the EU–China agenda goes far beyond that. There are many other issues involved. Some are clearly difficult—we all know about the China 2.0 shock for Europe—but there are also plenty of other issues, such as climate.
For many years, Ukraine was the first issue Europe raised with China. The message was basically: “Before we discuss anything else, we need to talk about your relationship with Russia.” China–Russia came first, and only after that could Europe move on to the broader agenda. But over time, especially since Trump came back to power and the US position shifted, that dynamic has changed. In discussions with China, you increasingly hear the argument that “the US is doing more for Russia than we are,” and that has made the starting point much more difficult. Today, the conversation is simply much harder.
For me, this dual-track approach means that, yes, there are issues we need to discuss with China beyond Russia — and that is one track. But we cannot lose the other track. No conversation with China can happen without keeping both in mind. You cannot simply block engagement with China, because I think the relationship is too important for Europe, especially given the economic pressure Europe is facing from China. That would be unrealistic. And the dual track does not mean one side is good and the other is bad. It means separating Russia-related issues from non-Russia-related ones. But even the non-Russia-related track can be highly challenging at times. You cannot ignore China–Russia relations.
The value of this approach is that it forces Europe not to overlook the two dimensions of China’s impact: the indirect impact through Russia and the war in Ukraine, and the direct impact on Europe itself. That is why I think it is important to maintain this approach.
– If Europe were eventually to consider lifting sanctions against Russia, what would have to change for that to happen? Would Russia need to pay reparations, or take other major steps, before Europe could even consider such a move?
– First, on China’s sanctions. Europe has sanctioned a few Chinese banks, but these measures have been very limited. We are talking about very small banks, mainly from northern China. Yet let me tell you, even those limited measures still come with a cost, because China almost always responds with sanctions of its own. Beijing does not want to be seen as a country being sanctioned by Europe. Every time Europe has sanctioned China — take March 2021, after the measures announced in January — China came back with a much broader response, targeting European research centres such as MERICS and even members of the European Parliament. So, sanctioning China is not something Europe can do lightly. There are costs and risks involved, especially when it comes to core issues such as Xinjiang or Russia-related matters. That is the first thing to keep in mind.
Then, of course, there is the Russia question. Remember when China used to push Europe to lift sanctions on Russia? It no longer does. And I think that is very revealing. Why? Because China is comfortable with Russia being in a weaker position. Again, I come back to the key point: Beijing still believes Russia has things to offer.
Putin has been very careful not to completely exhaust his leverage, and that is why Chinese pressure on Europe to lift sanctions has remained relatively limited. This matters because Europe is now negotiating with China on issues such as overcapacity. One might have expected China to use its leverage to protect Russia — but that is not happening.
If Europe lifts sanctions on Russia, it will have to do so on its own terms, because there is currently no external pressure strong enough to force that decision. This means that lifting sanctions remains very difficult unless there is a significant move from Russia itself to end the war on terms that are acceptable, in my view, to both Europe and Ukraine. And that is an important point.
If this changes, and Putin decides to play his cards differently — for example, by giving China something significant, whether it is deeper strategic access or concessions such as on the Arctic — then Ukraine could face more pressure, because China would have additional leverage it could use with Europe. But that is not happening yet. Again, this is very much like a poker game: how much is Putin willing to give China in exchange for Beijing using its leverage with Europe? And would China actually do it?
I am a China expert, not a Russia expert, and I can tell you quite openly that China desperately needs exports right now. And that is why the tone towards Europe is changing and becoming somewhat more positive. China used to say: “There is nothing to negotiate here. Take it or leave it — you need us.” Now the message is a bit more nuanced: “Yes, you need us, but we also need you, so maybe we can move beyond this trade dispute.”
China understands that the situation in Europe is becoming increasingly difficult. Look at the tens of thousands of potential job losses at Volkswagen, for example. The reality is that China is no longer in such a strong position to use its leverage over Russia — unless Russia is willing to give away a great deal. And even then, because the Chinese economy is struggling outside of exports, using that leverage would come at a significant cost for Beijing.
This is, in a way, a sweet spot for Ukraine, if you ask me. Because you don’t have that China-driven pressure — coming through Russia — to lift the sanctions. At this point, this is really about Europe. And I think for Europe, given what is happening and the amount of political capital that has already been spent — look at Starmer, for example. He has been told that too much time has been spent on international issues. And, frankly, a big part of that is Russia and Ukraine. So, because of that political capital, Europe cannot lift the sanctions without some kind of victory. Otherwise, what do you tell your taxpayers or your voters? That is why, to finish here, I think a lot would have to happen before these sanctions can be lifted.
