Despite Western sanctions, Russia continues to rake in billions of euros in extra revenue from crude oil and petroleum product exports — money that flows straight into financing its war against Ukraine and bolstering its military machine.
A March report by Germany’s Federal Agency for Civic Education estimates that, on average, some 200 so-called “shadow” tankers sail out of Russian ports each month. More than three-quarters of Russia’s seaborne oil exports depart from terminals in the Baltic and Black Seas. Together, these vessels carry 110–120 million barrels of oil monthly, generating nearly €15 billion in additional revenue for the Kremlin last year.
Switzerland’s Neue Zürcher Zeitung recently laid out potential ways to curb the shadow fleet in the Baltic — or at least make its operations riskier, slower and more costly. The Ukrainian Week takes a closer look.
First, pressure could be applied to buyers of Russian oil through a unified blacklist. Europe and the United States, for example, could tie arms exports, technology transfers, and market access to strict conditions: no oil from sanctioned tankers. This approach would give at least two European countries leverage over India’s arms procurement — France with its Rafale fighter jets, and Germany with submarines and artillery ammunition.
Yet, in practice, the most effective measures have come largely from American, not European, sanctions. Buyers of Russian oil, the banks involved, and port authorities all faced U.S. penalties the moment they attempted any dealings with sanctioned vessels. This heightened pressure on the shadow fleet forced Russia to accept further price cuts on its oil exports. In the spring, after Donald Trump took office, questions arose about the future of U.S. sanctions, as the newly elected president explored how far they could be eased to open peace talks with Putin.
The article also points to the potential of a unified blacklist, given that no consolidated database of vessels currently exists. If such a list were maintained and regularly updated by the EU and the United Kingdom, it could be directly integrated into port and coastal protection systems — leaving shipping companies, banks, and insurers with no excuse of ignorance.
Second, stricter checks should ensure that tankers are properly insured, particularly with regard to financial coverage in the event of an oil spill. “Past incidents have shown that damages can run into the billions. If a vessel refuses to provide information, or if the insurance proves inadequate, sanctions could be applied. This could lead to ships being taken out of service or confiscated by authorities,” notes Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
Third, since there is still no unified coast guard system, establishing a joint civilian operations centre for countries bordering the Baltic Sea would be a significant step forward. Such a move would likely face criticism — at least in Germany, which opposes blending civilian and military measures. Yet this is exactly the approach Russia employs in the Baltic.
“This could serve a double purpose: it would help prevent environmental disasters from rusty tankers — like the Eventin, which ran aground near the island of Rügen this January and was detained by German customs — while also acting as a deterrent, making every vessel in the shadow fleet aware that it is under close watch,” writes Neue Zürcher Zeitung.
The fourth element is deterrence. Since January, NATO warships from the “Baltic Sentry” mission have been patrolling the Baltic Sea, and with the Alliance boosting its presence at sea and in the air, keeping an eye on suspicious vessels has become easier. The EU could also launch an operation similar to the “Aspides” mission in the Red Sea, aimed at protecting freedom of navigation. But this approach carries risks, as Russia could see any increase in Western naval presence as an escalation, making this measure largely symbolic.
The final — and least likely — option is a naval blockade, which could only be enacted in a state of defence. Roderich Kiesewetter, a CDU/CSU expert on foreign and security policy, notes that under the right of self-defence it could be legitimate to declare a threat and deploy naval forces against shadow fleet vessels. Still, such a move would sharply raise the risk of armed confrontation with Russia.
