Every week, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Kremlin’s new strategy to “counter extremism,” Russia’s ongoing mobilisation, and Moscow’s efforts to destabilise Moldova ahead of the elections.
Domestic policy takeaways
- Moscow unveils a new “counter-extremism” strategy with significant implications for Russian society and Ukraine. On December 28, Russian President Putin approved a new strategy for “countering extremism,” a document with significant implications for both Russia’s domestic politics and its foreign policy. When it comes to foreign policy, the strategy openly confirms the Kremlin’s intent to address so-called extremist threats “originating from Ukraine.” This essentially serves as another justification to prolong the war. The document also outlines plans for the “socio-cultural integration” of Ukraine’s occupied territories as part of its efforts to counter extremism. While the specifics of this integration remain unclear, it likely points to ramped-up propaganda targeting these regions. Ukrainian Prism previously highlighted that Moscow’s 2025 budget includes, for the first time, substantial funding for propaganda media directed at the occupied areas of Ukraine. This raises the issue of the necessity for Ukraine to start as soon as possible to create a new practical strategy to counter Moscow’s efforts to intensify the spread of propaganda among the population of the occupied territories.
- The document introduces several “new features” within Russia that are set to have a harsh impact on what remains of civil society, as well as on independent public figures and non-systemic political groups. Among these changes is the proliferation of overlapping legal terms such as “xenophobia,” “Russophobia,” “financing of extremist activities,” “extremism,” and “ideology of violence.” The danger lies in how easily law enforcement agencies can weaponise these broad and nearly interchangeable definitions. Any public statement by a figure or activist could be interpreted as falling under one of these categories, providing a pretext for launching criminal cases.
- One of the most significant changes is the introduction of a registry of Russians who have left the country. The document identifies this measure as a key element in its strategy for “countering extremism.” This move seems to target two groups. The first includes Russians still in the country who may be planning to leave, especially in light of the recent military draft, widely seen as a form of covert mobilisation. The second group comprises Russians abroad, particularly those involved in opposition activities, as the registry could be used to exert pressure on these individuals.
- The document also outlines plans to involve schoolchildren in “supporting veterans of the war with Ukraine” as a way to prevent the spread of extremist ideology among teenagers. While the Kremlin has been ramping up its efforts to instil propaganda in children and teens since the full-scale invasion began, these initiatives, like earlier ones, are unlikely to yield the desired results.
- Mobilisation in Russia: The long-awaited “unified digital military register” is now operational. Under Russian law, the so-called “unified digital register of military registration” is set to officially launch on January 1, 2025. Over the past year, Ukrainian Prism has repeatedly analysed this development as a key element in the authorities’ preparations for a potential second wave of mobilisation. Essentially, the registry is designed to issue electronic summonses to Russian citizens while facilitating direct communication between the Ministry of Defence and the FSB. The Ministry oversees mobilisation, while the FSB controls border security and monitors crossings by Russian nationals.
- Previously, there was no real-time information exchange between these two agencies regarding conscripts. This new connection is critical for the registry’s main function, which was partially implemented during the autumn 2024 conscription: restricting the travel of individuals eligible for military service as soon as a summons is recorded in the electronic system. Ukrainian Prism noted earlier that Moscow had planned to launch the registry in the autumn of 2024 and trial it during the seasonal conscription. However, initial tests in select regions exposed significant technical issues, forcing a delay in the system’s rollout.
- The chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defence, Andrey Kartapolov, confirmed in September that the registry would officially go live on January 1, 2025. However, it is important to note that the Kremlin will likely conduct further trials during the spring 2025 conscription period (April 1 to July 15) to ensure the system’s functionality before considering a second wave of mobilisation. This suggests that the likelihood of Russia initiating a new mobilisation wave in the early months—or even the first half—of 2025 is relatively low, barring a significant deterioration in Moscow’s position on the battlefield.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Moscow halts gas to Transnistria, marking the start of its strategy to sway Moldova’s upcoming parliamentary elections. As anticipated, the flow of Russian gas through Ukrainian territory was completely halted on January 1, following the agreement’s expiration between Ukraine and Russia. However, this development has unexpectedly caused a major crisis for Transnistria, a pro-Russian separatist “republic” in Moldova. Since the start of the year, the Russian company Gazprom has stopped supplying gas to the region, which heavily relies on free gas to sustain its economy and overall operations.
- Gazprom cited unpaid gas bills from Moldova—through which Transnistria officially received its supply—as the reason for the cutoff. Yet, for roughly two decades, Russia had provided gas to Transnistria virtually free of charge without issue. The sudden halt has now triggered an energy collapse, sparking fears of a looming socio-economic crisis in the region.
- Interestingly, Russia retains the technical capacity to deliver gas to Transnistria via the Trans-Balkan route. This raises suspicions that the Kremlin’s move is politically motivated, aimed at stirring instability in Moldova ahead of crucial parliamentary elections where pro-Russian factions stand a strong chance of success. Rising electricity costs, the threat of blackouts, and potential refugees from the left bank of the Dniester could sway the Moldovan electorate.
- Compounding the problem is Transnistria’s large thermal power plant, which relied on Russian gas to produce electricity, much of which was sold to Moldova. With this supply now cut off, Moldova’s energy sector faces significant challenges, adding to the broader uncertainty in the region.
- The state of Russian-Syrian relations and the future of Russia’s military bases. Ukrainian Prism continues to monitor relations between Russia and Syria’s new government to assess the future of Moscow’s military bases in the country. So far, there has been no confirmation of a complete withdrawal from the bases in Tartus and Hmeymim. In fact, recent statements from members of Syria’s new leadership suggest otherwise.
- Ahmed al-Sharaa, the de facto leader of Syria and head of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group, has expressed a desire to maintain ties with Russia and avoid actions that might strain their bilateral relations. Meanwhile, Russia has taken a noticeably tougher stance towards the ousted regime of Bashar al-Assad. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently criticised the former government, citing its failure to meet the basic needs of the Syrian population as the primary cause of its downfall.
- Given these dynamics, it appears Moscow has a strong chance of preserving its military presence in Syria. Ukrainian Prism will continue to closely track developments, particularly given the strategic importance of the Khmeimim and Tartus bases to Russia’s operations in Africa.
