Ukrainian journalist and European Parliament candidate for the Italian party Azione, Nataliya Kudryk, spoke to The Ukrainian Week about support for Ukraine in Italy, key factors shaping public opinion, and the Pope’s rhetoric.
***
– How has support for Ukraine in Italy changed since the full-scale war began, and what factors have influenced this shift?
— I would distinguish between the official stance of Giorgia Meloni’s government and the broader public sentiment in Italy. At Christmas, the Italian government approved its 10th military aid package for Ukraine for the upcoming year, marking the fourth such package under Meloni’s leadership. The specifics of this aid remain classified, and since 2022, the Italian authorities have refrained from revealing the details of what is being provided. However, it is known, for instance, that two significant and powerful SAMP/T air defence systems have been sent to Ukraine. Reports also suggest that this package includes the missiles required to sustain and operate these systems.
Despite the presence of divergent voices within the pro-government majority — including some politicians with pro-Kremlin and openly pro-Russian leanings — the Italian government has maintained a clear position of support for Ukraine.
For the time being, Meloni has managed to sideline these dissenting voices, although on occasion, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani and Defence Minister Guido Crosetto have made statements that leave room for ambiguity and uncertainty.
That being said, I do have concerns with the current government, particularly given that Rome still prevents Ukraine from using Western weapons to strike Russian territory. Take, for example, Tajani’s recent comments, such as “we are not at war with Russia.” How should we interpret these remarks, and what do they really signal? To me, it suggests a lingering desire to preserve ties with Russia, as well as an indication to Moscow that once the conflict subsides, Italy would be quick to restore relations. Unfortunately, the ministers have not made themselves available for interviews on this topic.
When it comes to public opinion in Italy, it’s clear that attitudes are highly divided and have become increasingly polarised. The shift began as early as 2022 when Italian television was flooded with a steady stream of Kremlin-backed agents and so-called experts who pushed a narrative that was seen by many in Italy as an alternative view of events. The mood shifted again in the autumn of 2023, when Ukraine’s counteroffensive appeared to stall.
Today, a prevailing view among much of the Italian population is that a diplomatic resolution should be pursued, which, in practical terms, often translates to the concession of Ukrainian territories. There’s a sense that Ukraine is seen as a sacrifice that can be pressured into negotiation. These sentiments are actively promoted by politicians, including those within the pro-government majority. Matteo Salvini, leader of the Northern League, has long maintained an anti-Ukrainian stance, while Giuseppe Conte, head of the opposition Five Star Movement, shares similar views. Meanwhile, opposition leaders such as Elly Schlein of the Democratic Party and Nicola Fratoianni of the Left Green Alliance hold an ambiguous position, opposing further military aid to Ukraine.
This rhetoric is echoed by influential opinion leaders—historians, political scientists, journalists, and writers—who frequently appear in the media, fuelling debates about the necessity of halting the war and pursuing negotiations. Catholic communities, wielding significant influence in Italy, amplify these views, drawing on the pacifism championed by the Vatican. Pro-Russian sentiments are also relatively prevalent in these circles.
At the same time, a vocal minority—roughly 8% of the population—remains steadfast in its support for Ukraine, reflected in the share of voters backing explicitly pro-Ukrainian parties in the most recent European elections.
– What other factors contribute to these sentiments? Why is it so challenging to promote pro-Ukrainian views at this point?
— Even before 2022, Ukraine was not widely seen in Italy as a fully independent nation, despite the tireless efforts of the diaspora, Ukrainian diplomats, and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. Instead, Ukraine was often regarded as something closely tied to Russia, existing within its sphere of influence. Questions like, “Is Ukrainian really a different language from Russian?” were common, and we found ourselves repeatedly explaining this distinction.
Furthermore, Italy has long harboured strong Russophile sentiments, dating back to the era of the empire, the Soviet Union, and continuing through to modern Russia. The Communist Party had a significant influence here, both politically and culturally, with the effects still felt today. While Italy was part of the Euro-Atlantic bloc, for many Italian communists and intellectuals—particularly in academic and political circles—Moscow was the ultimate authority and the main point of reference. It was seen as a counterbalance to the United States, which also gave rise to a strain of anti-Americanism.
As Ukrainian writer Oksana Zabuzhko aptly describes, a deep ideological and cultural framework has been built over time, woven through a network of Russian agents, entrepreneurs, diplomats, and cultural figures. This foundation has made it exceedingly difficult to counter these narratives now. In meetings, one often encounters confusion—how can one possibly challenge the grand myth surrounding Russia, its military, its economy, and, above all, its culture, which has been carefully constructed over decades?
In recent years, Russian propaganda has been aggressively propagated through numerous cultural events across Italy—art films, creative evenings, and performances such as Anna Netrebko’s appearances at La Scala.
Sadly, I have yet to hear any prominent Italian intellectual or cultural figure publicly condemn these events. I’m not even suggesting the outright cancellation of Russian culture, but at the very least, calling for a pause or offering a critical perspective would seem reasonable. Simply questioning the appropriateness of such events would be a start. However, the prevailing view remains that culture should be kept entirely separate from politics. As a result, the burden of confronting these issues falls squarely on the shoulders of the Ukrainian diaspora and diplomats.
– Recently, the Italian Institute for Socioeconomic Research (CENSIS) published an analysis of Italy’s social situation for 2024, revealing that over 65% of Italians blame the West for the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. Why do these views persist?
– Indeed, there is a widespread belief among the public that nearly every armed conflict worldwide has been provoked by the United States and its European allies. As a result, wars in Ukraine and the Middle East are often viewed through this lens.
In the case of Ukraine, when the full-scale war began, many Italians admired the courage and heroism of the Ukrainian people as they resisted the Kremlin’s forces. Eighteen million Italians contributed to humanitarian aid for those affected by the bombings, and Italy welcomed over 160,000 Ukrainian refugees. However, over time, public sentiment began to shift. A growing number of Italians now believe that the United States is using Kyiv as a ‘pawn to weaken Russia’. This view has contributed to the idea of a proxy war—a clash of interests involving the US, Russia, and China.
Similar attitudes have emerged regarding Israel, where the perception of long-standing US support for what many Italians claim is a genocidal policy by Israel towards the Palestinian people has shaped public opinion.
On the other hand, much of the blame is directed at the United States—who else, after all? Europeans? That would require Italians to share in the accountability, something they are not particularly inclined to do. People often argue: “We’ve never had any historical issues with Russia; our relationship has been marked by strong economic, political, and cultural ties. So why should we bear any responsibility?”
Furthermore, Italy lacks a robust culture of responsibility or a tendency to make bold decisions, even when they are positive. There is a prevailing reluctance to take a clear stance. A friend once told me, “Do you know why Italians find it hard to understand Ukrainians? Because we have a saying: ‘Better a live coward than a dead hero.'” As a result, Italians often place the blame on the Americans and Brussels bureaucrats, insisting it’s their fault. Meanwhile, they maintain that they neither want war nor wish to take accountability for it.
– This study also reveals an intriguing trend among young people, who make up the largest group of those indifferent to armed conflicts. What does this signify, especially when it comes to supporting Ukraine?
– At various public events and conferences, I’ve noticed that few young people seem to engage with this issue. The education and cultural framework for youth in Italy, as in many European countries, largely revolves around fulfilling individual needs. As a result, ideals such as defending one’s homeland, condemning dictatorial regimes, protecting democracy, or upholding justice receive little attention. When these topics are discussed in schools, if at all, they are often framed as, “You’re lucky to live in a democratic country.” Authoritarian regimes are portrayed as distant, making them feel abstract and detached for students.
School textbooks, too, often carry pro-Russian narratives. Despite the presence of newer editions, if Ukraine’s Ministry of Education were to examine them, there would be numerous issues to address. Unfortunately, this is a concern for Ukrainian parents rather than Italian ones. A similar perspective extends not only to Ukraine but also to other former Soviet republics.
Nowadays, if children ask questions — and I know this from personal experience as my child attends middle school — teachers either avoid discussing the topic or try to explain it in a very neutral manner, saying something along the lines of, “Both Russia and Ukraine deserve respect, and everyone should live in peace.”
In one Italian town, I observed a meeting where an Italian journalist, an Italian professor, and a Ukrainian professor spoke about Ukraine and the harmful effects of Russian propaganda. Although the high school students didn’t seem particularly engaged, one boy asked a question. His point was that while they had spoken about Russian propaganda, the students were also subjected to American propaganda, which he claimed was equally manipulative. He asked why Europeans couldn’t live independently, free from the influence of either Russia or the United States, adding that they simply wanted to live without being drawn into anyone’s camp. This kind of sentiment seems prevalent among young people, and it’s difficult to view it as fostering a sense of responsible European citizenship.
– This year, you ran for the European Parliament with the Italian party Azione. What challenges did you encounter?
– Initially, there was a sense of distrust, disillusionment, and pessimism within the Ukrainian community. This stemmed from several factors, but the bottom line was that many simply weren’t interested in the European elections. This indifference was partly due to a lack of political awareness or engagement with local political processes. At times, it was driven by a lack of trust in local politicians, who were seen as inconsistent. Ukrainian candidates were often welcomed into political ranks not out of genuine support, but because discussing Ukraine was seen as politically fashionable. In general, there was little enthusiasm for this political event, particularly given Europe’s lack of strong action and insufficient support for Kyiv and Ukraine’s Armed Forces.
Of course, there were individuals who supported us, but given the size of the Ukrainian community in Italy, especially those with Italian passports, the overall interest was low. While the prospects for Ukrainian candidates may not have been particularly high, it was still an opportunity to make our presence felt as a community—especially since this was the first time Italian parties had invited us to take part in these elections.
One of the main challenges was convincing my party colleagues that the situation in Ukraine demanded a swift, decisive response—without hesitation or undue fear. It was crucial to clearly communicate to voters, especially the Ukrainian community, where the party stood on key issues, such as allowing Ukraine to use Western weapons to strike Russian territory. Initially, the leader made a rather ambiguous statement, and I had to persuade many that we needed to take a firm stance on this. Eventually, the party adopted this position, and it may have been the only one during the elections to explicitly state that Ukraine should be allowed to target strategic military sites in Russia.
I also encountered scepticism within the party regarding holding the Putin regime accountable, particularly when it came to prosecuting Putin for war crimes in Ukraine. Unfortunately, even among our allies—liberal Europeans who support Ukraine’s resistance—there is a pervasive doubt about the possibility of punishing Russian war criminals on the international stage.
Another significant challenge was explaining to Italian voters the broader threat of Russian imperialism—not just to Ukraine, Lithuania, or Poland, but to the entire fabric of Europe, including Italy.
– Pope Francis has made controversial remarks about Ukraine, including criticising Europe’s arms supply. Is there anything that could shift his stance, and how should Ukraine address this?
– I believe Pope Francis is unlikely to change his position on the Russian-Ukrainian war, and particularly on Ukraine, for two key reasons. The broader one is his deeply held belief that there is no such thing as a just war; in his view, all wars are a form of madness and failure. As such, it doesn’t matter to him that Russia is the aggressor and Ukraine is defending itself—his condemnation is directed at war as a phenomenon, rather than making a distinction between the aggressor and the victim.
Secondly, as some Vatican commentators have pointed out, the pope has long harboured pro-Russian sentiments. He has shown considerable sympathy for the Russian Orthodox Church and for Russia as a nation. Moreover, one must also factor in his personal ambitions—Pope Francis has expressed a desire to be the first Roman Catholic pontiff to visit Russia.
Yes, Pope Francis frequently speaks about Ukraine at pilgrim gatherings and various ceremonial events, but as many commentators note, these statements hold little diplomatic weight. In 2023, he announced a peace mission that was initially expected to produce significant results. However, it has since been reduced to more modest humanitarian efforts, such as helping to free Ukrainian prisoners of war and return deported children from Russia. From what I hear, including from Ukrainian civil society organizations, the Vatican’s influence in this regard is quite limited.
That said, I know the Vatican has gathered the names of around five thousand individuals in captivity. I personally witnessed Cardinal Matteo Zuppi speaking with a woman searching for her son. In this regard, the Vatican does appear to be genuinely attentive, and I remain hopeful that their efforts are making a difference.
– How can Ukraine work more effectively with the Vatican?
– From what I’ve observed, Ukraine is already doing a great deal, particularly the Ukrainian embassy and, above all, the Greek Catholic Church. When His Beatitude Sviatoslav visits Rome, he attracts far more attention than even President Zelensky. His press conferences draw large crowds of journalists, and his words are widely quoted.
There have been suggestions that there’s no pro-Ukrainian lobby within the Vatican, and that the embassy could take a stronger stance. This is a matter for diplomats and experts in the field to discuss. However, from my perspective, even with increased efforts, it would be difficult to change Pope Francis’ position, especially given that many Ukrainian Christians look to him for guidance. If he holds such convictions, I don’t think they can be easily altered. Our focus should be on moving forward and continuing our work.
