Every week, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Slovak Prime Minister’s Moscow visit, political fallout from the Azerbaijani plane crash, and Putin’s latest comments on ‘negotiations’.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Azerbaijani plane crash: political consequences. On December 25, an Azerbaijani Airlines flight from Baku to Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, crashed near Kazakhstan’s Aktau airport. Evidence from the wreckage photos suggests the most likely cause was an accidental strike by Russia’s air defence system. This incident occurred because Russia failed to close its airspace despite reported Ukrainian drone attacks on Chechnya at the time. In response, several major international airlines have already cancelled flights over this region of Russia. Azerbaijani government representatives, speaking anonymously through local media, have stated their expectation that Moscow will admit fault and provide compensation. Meanwhile, some Azerbaijani parliament members have made similar demands publicly. Officially, Azerbaijan has attributed the crash to “external physical and technical interference.” For Russia, the accident has two aspects. In terms of foreign policy, its impact hinges on whether Moscow admits responsibility. However, practically, it is unlikely to affect bilateral relations with Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan. The most tangible consequence, in the absence of a response, would be the continued suspension of international flights over certain Russian regions.
- The situation is markedly different when it comes to domestic politics. First, we need to await detailed information about who was directly responsible for shooting down the plane. If it was carried out by Chechen forces, it could spark federal dissatisfaction with Moscow over Kadyrov’s increasingly unilateral actions. If it was the work of air defence systems, it’s worth noting that direct attacks on Chechnya have only recently begun, each accompanied by high-profile threats from Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. It’s plausible that Kadyrov persuaded the Kremlin to provide additional air defence systems, given the lack of significant responses to previous drone strikes.
- The downing of the Azerbaijani plane casts a negative light on Kadyrov. His public offer to compensate the victims’ families, effectively acknowledging guilt without making explicit statements, further damages his image. This is not the only recent setback. Just days ago, Kadyrov interfered in Uzbekistan’s domestic politics following allegations of Chechen involvement in a failed assassination attempt on a local official. His subsequent threats drew public ire from Uzbek politicians. Earlier, Kadyrov had openly clashed with senior figures in Russian federal law enforcement agencies.
- These incidents have dealt continuous blows to Kadyrov’s reputation within Russia and may eventually call into question his ability to maintain effective control over Chechnya.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Slovak Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow. On December 22, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico made his first official visit to Russia, holding a several-hour meeting with Putin. This visit had not been officially announced beforehand, though Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić had mentioned it a few days prior. The discussions between the Russian president and the Slovak prime minister centred on the gas issue—specifically, the agreement on the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine, which is set to expire on January 1, 2025, and will not be renewed. In recent months, various media outlets have reported on negotiations exploring alternative formats for continuing gas transit, but these efforts have yielded no tangible results. Both Ukrainian and Slovak analysts suggest that Fico’s visit was a political gesture aimed at his domestic audience, as well as a potential form of “revenge” for Ukraine’s stance on the transit issue.
- No press conference followed the talks between Fico and Putin. However, a few days later, it emerged that the leaders, as anticipated, discussed the issue of “peace talks.” Moscow capitalised on this, making it the only significant political outcome of the meeting. For instance, during a press conference following the Eurasian Economic Union summit in Belarus, Putin stated that Slovakia was ready to serve as a platform for “peace negotiations” and that Russia itself had no objection to this. The Slovak authorities later confirmed this information.
- This development provides Moscow with a narrative to publicly promote the idea that Russia is open to peace talks despite its ongoing rhetoric contradicting such claims. In this context, the emphasis lies on “peaceful rhetoric” rather than any genuine willingness by the Kremlin to negotiate. These statements allow Putin to present himself as a peacemaker on the international stage, contrasting with Ukraine, which is unlikely to entertain such a proposal given Fico’s pro-Russian stance. Additionally, the talks between Fico and Putin highlight the continued failure to achieve effective diplomatic isolation of Russia. Unfortunately, there appear to be no viable paths to alter this situation, particularly in light of the possibility of discussions between newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump and Putin.
- New statements from the Russian authorities on the ‘negotiations’. At the aforementioned press conference, in addition to discussing Slovakia as a potential platform for “peace talks,” Putin made several political statements that shed light on Moscow’s stance ahead of anticipated talks with Trump on ending the war. Notably, the Russian leader declared that Russia intends to continue the war in 2025, indirectly casting doubt on the likelihood of achieving peace through negotiations. Furthermore, Putin reiterated his threats, mentioning the potential use of the Oreshnik missile and “more powerful” medium-range weapons against Ukraine. Simultaneously, however, he publicly expressed a desire to end the war.
- Another key element of his remarks was Russia’s position on Ukraine’s NATO membership. Putin explained Moscow’s “ultimatum” regarding the war’s resolution, which involves a legally binding guarantee from Kyiv and Western nations that Ukraine will not join the Alliance. Reports indicate that Trump’s team is considering delaying Ukraine’s NATO membership for a specific period, but Putin underscored that Russia demands permanent assurances of Kyiv’s non-membership, signalling an unwillingness to compromise on this critical issue.
- This, combined with Russia’s second “ultimatum” — the continued occupation of territories in four Ukrainian regions — highlights that Moscow’s position remains unchanged and offers little hope for a peaceful resolution in the near future. The Ukrainian government should leverage these facts to counter Russia’s “peaceful” rhetoric and present them frequently to the incoming Trump administration.
- Russia’s renewed nuclear blackmail threats. Alongside its unyielding “negotiation” rhetoric and ongoing threats against Ukraine, the Kremlin has once again resorted to nuclear blackmail. Since adopting its new nuclear doctrine, Moscow had refrained from mentioning the use or testing of nuclear weapons, but now Russian authorities have decided to bring this factor back into play. For instance, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, one of Russia’s leading diplomats in negotiations with Western countries, stated that Moscow is considering a full range of potential steps, including the resumption of nuclear tests. Ryabkov went on to place partial blame on Donald Trump, claiming that the Trump administration had taken a radical stance on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. He pointed out that the 2018 version of the U.S. nuclear doctrine explicitly portrayed this treaty as harmful to American interests. This move by Moscow is further evidence that it has no intention of moderating its radical rhetoric, even in the context of potential negotiations with Trump. Consequently, the notion that Moscow is genuinely aiming for an end to the war is unfounded.
- Russia may use former MP Viktor Medvedchuk and his projects to pressure Kyiv. As Donald Trump’s inauguration approaches and preparations for potential peace talks begin, Russia appears to be stepping up its efforts to promote “alternative” Ukrainian political forces in the public sphere. One such initiative is the organisation known as “Other Ukraine,” established by former MP Viktor Medvedchuk, who was accused of treason and later exchanged. Launched in 2023, this project brought together former pro-Russian journalists, public figures, and MPs who fled Ukraine after the full-scale invasion. They have since been vocal in advocating Russia’s stance and criticising the Ukrainian government.
- Until recently, this organisation had received little attention from Russian resources and seemed to serve merely as a pretext for fund distribution. However, since December, the situation has shifted. The Kremlin utilised this group during the “Direct Line with the President” event, where a representative of “Other Ukraine” questioned Putin about the conditions for negotiations with Ukraine and who the Kremlin would engage with “if it’s not Zelensky.” While Medvedchuk’s name wasn’t mentioned in the question, Putin referenced him in his response, effectively reintroducing Medvedchuk into Russian political discourse.
- Shortly after, Medvedchuk resurfaced in the media, this time in Ukrainian outlets, claiming he had filed a request with the Brussels prosecutor’s office to open a criminal case against Volodymyr Zelenskyy for allegedly attempting to bribe Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico. This increased media activity, coinciding with the lead-up to Moscow’s discussions with Trump, suggests that Russia might be aiming to leverage this political project to heighten pressure on Ukraine. However, it’s also possible that Medvedchuk’s actions are self-motivated and intended to regain relevance in the media landscape. Ukraine should disregard such statements and activities by these Russian “proxy” political resources.
- Iran and Russia are preparing to sign a potential “defence” agreement. On December 27, Iran’s ambassador to Russia confirmed that a long-anticipated agreement on comprehensive cooperation between Iran and Russia would be signed during Iranian President Massoud Peseshkian’s official visit to Moscow on January 17, 2025. The Russian government has been pushing for this agreement for months, and early reports suggest it may mirror the pact recently signed between Russia and North Korea.
- Ukrainian Prism has repeatedly highlighted the challenges in Iranian-Russian relations. Over the summer and autumn of 2024, a behind-the-scenes conflict emerged between Tehran and Moscow regarding the resolution of tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Zangezour corridor. Furthermore, after Iran elected a new president this summer, there were indications that Tehran might be open to mending ties with the West.
- However, following the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria—a significant blow to Iran’s influence in the Middle East—Tehran seems to be pivoting toward a closer alliance with Russia. While the specifics of the forthcoming agreement remain unclear, if it mirrors the one signed with North Korea, it could spell trouble for Ukraine. This might involve the deployment of Iranian forces in the war or deeper military collaboration between Moscow and Tehran.
- Increased focus on sanctions against Russia’s “shadow fleet.” A vessel from Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet,” used by Moscow to circumvent sanctions and sell oil, was detained in the Baltic Sea. Finnish special forces boarded the ship following a series of undersea internet cable disruptions in the region over the past week. The tanker’s route revealed suspicious movements near the damaged cables, and the absence of its anchor further supports allegations that Russia employed the vessel to sabotage underwater infrastructure.
- This incident has bolstered calls for stricter sanctions against Russia’s “shadow fleet.” EU officials have also indicated they are considering restrictions on these ageing tankers. Notably, in October 2024, Estonia and Finland publicly warned that they might close the Baltic Sea to Russian ships if security risks persisted—an option that now seems increasingly plausible. However, such actions could provoke military threats from Moscow.
- The Ukrainian Prism has previously analysed political trends within certain EU countries, suggesting renewed efforts to tackle Russia’s “shadow fleet.” Additionally, according to The Washington Post, the Biden administration is reportedly considering new sanctions against Russia in response to these developments.
