Every week, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Putin starts involving its war veterans in the government, the recent meeting of the Russian Ministry of Defence’s Collegium, and the sale of Russian uranium assets in Kazakhstan to China.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- The consequences of Prigozhin’s rebellion: Russian State Duma tightens penalties for armed uprisings. On 17 December, the Russian State Duma passed a bill in its second and third readings aimed at “strengthening responsibility for organising and participating in an armed rebellion.” The bill’s first reading took place on 15 October. The rapid progression of this legislation clearly suggests Kremlin involvement, making its full adoption likely in the near future. In essence, it is an update to the Russian Criminal Code, introducing several new articles and refining existing terminology. These changes, largely technical, appear designed to streamline the legal framework for imposing relevant penalties.
- The revised terms are notably harsher: the list of offences punishable by life imprisonment has been expanded, and early release for “terrorist activities and participation in armed rebellion” is explicitly ruled out. While this severity doesn’t necessarily imply that the Kremlin fears the emergence of another rebellion, it delivers a political message: the leniency shown during the Prigozhin episode (when Wagner fighters avoided punishment) will not be repeated, and future rebels will face consequences.
- Beyond its technical provisions, this bill reveals steps taken by the authorities to preempt the possibility of another rebellion. For instance, it explicitly states that individuals who voluntarily inform the authorities about a planned rebellion will qualify for “early release from punishment.” In theory, this measure aims to deter potential rebels and sow discord within their ranks.
- However, under current conditions in Russia, the likelihood of another armed rebellion remains remote. The decisions and circumstances that might theoretically lead to such an event appear highly improbable, particularly in the short or medium term. Crucially, only one structure in Russia mirrors the Wagner Group in terms of autonomy and hierarchy: Ramzan Kadyrov’s personal army in Chechnya. According to Kadyrov himself, he commands around 70,000 fighters. Yet, no factors suggest a realistic prospect of Kadyrov staging a rebellion against Moscow. Additionally, this law carries a broader political message, particularly in the context of potential negotiations with former US President Donald Trump. It signals the state’s readiness to adopt a hardline stance domestically in anticipation of any diplomatic talks.
- Putin continues to push for the inclusion of war veterans in Russian government structures. On 14 December, the 22nd congress of the ruling United Russia party took place. Unlike in previous years, this meeting featured several notable announcements and directions for the party’s future development. Most significantly, there was a partial leadership reshuffle, favouring a small number of war veterans. This shift aligns with the policy outlined by Putin during his Federal Address earlier in 2024, which declared Russian veterans of the war against Ukraine as the country’s “new elite,” destined to assume state positions. To support this initiative, certain structures have been formally established under Sergei Kiriyenko, the first deputy head of the Russian presidential administration and the unofficial overseer of domestic policy. Among these is the “Time of Heroes” educational programme, designed to prepare veterans for roles as officials and civil servants. Some graduates of this programme have already assumed positions in Russian regions.
- In practice, however, Putin’s push to form a “new elite” has encountered resistance within the domestic political system and a degree of rejection from the public. This was evident during the autumn elections at various levels. Despite the emphasis on veterans, only a small fraction were elected to parliamentary positions. Of the 308 successful candidates, just 37 veterans secured seats in regional parliaments.
- Recent developments suggest that Putin aims to integrate veterans directly into United Russia’s governing structures. This strategy appears designed to reshape the party’s post-war reputation by centring it around the veterans’ community. While this approach could help the Kremlin limit veterans’ political influence by binding them to the ruling party, it faces clear challenges. The main challenge lies in the traditional Russian bureaucracy’s resistance to integrating veterans, a tension already evident in some instances. Over time, this could create a significant rift within United Russia. Putin may either be overlooking this risk or merely using rhetoric about veterans’ inclusion as a façade, with no real intention of granting them power—a scenario that seems more likely.
- Overall, these moves hint at the priorities Putin and United Russia may focus on as they prepare for the 2026 State Duma elections. Likely themes include a symbolic narrative of “victory,” the restoration of national sovereignty, and an appeal to the more fervent segments of society, who may be more receptive to Putin’s rhetoric about a “new elite.”
- Political aspects of the recent meeting of the Russian Defence Ministry’s Collegium. On 16 December, the Russian Defence Ministry held an expanded Collegium meeting, featuring speeches by Putin and Defence Minister Belousov. The event received extensive coverage in Russian media and was attended by numerous high-ranking security officials and other government representatives. For Belousov, the meeting served as an opportunity to publicly showcase the interim results of his tenure as minister. For Putin, it was yet another platform to deliver political statements. He reiterated his familiar rhetoric, blaming the United States and Europe, claiming Russia has no interest in an arms race, and stressing the need to ramp up production of new weapons. The only notable point from Putin’s speech was his announcement that serial production of the Oreshnik complexes, the Kremlin’s new weapon of terror, would begin soon. This contradicts his earlier claim that Russia had already started mass production of these missiles, highlighting Moscow’s continued inability to manufacture them in sufficient quantities. Overall, Putin’s speech offered little new information, unlike Belousov’s remarks.
- The Defence Minister’s speech delivered several key messages that shed light on Moscow’s potential priorities in the near future. Like Putin, Belousov echoed the familiar rhetoric of a staunch confrontation with the “collective West,” signalling no shifts in the public stance of Russian authorities. However, other aspects of Belousov’s address stood out. Notably, he outlined the main factors currently shaping the Defence Ministry’s operations. These include ongoing warfare, the execution of specific tasks, the military’s presence in Africa, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Transnistria, preparations for a possible conflict with NATO in the coming decades, the role of artificial intelligence and information technology, and the importance of efficient allocation of the sizeable defence budget.
- Two points from this list are particularly noteworthy, as they may offer insights into Russia’s future plans—or at least highlight areas of Moscow’s strategic focus. Firstly, for the first time at such a high level, Moscow openly declares not just the possibility of armed conflict with NATO, as Russian officials have long stated, but also its preparations for such a conflict. The mention of a timeframe and several technical military innovations suggests that these preparations are serious.
- Secondly, after a long hiatus, the Russian authorities are drawing attention to the Transnistria issue. It remains unclear whether this is merely propaganda or a genuine reflection of Moscow’s intentions to escalate tensions over Moldova. In any case, the current capabilities of the Russian military, particularly its navy, make it unlikely that this region poses any immediate threat to Ukraine.
- Another key aspect of the meeting was Putin and Belousov’s statements about “seizing the initiative” along the frontline and turning the tide. While this rhetoric isn’t new—similar comments have been made by Russian officials in recent weeks—the emphasis on it now signals that the Kremlin is raising the stakes ahead of potential negotiations with Donald Trump. The same applies to the renewed focus on the “illegitimacy” of the Ukrainian government in Putin’s rhetoric. Taken together, these remarks cast doubt on the prospects for negotiations following the inauguration of the U.S. president-elect.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Russia continues to expand its “shadow fleet”. BRS Shipbrokers has reported that Russia’s “shadow fleet” continues to expand. In the past few weeks, the number of regular vessels transporting oil from Russia has risen by around 2%. Overall, the company states that the size of Russia’s “shadow fleet” is growing by about 10 vessels each month, bringing the total to 850, or roughly 9% of the global fleet. Russia is reportedly offering significant bonuses to tanker owners who sell their ships to the “gray fleet.” This situation presents an opportunity for Ukraine to more effectively push for further sanctions against Russia’s oil market. Notably, two tanker shipwrecks near Crimea recently resulted in a substantial oil and fuel spill. Both vessels were due for decommissioning 10-15 years ago. The political climate in Europe also supports the potential for increased pressure on Russia’s “shadow fleet.” On December 18, the Joint Expeditionary Force summit in Estonia, which included 12 European countries, focused in part on intensifying efforts against the “shadow fleet.”
- Russia sells its uranium assets in Kazakhstan to China. On December 17, it was reported that a subsidiary of Russia’s state-owned Rosatom had sold its stake in several joint uranium mining projects with the Kazakh company Kazatomprom. The buyers were companies controlled by China. This decision was likely made in response to Western sanctions. According to reports, these sanctions have created difficulties for Kazakhstan in selling uranium on the international market. For Russia, losing control of several uranium deposits is a significant issue. Before this decision, Rosatom controlled 14% of the global uranium mining market. It is possible that Kazakhstan is preparing for the potential imposition of sanctions directly targeting Rosatom. At the same time, Kazakhstan’s uranium mines produce most of the uranium mined by Russia. This situation unfolds against the backdrop of ongoing negotiations regarding the construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant, a project in which Moscow is eager to participate. This development, however, is unlikely to boost the optimism of the Russian authorities.
- “Direct Line” with the Russian president; marginalisation of the platform. On December 19, Putin held another of his annual “direct line” events, one of the Kremlin’s methods of facilitating “communication” between the president and the public. This event is often used by propaganda to showcase the government’s unity with the people. Since the beginning of the war, Putin has combined this event with traditional communication with various media representatives, both Russian and foreign. In essence, it has always served as an opportunity for the Kremlin to send key political signals, especially to Western countries. In this sense, the annual “direct line” has often been akin to other major speeches by the dictator, such as the Federal Address.
- However, this year’s event was radically different. For the first time in many years, Putin presented no new information or political signals. Instead, viewers were treated to an extensive domestic propaganda spectacle, which could have been mistaken for any other of Putin’s speeches. His only “important” message was a bizarre suggestion to hold a “technological duel between the Oreshnik missile and Western air defence systems in Kyiv,” a proposal that is politically baffling. After the “direct line,” Putin reiterated this strange idea. In fact, what we witnessed was the clear marginalisation of the “direct line” format as a platform for sending foreign policy messages.
- As for the other key points in his speech, we once again heard claims of “readiness for negotiations,” with no preconditions, and even talk of potential compromises, while accusing Ukraine of being unwilling to engage in talks. This sits in stark contrast to Putin’s statements before the “direct line,” which made no mention of compromises. This discrepancy leads to an important conclusion: despite its repeated claims of being open to peace on the “ultimatum conditions” announced in June 2024, the Kremlin lacks any genuine stance on peace negotiations. Putin’s speech in June, offering peace only if Russia gains control of the four Ukrainian regions, essentially lays out the very precondition he insists does not exist. These recent statements about “compromises” appear to be little more than public preparations for negotiations with Donald Trump. In reality, the Kremlin is already shaping its negotiating rhetoric, aiming to portray Russia as eager for peace while accusing Ukraine of refusing to make concessions. However, it remains uncertain how successful this strategy will be in talks with Trump.
