Every week, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: The fate of Russian military bases in Syria, preparation of the Russian population for the potential end of the war, and ongoing interstate talks about possible peace negotiations.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Some signs of Russia’s domestic political preparation for a potential end to the war. The Russian government has reportedly made several revisions to its draft budget for 2025, including a significant boost in funding for certain state television and radio channels. Essentially, this represents an increase in the budget for domestic propaganda, as subsidies have been allocated to media outlets catering exclusively to the Russian market. The funding increase amounts to approximately 50%, reaching 140 billion rubles. Notably, for Ukraine, the Russian government has, for the first time, decided to finance the “Russkiy Mir” company, which carries out propaganda targeting the occupied Ukrainian territories.
- Although pro-government media have claimed that this increase in spending is driven by purely economic factors, such as high inflation and rising service costs, the budget plans for 2026 and 2027 suggest otherwise. In these subsequent years, funding for domestic propaganda remains unchanged, indicating that the Kremlin prioritises ramping up propaganda efforts specifically next year. Several other factors point to the Russian authorities’ attempts to tighten control over public opinion, particularly in the context of potential negotiations. The Kremlin is clearly unwilling to risk significant public dissatisfaction in the event of sharp compromises. One such factor is the launch of exercises to test the ability to completely isolate Russia’s internet space from the global network. These measures are already being trialled in certain southern regions, including Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia.
- There is further evidence suggesting the Russian authorities may be preparing for a possible end to the war. In early December, the pro-government newspapers Kommersant and Vedomosti published reports on decisions by the Kremlin’s domestic political unit that hint at such preparations. The articles described a private seminar for vice-governors, organised by the presidential administration in late November, where the focus was on the “war victory narrative.” Specifically, it explored how regional authorities should promote this “victory” in society. Similarly, discussions touched on priorities for organising the post-war lives of Russian soldiers. This preparation is also visible in the public sphere. In an interview with a Russian magazine, Sergei Naryshkin, head of Russia’s foreign intelligence service, unexpectedly claimed that Russia is “close to victory,” a notable shift given the absence of previous statements offering a time frame. It’s worth noting that Naryshkin is one of the few officials directly involved in communications with U.S. representatives.
- However, it is important to understand that these moves reflect preparations for potential scenarios rather than concrete proof of readiness to end the war. The 2025 Russian budget, which includes record spending on war financing, remains a significant factor that cannot be ignored.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Russia’s current stance on negotiations and ending the war. In recent weeks, Ukrainian Prism has continued its weekly analysis of Russia’s stance on peace talks to end the war or, at the very least, secure a ceasefire. As previously highlighted, the Kremlin’s position shows no real signs of change. Moscow remains firm in its “ultimatum” approach to negotiations, as evidenced by various meetings and statements from Russian officials. However, this flurry of activity suggests that certain negotiations or exchanges of positions have likely entered a more active phase. This is particularly evident in the series of contacts between Hungarian and Russian representatives. For instance, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban recently had a phone call with Russian dictator Vladimir Putin. Yet, no announcements followed that indicated any shift in the Kremlin’s position. Moscow’s stance remains entirely unchanged, as reaffirmed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov after his talks with Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto. Lavrov reiterated that Russia is prepared for negotiations based on the terms Putin outlined in his June speech: the full annexation of four Ukrainian regions and Ukraine’s abandonment of its NATO aspirations.
- In this context, it is evident that the Russian government has begun actively consulting with its “partners.” Notably, this includes China, where Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council and former President Dmitry Medvedev recently paid an official visit. During his meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, Medvedev publicly stated that he had come to deliver a “message” from Putin. Additionally, Russian media reported on a planned visit by Vyacheslav Volodin, chairman of the Russian State Duma, to India. However, this visit was unexpectedly postponed, with the official explanation being that Volodin had tested positive for Covid. This claim was later disproven when Volodin attended a meeting of CSTO parliamentary speakers just days later, a gathering also attended by Putin. Given Putin’s strict requirement for officials to quarantine before meeting him, this raises the possibility that India declined to host the meeting, though the exact reason remains unclear.
- Overall, Russia’s current position has been outlined by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, one of the Kremlin’s key negotiators with Western representatives. Ryabkov stated that Russia does not rule out the possibility of a “second Yalta conference” to solidify the outcomes of the war. His remarks underline the Kremlin’s ongoing push to formalise “spheres of influence” in the region through legal agreements.
- Meeting of the five nuclear states in Dubai. Further evidence of Russia’s active involvement in consultations is the recent meeting in Dubai of representatives from the five nuclear powers—the United States, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Russia. The meeting, chaired by China, focused on the nuclear doctrines of these countries. It is clear that the trigger for this gathering was the recent changes in Russia’s nuclear doctrine, which includes numerous politically charged provisions aimed at pressuring Western nations over their military support for Ukraine.
- Russia has increasingly sought to publicly threaten the international community with its revised nuclear stance. The United States and its allies likely used the meeting to seek a practical explanation of Russia’s doctrine rather than the political rhetoric typically offered. Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stated explicitly that Moscow views the meeting as an opportunity to send “important signals” to Western nations. In reality, this reflects the Kremlin’s continued use of blackmail and threats as tools to apply pressure ahead of potential negotiations to end the war.
- The overthrow of the Assad regime and its impact on Russian military facilities in Syria. The situation in Syria remains a central focus of Russian foreign policy, particularly concerning its two military bases on the Mediterranean coast—the port in Tartus and the Hmeymim air base. The significance of these facilities cannot be overstated, as they serve as critical hubs for Moscow’s military logistics supporting its operations on the African continent. Losing these bases in the short term would severely undermine the Kremlin’s ability to conduct military actions in several African countries, which are already experiencing setbacks in the form of losses and defeats among their forces. In such a scenario, Moscow would not only need to find a new location for its military infrastructure but also build it from scratch. Currently, the most plausible candidate for a new Russian military base is Libya, specifically the port city of Tobruk. The Russian military is already utilising Tobruk’s infrastructure to transport weapons, equipment, and troops. Since at least September 2023, following a meeting between Vladimir Putin and Khalifa Haftar, the commander-in-chief of the self-proclaimed Libyan National Army, Russian authorities have been negotiating the establishment of a fully operational military base in Tobruk, akin to Tartus. However, it is known that Tobruk’s port infrastructure requires significant upgrades. Additionally, Russia has an agreement with Sudan to build a naval base on the Red Sea. However, a military facility there would not fully replace the strategic role of the Tartus base.
- Despite this outlook, there are still no concrete signs of a large-scale evacuation of Russia’s two military bases in Syria. However, indications of preparations for such a possibility are emerging. In recent days, several media outlets, including Bloomberg, have reported that the Kremlin is engaged in direct talks with the Syrian opposition about maintaining these bases, with reports suggesting that Russia is close to reaching an agreement. If such an agreement is secured, Moscow’s capacity to project influence in Africa would likely remain intact. Furthermore, the developments in Syria could accelerate the construction of a new military base in the Libyan city of Tobruk, aimed at mitigating the risk of losing the Tartus and Khmeimim bases in the future.
- Looking ahead, a few scenarios can be anticipated. Russia is likely to begin a rapid modernisation of the port of Tobruk, transforming it into a fully operational naval base, while also scouting for a location to establish a new air base. Should Moscow succeed in striking a deal with the Syrian opposition, its operational capabilities could expand significantly in the medium term. Conversely, if no agreement is reached and the Kremlin is compelled to evacuate its military bases in Syria, we could see an almost total inability of Russian forces to carry out major military operations in Africa in the short term, as well as a diminished capacity to support the forces already deployed on the continent.
- Russia publicly announces its push for a new prisoner exchange with the United States. For the first time, Russian authorities have publicly expressed their willingness to consider another prisoner exchange with the United States, similar to the one carried out in August 2024. Previously, the Kremlin avoided making direct comments on such decisions or their prospects. This shift likely reflects an effort by Moscow to use the potential exchange as a means to foster improved relations with the new US administration under Donald Trump.
- Russian representatives visit Kazakhstan to discuss building the country’s first nuclear power plant. Russia continues its efforts to persuade the Kazakh authorities to allow it to build the country’s first nuclear power plant. A recent referendum in Kazakhstan yielded positive results on the matter, and Astana has consistently emphasised that an international consortium will oversee the project. Ukrainian Prism has previously analysed this issue, highlighting Kazakhstan’s ongoing negotiations with various foreign partners.
- Currently, active discussions are taking place with France and China, with Kazakhstan holding meetings with representatives of relevant companies from these countries. South Korea has also emerged as a potential player. Meanwhile, Russia is aggressively promoting its services despite Kazakhstan’s clear stance that the construction must involve an international consortium. For instance, Valentyna Matvienko, head of the Federation Council (Russia’s upper house of parliament), visited Kazakhstan accompanied by a Rosatom delegation to advocate for Russian involvement in the project.
- The question of Russia’s participation in the nuclear power plant construction is largely political. While Rosatom has so far avoided direct, significant sanctions, the possibility remains. The war in Ukraine and Donald Trump’s return to power in the United States add further complications. Should Russia maintain its rigid “ultimatum” approach and reject compromise, sanctions on Rosatom could become a reality. This potential risk will undoubtedly influence the decisions of both Kazakhstan’s authorities and Western companies. Consequently, at this stage, Russia’s role in the project is likely to be minimal or purely symbolic.
