Suleiman Mamutov, legal advisor for Amnesty International Ukraine and member of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, spoke with The Ukrainian Week about the key challenges in human rights protection under colonialism, the policies of decommunisation and decolonisation, with a particular focus on Crimea, and the role of indigenous peoples in these processes. These topics will be explored further at a conference on 13 December 2024, organised by Amnesty International Ukraine in collaboration with the Doctoral School and the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at NaUKMA.
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– The key themes of the conference are decolonisation and the impact of the war on human rights. What challenges do these issues highlight?
– While the Russian war in Ukraine is frequently seen as an anti-colonial struggle, this conference will be the first of its kind organised by an international organisation and movement. In my view, discussions like these will remain relevant because, globally—and perhaps even within Ukraine—this war is not fully understood or recognised as a classic anti-colonial conflict. It is, at its core, a fight not just for territory or political power but for identity and the right to self-determination.
Colonialism can take many forms, but in our case, it’s particularly striking. The aggressor goes so far as to deny the very existence of those it attacks, claiming, “You are merely part of our people.” This reflects the broader rhetoric of Russia’s political leadership. We don’t have to look that far for an example—Vladimir Putin made this point explicitly in his July 2021 article on the “historical unity” of Ukraine and Russia, just months before the full-scale invasion began.
The war has brought the issue of Russia denying Ukrainian identity into sharp focus. But it also highlights a critical point: Indigenous peoples, who mostly reside in the temporarily occupied territories, are among the most vulnerable in this situation. This directly ties into anti-colonial rhetoric—it’s not just about land but about exploitation and the attempt to subjugate entire peoples.
– What are the main challenges to human rights advocacy under colonial conditions?
– One challenge we face is that our modern understanding of human rights was shaped in the aftermath of World War II. If we look closely at documents like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we can see that, in many ways, they still carry a colonial mindset. These frameworks were designed with an emphasis on individual rights, while collective rights—especially those of Indigenous peoples—were largely ignored.
The concept of collective rights began to take shape much later, and for Indigenous peoples, this journey has been particularly long and complex. As a result, the colonial aspects of human rights issues were not fully addressed in the frameworks that later became the foundation for constitutions and specialised laws aimed at implementing various rights.
Another challenge is recognising that an anti-colonial war is a struggle that began centuries ago and may extend far beyond our lifetimes. This is the very nature of such a fight. For Ukraine and the world to fully recognise this war as anti-colonial, it will require significant time and effort. It’s not the kind of advocacy that fades after two or three years.
The results of the work we are doing now—to secure justice and restore people’s rights, not only in terms of housing or property but also in their right to self-determination and identity—are unlikely to be immediate. For human rights advocates, this is a long and challenging process that requires meticulous documentation and global advocacy to establish international mechanisms, including judicial ones.
To many, this may seem like an unattainable goal. However, consistent, systematic work can lead to outcomes that may materialise much later. It is vital to understand that since war crimes have no statute of limitations, we must keep this long-term perspective, continue to push forward, and steadily bring that future closer.
– What is the current status of international mechanisms?
– Ukraine has ratified the Rome Statute, albeit with some reservations. Since 2014, the International Criminal Court in The Hague has been investigating war crimes committed on Ukrainian territory. Notably, an arrest warrant has been issued for the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation in relation to the unlawful forced deportation of civilians, including children. This could potentially serve as evidence of genocide in the future.
Ukraine has also brought an unconventional case on genocide before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Instead of trying to prove that Russia is committing genocide, Ukraine argues that Russia’s accusations—claiming that Ukraine orchestrated the extermination of the Russian-speaking population—and the full-scale invasion based on these accusations violate the Genocide Convention. Additionally, in 2024, the ICJ issued a ruling on Russia’s violations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
Looking ahead, Ukraine is working to establish a specialised tribunal to address the crime of aggression as a distinct offence. Researchers, international legal experts, and certain Ukrainian state bodies are also pushing to have Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine recognised as acts of genocide. Achieving this may require the creation of a separate tribunal.
– A recent survey by the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory shows increasing support among Ukrainians for decommunisation and decolonisation. How should this policy be applied to Crimea?
– In my view, such a policy should be grounded in the recognition that Crimea, like Ukraine, was a colonised territory. If colonisation and widespread violations of rights, including collective ones, have taken place, we must turn to the framework of Indigenous Peoples’ rights. This framework should form the foundation of any policy related to Crimea.
This includes the global principle of the right of Indigenous Peoples to free, prior, and informed consent regarding decisions and actions that may affect their rights—not just the people but the territory that has historically and traditionally belonged to them.
When we discuss the decolonisation of Crimea, I believe it should be based on clear and articulated consent rather than simply consultations where “we’ve heard you,” but ultimately, we proceed with a different decision.
– When discussing the role of Crimea’s Indigenous peoples in the decolonisation process, what other factors should be emphasised?
– When it comes to preserving Indigenous Peoples, we must focus on their right to self-determination within the Ukrainian state. This right is enshrined in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which Ukraine endorsed in 2014. Equally important is safeguarding their identity and agency.
Ideally, any decisions regarding the traditional territories of Crimea’s Indigenous Peoples should involve them directly, following the principle that “no discussion about the homeland of Indigenous Peoples without the Indigenous Peoples.” This principle mirrors what Ukraine and its citizens seek on the global stage, advocating for the nation’s future and fate.
— One of the key topics of debate regarding Crimea is its future status. What, in your view, should it be?
– I am convinced that Crimea should become an autonomous region within the Ukrainian state, but the foundation of this autonomy must be rooted in the right of Indigenous Peoples to self-determination. The form of autonomy we are familiar with was, in fact, reinstated by the communists under Moscow’s orders in January 1991, as the so-called Autonomous Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic. This had been dissolved in 1945, a year after the genocide of the Crimean Tatar people.
While I understand that, during Soviet times, there was little chance for meaningful agency in this context, the autonomy we now refer to as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea—enshrined in Ukraine’s Constitution—was created by drawing on that Soviet-era model. The key difference is that, in 1991, it became an autonomy of the majority—essentially an autonomy for Crimean communists, who pushed it through Ukraine’s parliament, embedding these changes in the 1996 Constitution.
It is crucial to recognise that the constitutional process from 1992 to 1996 completely excluded Indigenous Peoples. There were no consultations with them, nor was their perspective considered in Chapter 10 of Ukraine’s Constitution, which defined the functioning of this autonomy. One could even argue that, regrettably, this chapter effectively reinforced the consequences of the 1944 genocide. It was, in essence, a product of the Communist Party, designed to provide future leverage for detaching Crimea from Ukraine.
– Over the centuries, Crimea has seen extensive renaming of its geographical locations, a practice that continues today. How can we restore these historical names, and when should this be done?
– After the forced expulsion of all Crimean Tatars from Crimea and the genocide that followed, the Soviet renaming of the region was far from democratic. This raises the question: should we reinstate these names in the same way? When discussing de-occupation, political leaders and, I believe, society at large often assume it won’t require long transitional periods or, particularly, referendums. However, I believe that any actions taken must reflect the will of the Indigenous peoples, whose rights were violated during these renamings.
This must be seen as part of a broader narrative: the Soviet regime not only deported the Indigenous people, decimating their population, but also abolished their autonomy, which was their last remaining form of agency. On top of that, they erased all traces of their existence. This erasure deeply shapes the Crimean Tatar sense of annihilation.
If we – and Ukraine does – recognise this as genocide, I see no reason to delay the restoration of justice—whether today or after de-occupation. The sooner, the better.
– When it comes to legislation on Crimea, how should Ukraine approach its transformation? Specifically, do we currently have the necessary legal framework in place for renaming?
– At present, there are conditions in place, as legislation has been passed addressing issues of de-Sovietisation and decolonisation. However, its application is quite limited. The law allows changes only to names associated with individuals who were involved in the colonisation of Crimea. Yet, after the Soviet government carried out a series of renamings on the peninsula, many names were introduced that have no connection to any historical figures.
In my view, this is ultimately a matter of political will and, perhaps, the need for greater awareness among indigenous peoples about the problem they face and its colonial nature.
– If we look at the legislation on Crimea more broadly, what other aspects need to be transformed?
– The first and foremost goal of the Crimean Tatar people is to amend Section 10 of Ukraine’s Constitution, which relates to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. In 2017, a working group was established under the Constitutional Commission to begin drafting updates to this section, with a focus on respecting the rights of Indigenous peoples. While we are currently under martial law, and immediate constitutional changes may not be realistic, Indigenous peoples still have the right, ability, and responsibility to advocate for these changes.
If we take a closer look at archival documents and correspondence from the Constitutional Commission, we find that many legal experts, scholars, researchers, and respected judges from the Ukrainian diaspora have voiced concerns about the Ukrainian Constitution. Their worries go beyond Section 10, touching on issues like the state’s overreach into citizens’ lives, the Constitution’s heavy social focus, and the risk of public disillusionment when the state fails to deliver on extensive social benefits. The problem, then, isn’t just about the rights of Indigenous peoples—it’s about deeper concerns regarding the overall quality of Ukraine’s Constitution.
– The Crimean Tatar Mejlis has yet to be recognised as the representative body of the Crimean Tatars. Is this due to a lack of political will, or are there other factors at play?
– In 2014, Ukraine recognised the Crimean Tatars as an Indigenous population and endorsed the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In 2021, the Verkhovna Rada passed the law “On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine,” one of whose provisions directly addresses the legal status of their representative bodies. Shortly thereafter, at the subordinate level, the Cabinet of Ministers outlined the procedure for securing the legal status of such bodies.
The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people has completed all the necessary steps, with the final one being the decree to grant it legal status. However, this procedure has been ongoing for over a year. The reason for the delay is unclear. It could be related to other priorities, which would be concerning as this is a typical situation where minority issues are overlooked. It might also stem from frequent changes within the Cabinet of Ministers or possibly from concerns about what this process could entail.
Once the Mejlis secures its legal status, it will be able to formally initiate consultations with state bodies on matters concerning its rights and interests, such as the issue of renaming. Furthermore, the Mejlis will be empowered in a more substantial way. Over the past decade, efforts have been underway at the UN to enhance the participation of Indigenous peoples in various UN bodies, including the General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council. These discussions have effectively been finalised, and priority will naturally be given to those representative bodies of Indigenous peoples recognised within their countries. This could strengthen not only the Mejlis or the Crimean Tatars but also Ukraine, providing it with an ally in these bodies.
