Every week, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Russia’s stance on negotiations before the BRICS summit, key appointments in the presidential administration, and Kremlin’s pressure on Kazakhstan.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Appointment of a new Russian special representative for BRICS economic issues. Last week marked a significant development in Russia. On October 19, President Putin signed a decree appointing Maxim Oreshkin as the “special representative of the president for financial and economic cooperation with the BRICS countries and interaction with the New Development Bank.” This appointment underscores Putin’s commitment to creating an “alternative financial system” and signals his intent to steer the BRICS organisation toward a more anti-Western agenda.
- Oreshkin is a key member of Putin’s domestic political team, currently serving as the deputy head of the presidential administration. Notably, he has ascended the career ladder rapidly, having been appointed during a government reshuffle in the spring of 2024, which has established him as a significant figure within the Russian political landscape. While he oversees the economic direction, he is often viewed in Russia as lacking a comprehensive understanding of the country’s economic realities. His frequent provocative public statements and proposals are frequently disconnected from the practical needs of Russia’s economic development.
- Additionally, Oreshkin is at odds with the head of the Russian central bank, Elvira Nabiullina, and has publicly voiced his dissatisfaction with her financial strategy. However, the most critical factor is Putin’s personal favour towards Oreshkin. The Russian president often delegates oversight of various important economic projects to him. Within the Russian expert community, Oreshkin is regarded as a shrewd careerist, characterised by exceptional organisational skills and adeptness at aligning with Putin’s personal ambitions. This likely explains why he continues to impress the Russian president.
- Consequently, Oreshkin’s appointment as special representative for the BRICS on economic matters should be viewed as Putin’s intent to more effectively pursue the construction of an “alternative” to the Western financial and economic system. His promotion likely stems from the Russian government’s recent setbacks in implementing the BRICS Bridge payment system, which was intended to supplant the SWIFT system but failed to garner a favourable response from other member states.
- Through Oreshkin, Russia is poised to intensify efforts to develop various economic initiatives aimed at counteracting the financial and economic sanctions imposed on Moscow, as well as to further the establishment of a “multipolar world” through BRICS. However, the lack of positive responses from BRICS member states regarding these initiatives raises doubts about the potential effectiveness of Russia’s strategy.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Moscow is seeking to revive the Russian-German forum “Petersburg Dialogue.” Last week, two German media outlets, Die Zeit and ARD, reported that Russian authorities are in negotiations with several German politicians to revive the Russian-German forum known as the “Petersburg Dialogue.” Established in 2001, this forum has served as a platform for bilateral cooperation between Russia and Germany in the realms of politics, economics, and culture, facilitating informal discussions. However, in 2023, the German board of the forum officially announced the cessation of its activities. In contrast, Russian officials indicated their intent to continue the forum’s work in a new format, although specific details were not disclosed.
- According to German media, a meeting is scheduled to take place on October 20 in Baku, involving Russian officials and several German politicians, including Martin Hoffmann, the former managing director of the Petersburg Dialogue. This meeting is reported to fall under the same forum’s framework. Additionally, it has been revealed that a similar gathering occurred in April of this year, as confirmed by Mikhail Shvidkoy, the special representative of the Russian President for International Cultural Cooperation. Such private meetings may suggest that the Russian authorities are attempting to resume the forum’s operations, at least implying a desire to rekindle its activities.
- The Kremlin’s stance on negotiations ahead of the BRICS summit in Kazan. Russia is currently hosting the annual BRICS summit, which will span three days and represents Moscow’s most significant foreign policy event of the past year. This importance stems largely from Putin’s ambition to leverage the organisation as a platform for the further development of alternative institutions to the West. He has consistently demonstrated that the BRICS is more than merely an economic alliance in his view. Additionally, the summit in Kazan has the potential to influence Russia’s stance on peace negotiations aimed at ending the ongoing war.
- Ukrainian Prism has previously conducted a comprehensive analysis of the various ways in which BRICS member states have sought to influence Moscow’s position on this matter. In recent weeks, representatives from certain states have attempted to sway Russia’s approach to peace talks. For instance, during the BRICS security meeting in St. Petersburg, the Russian side publicly acknowledged that some foreign representatives regard the cessation of hostilities as a critical issue. It is also apparent that they do not endorse Putin’s ultimatum regarding negotiations. This ultimatum, articulated by the Russian president in June 2024, includes the annexation of all territories from four Ukrainian regions, the lifting of sanctions, and Ukraine’s renunciation of its path towards NATO membership.
- This position remains unchanged as the BRICS summit unfolds in Kazan. However, on its first day, October 22, Putin conducted a series of bilateral meetings with leaders from the organisation, including Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It is likely that discussions regarding the war in Ukraine and the associated negotiations were raised during these encounters. The presence of numerous foreign leaders, combined with the potential for them to exert pressure on Putin regarding the negotiations, could serve as a catalyst for the reconsideration of Russian ultimatums.
- In this context, it would be advantageous for Ukraine, with the support of its Western partners, to establish a dialogue format with China to discuss the Sino-Brazilian peace initiative. Such a strategy could enable Ukraine to exert additional pressure on Moscow, which, while not openly critiquing China’s plan, has exhibited differing views concerning the ultimatum surrounding the “four regions.”
- Russia is pressuring Kazakhstan after it refused to join BRICS. Last week, just before the BRICS summit in Russia, the President of Kazakhstan publicly declared that his country would not be joining the BRICS organisation. Kazakh authorities attributed this decision to their preference for collaboration within the framework of the United Nations. Almost immediately following this announcement, the Russian agricultural control agency imposed temporary restrictions on the import of several agricultural products from Kazakhstan into Russia. Although there are no overt disputes between the two nations in the public sphere, recent developments suggest otherwise.
- One significant concern for Moscow is the construction of a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan, for which a referendum was recently held. The Kazakh authorities have made it clear that they will not entrust the construction of the nuclear facility to the Russian company Rosatom, opting instead for an international consortium. Contacts with the French company Assystem, known for designing and building nuclear energy projects, have already come to light. While the Kremlin has yet to publicly criticise the Kazakh authorities’ decision, the underlying tensions are evident.
