In an interview with The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden, Yevhen Dykyy, a former commander of the Aidar battalion, researcher, and publicist discussed various topics related to the Ukrainian army’s offensive, the liberation of occupied territories, the acquisition of weapons and equipment from Western allies, starting positions for future counterattacks, mobilisation, and the difference between the rear and the front. Since February 2018, Dykyy has been leading the National Antarctic Scientific Center.
Below, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes his direct speech.
About the counteroffensive-2023
The story of Ukraine’s ambitious plans for the counteroffensive began in September 2022. “It was a period of victory, as we had successfully liberated a large part of the Kharkiv region and were pushing the enemy out from under Kherson. At this time, an article written by two generals, Valeriy Zaluzhny and Mykhailo Zabrodsky, was published. The article essentially outlined the Ukrainian offensive plan for 2023, which aimed to reach the Sea of Azov, cut off Crimea, and turn it into an island by the first half of the previous year. This plan was considered realistic, as evidenced by General Kyrylo Budanov’s September interview, where he spoke of drinking coffee in Yalta in June. I still believe that those goals were achievable at that time.
The generals’ article not only outlined the plan for the counteroffensive but also provided a clear list of the necessary resources for its implementation, including 300-400 tanks, 500 artillery pieces, 700 armoured vehicles, and 40 infantry brigades.
After the article was published, we encountered disagreements with our Western partners. The main issue lies in the different strategies and ultimate goals of the war between us. From the start, our goal was to achieve a military victory over the Russian Federation by defeating their army. Have you ever heard Joe Biden explicitly express the goal of defeating Russia? During Zelensky’s last trip to the United States on December 11, 2023, Biden used the phrase “victory for Ukraine” for the very first time. There was also a change from his usual statement of “stand with Ukraine as long as needed” to “stand as long as we can.” However, it is important to note that the strategy of Joe Biden and other Western allies is not to defeat Putin but rather to prevent him from winning. They believed that Putin would negotiate due to the high cost of the war, but this was a strategic mistake. In the Russian worldview, they either defeat the Ukrainians or physically eliminate them.
In 2022, our goal of “defeating Russia” and Biden’s goal of “preventing Putin from winning” coincided. The objective was to halt the advance of the Russian horde. Following Ukrainian victories in Kharkiv and Kherson, the differences became evident. These differences later shaped the subsequent Western supplies, impacting the pace of the Ukrainian offensive.
Moreover, the West faced the same problem as Ukraine did in 2014. Back then, on paper, there were 100 tanks in the hangar, but in reality, there were 50, and without batteries. As a result, at the beginning of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in March 2023, Ukraine received barely 15% of the necessary resources. By the end of 2023, 30-40% of the promised weapons arrived.
The former commander of U.S. forces in Europe, General Ben Hodges, explicitly stated that with the resources that allies provided in the spring, his army wouldn’t even start the offensive. Already in the spring of 2023, it was clear that the conditions for the counteroffensive were not met. Therefore, the plan had to change. Ukrainian society realised this only in November 2023. We didn’t have a failed offensive. The failure was in communication with the rear.
Russia’s sabotage of the Kakhovska Hydroelectric Power Station became the final straw when it became clear that events were unfolding according to the most challenging of all the possible scenarios. In a creative yet utterly criminal manner, the occupiers thwarted our attempts to establish a bridgehead on the left bank and approach from the rear to undermine the Russian defence they had been fortifying for nine months.
About Achievements of the Ukrainian Army in 2023
The military holds our left-bank bridgehead in Kherson, particularly in the village of Krynky. In his end-of-the-year speech, Putin spoke of the “big geopolitics.” He specifically mentioned our Ukrainian cities and the “Russian city of Odesa.” If I’m not mistaken, he mentioned Krynky at least four times. These Krynky are a thorn in his side. From our positions on the left bank, it’s 60 kilometres away from Perekop. Occupiers’ war correspondents call it what it is — “clashes on the Kherson-Crimean direction.”
It is clear from the map that almost two out of three of the so-called Surovikin Line, which is composed of three defensive stripes, have been destroyed. As a result, the starting position for the Ukrainian offensive in the upcoming spring drastically differs from where it began in the summer of 2023.
However, war is primarily about killing. The soldier’s role in the war is to eliminate as many enemies as possible and avoid being killed himself for as long as possible. Therefore, when we began 2023 in a defensive position in Bakhmut, the casualty ratio was one to eight. For every one of our fallen defenders, approximately eight Russians were liquidated. Later, when we transitioned to the offensive and were naturally supposed to suffer a similar death ratio, it somehow didn’t happen. Even during the offensive, for every Ukrainian warrior, the Russians laid down two or three occupiers. The loss ratio on equipment was even higher.
Yes, in 2023, we didn’t push Russians back. We inflicted severe losses. In terms of World War II comparisons, we are now in 1943. Both sides are now fully engaged, suffered significant casualties, and have achieved a relevant balance. It’s that balance after which one of us will roll downhill. Russians are not so confident that it won’t be them, so instead, they really want a pause; they want to freeze the conflict.
On the contrary, we must seize the opportunities available to us and turn the tide of war in our favour.
About Russia’s Problems
Russians face the same problems as us, but on a larger scale due to the size of Russia and sanctions. It is not a coincidence that while they attack Avdiivka, there are simply no people left to fight for Krynky.
The Russian defence industry is currently able to produce 20 new tanks per month, and an additional 50 can be brought out of storage. As a result, there is a growing interest in such equipment. The Soviet T-72 tank, also known as the “Seventy-twos,” has almost run out, and the most operational model currently is the T-62. To address this, T-55 tanks are now being delivered to the front. In Soviet tank manufacturing, a two-digit index represents the year of adoption into service. The tanks from the 1970s are no longer available, while those from the 1960s are still in operation, and those from the 1950s are being brought in as replacements. It is expected that tanks from the time of World War II will be arriving soon. Additionally, ammunition from the 1940s has already been introduced.
Meanwhile, the Ukrainian army burns approximately 100–150 enemy tanks per month. This is the data from independent observers such as the Dutch portal Oryx. It is also visible from satellites that 40% of the equipment from reserves beyond the Ural has already been withdrawn. It seems that the Russians have a similar situation with their shells. They currently have 4 million shells in their warehouses, and their industry produces about 1,01 million per year. However, by August 2023, the Russians had already fired 12 million shells. At this consumption rate, the available stockpile of shells will only last for about half a year. The Russians are aware of this, which is why they’ve been trying hard to befriend a comrade Kim.
Russia is indeed great, not in terms of power, though, but in terms of its size. Large spaces on a map don’t fight wars; resources do. Hence, they’ve launched a very aggressive information campaign trying to force a “ceasefire”.
Russia’s ultimate goal is to freeze the conflict, build up stockpiles of tanks and shells, conduct several waves of mobilisation, and prepare new units. Then, they will inevitably return to finish us off. In addition, they hope that in November, Americans will elect Trump, who already said he would stop supplying weapons to Ukraine.
About Ukraine’s Mobilisation
The internal discussion about mobilisation had to be held in September-October 2022. Until then, it was still uncertain whether Putin would go for a large-scale mobilisation in Russia. He did.
Fighting an enemy with significantly smaller human power is still possible if you have a massive technological advantage. Yet, we are fighting within a similar weaponry generation, a process which we can easily call the “80s disco” with elements of newer technologies.
So, the number of soldiers must be at least equal to that of the enemy. Since the beginning of the large-scale war, we have been fighting without a technological advantage and with fewer people. Despite this, all reported successes have been achieved with fewer people. However, there are limits to everything.
Unfortunately, the same approach was taken for mobilization as for preparing for a major war. We were first publically warned about a full-scale offensive in November 2021. Information was even leaked to the press, and newspapers published maps and diagrams of how Russia would advance. Until the last moment, we stubbornly held the position of “see nothing, hear nothing.” Now, for over a year, the issue of mobilisation has been postponed because it is unpopular. War is not about popularity; it’s about survival, especially since we did not start this war. Since they came to us, we must be ready to fight for our existence.
The question at hand is simple: should Ukrainians mobilise or surrender to occupation? No one has suggested a third option as a compromise. In a recent interview, Dmitry Medvedev stated that half a million people have been enlisted in the Russian army since January 1st, 2023. This provides a direct response to the question of whether Ukraine should mobilise and how many individuals need to be mobilised.
We cannot rely on tens of thousands of volunteers alone. We need an additional 500,000 mobilised individuals, which may seem daunting, but it is a minimal requirement for maintaining our defence capabilities and holding the territories we currently control. It’s important to note that this mobilisation effort is not aimed at defeating Russia or liberating territories. Rather, it is necessary for our defensive needs. However, we face a challenge in recruiting half a million people in just 3-4 months, a task too large for the state’s mobilisation system to handle alone. Therefore, it is imperative that both the government and society work together to achieve this goal.
Let’s remember the start of 2022. Within just a few months, around 700-800 thousand people were mobilised. People were raising funds to support those who were going to fight. Local councils and volunteers were working together to find places for the mobilised individuals to stay and organize basic training for them.
It seems that the local state authorities are attempting to distance themselves from the mobilisation effort. While the government did submit a draft law to the Verkhovna Rada, Ukrainian parliament, on changes to mobilisation legislation on December 25, 2023, their communication strategy leaves much to be desired. The military is left to bear the brunt of the negative reaction to the unpopular mobilization effort, as evidenced by Zaluzhny being forced to hold a press conference.
It is not the army that needs mobilisation; it is us – Ukrainian civilians. So that the army doesn’t allow what happened in Bucha to happen again. In order to achieve this, the Ukrainian army needs a sufficient number of fighters.
In addition, generals should not have to worry about finding soldiers. Questions to Zaluzhny regarding the categories of people they plan to mobilise are irrelevant. It is necessary to determine in the rear who should be assigned to the army. Civil authorities, in both legal and organizational, as well as moral aspects, should mobilise. I would like to hear from Zelensky a speech in the style of Winston Churchill, saying that for the upcoming years, he has nothing for us but sweat, tears, and blood. It is with such a spirit that nations triumph in wars.
About ‘Conflict’ between Valeriy Zaluzhny and Volodymyr Zelensky
Our leaders have never publicly declared any conflict. All this story is exaggerated—rumours from third parties. It seems to me that we have a much bigger problem, and I am not talking about personalities right now. We have a conflict between the civilian authorities and the army as an institution. Our army, commanded by Valeriy Zaluzhny and driven by a million people in uniform, has been successfully holding on for two years. Everyone is doing their job.
“I believe that Zaluzhny can be replaced if someone with better credentials emerges. However, there doesn’t seem to be anyone at the moment. Frankly, I found it laughable when General Viktor Muzhenko gave a big interview about our strategy while the supposed ‘conflict’ between Ukrainian leaders peaked. Perhaps he would like to answer questions about Ilovaisk first before sharing his thoughts on strategy. Frankly, it looked more like a ridiculous application for a position that, in his opinion, became available.
Why Compromise in This War is Impossible
Russians are not interested in finding a compromise. When the Western media suggests the “Korean option” for Ukraine, which would involve dividing the country along the front line, there is no point in discussing it. The truth is that no one is truly proposing the Korean option. Instead, they are suggesting a disguised Vietnamese or Chechen option. In Vietnam, a peace agreement was reached, and the troops withdrew. However, the agreement was violated on the same day, and communists occupied South Vietnam. The same thing happened in Chechnya. The Russian army signed the Khasavyurt Peace, which was a humiliating agreement, and the conflict was suspended for 10 years. During this time, the Russian army restructured itself, took control of the media, and returned to capture Chechnya for a second time.
Russia is not interested in the border of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Instead, it is seeking the Ukraine-Poland border. It has been widely speculated that the only region they do not claim is the Zakarpattia region, which may have been promised to Orban. On February 25, 2022, the Hungarian army was deployed in combat readiness on our border. Although they claimed that it was to receive refugees, it is clear that pontoon bridges are not used for humanitarian operations. It is evident that Hungary’s intentions were not entirely honourable.
Russia has no intention of controlling puppet regimes. As we have seen in four occupied regions, the Russian Federation takes them and incorporates them into its territory. Our stance on compromise can be aptly summarised by a phrase once said by Golda Meir, the former Prime Minister of Israel: “We want to live, and our enemies want us to die. This leaves little room for compromise”.
We are facing a similar situation with the Russians. They are seeking a ‘final solution’ to the Ukrainian issue, which is reminiscent of what Adolf Hitler had in mind when discussing the ‘solution’ to the ‘Jewish question’. It’s imperative for the state to assist individuals in making the correct decision since fighting is currently viewed as a lesser evil than being stuck in trenches.
Ukrainians already made a wrong choice during the time of the Ukrainian People’s Republic between 1917 and 1921. Those who chose not to fight were then sent in millions to the GULAGs by Soviet authorities, and those who survived were forced to fight in the Red Army anyway.
Therefore, compromise is not an option for us.
