For the European Union, the war in Ukraine became a chain of bitter revelations. Many countries were forced to acknowledge that their security was not as well guaranteed as it seemed, and their military industry was so uncoordinated that they could not provide Kyiv with the promised million shells. Why did this happen? The recent report by the European Defence Agency (EDA) provides a partial answer to this dilemma.
“It’s time to fortify our European continent and beef up our defence”, said Charles Michel, the President of the European Council, at the opening of the EDA’s annual conference. “History will judge, but I sincerely believe that our defence union was born in the first hours after Russian tanks rolled over the Ukrainian border. On that very day, we made a historic decision to send weapons to Ukraine—a decision that could not have been imagined a few days before the Russian offensive […]. Now, we need to step up and take this further”. Nonetheless, participants of the conference met this call with very little enthusiasm. Despite the evident demand for strengthening the European security system following Russia’s military attack on Ukraine, EU member states are not rushing to drastically change their defence policies.
While the rhetoric in support of Ukraine remains unchanged, not everyone is rushing to increase their spending on defence production.
The EDA report summarises the data on the production and storage of weapons in the EU member states. According to this document, in 2022, the total defence expenditures of 27 countries amounted to €240 billion, and by 2025, those are expected to increase by €70 billion. “Although the military budgets of the members are sharply increasing, they are still far from the target figures”, the report asserts.
Last year, the most significant increase in military expenditures was demonstrated by Sweden (+30%), Lithuania (+27%), and Spain (+19%). However, even with 20 out of 27 countries increasing their budgets, the European Union still allocates only 1,5% of its total GDP to defence, which does not meet even the 2% target. “We keep lagging behind other players”, noted Josep Borrell, EU foreign policy chief at the EDA conference.
Based on last year’s indicators, the countries with the largest defence budgets were Greece (3,9% of GDP), Lithuania (2,5%), Poland (2,2%), and Estonia (2,2%). France spends 1,9% of GDP on defence, the Netherlands 1,1%, and Austria 0,8%. Ireland allocated the least for defence (0,2%). Overall, in 2022, European countries’ defence spending increased by 6% compared to 2021. However, to reach the 2% target, an additional €75 billion is needed.
Why does the situation remain critical? One of the reasons, as noted in the EDA report, is the ‘fragmentation’ of the defence sector.
“In Europe, we have way too many different weapon systems”, insisted Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission. She cited the example of a howitzer used by the German-Dutch brigade, the ammunition for which is not interchangeable between the artillery of the two countries.
Today, European armies use twelve different types of tanks, while the United States has only one. The German-Dutch brigade, equipped with howitzers, uses two different types of projectiles. Ukraine’s Ambassador to NATO, Natalia Galibarenko, noted in her speech at the EDA conference that Ukraine has received “over 200 different weapon systems” from international partners, significantly complicating their overall maintenance.
According to the EDA’s conclusions, the European defence industry is significantly affected by a lack of investment. The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, recently referred to the “decades of silent disarmament” that lasted until the annexation of Crimea in 2014. A decade ago, expert circles began to raise the alarm, but there was no weighty response from the top political leadership of the European Union.
During the decades of peace, Europeans have become accustomed to investing almost nothing in defence. Now, to address the funding shortfall, Charles Michel proposes allowing private individuals to subscribe to European defence bonds aimed at strengthening collective security. There is no certainty that this idea will be implemented. It is worth remembering that the prospect of increasing European debt is a real taboo for many member states, especially for influential players like Germany.
Participants of the EDA annual conference concluded that EU countries could not deliver the promised one million shells to Ukraine not only due to a lack of funding but also due to their inability to work together, lack of operational interoperability of armies, adaptability, scientific research, and advanced modern developments.
“Although this year, EU military expenditures reached record levels—almost €270 billion—the spending on military research continues to decline,” asserts the EDA report.
The wavering attitudes towards the war in Ukraine, shared recently by some European media, are, in fact, a direct consequence of decades of negligent defence policies. The “silent disarmament,” publicly admitted by Josep Borrell, has led to collective impotence, which some Western politicians—incorrectly and manipulatively—are projecting onto Ukraine. Ukraine, on the other hand, has demonstrated integrity, persistence and dignity in the face of a full-scale war with Russia. Regarding the Western defence industry, the situation is very complex, yet it seems that the self-preservation of Brussels officials has finally started to work.
