The agreement Ukraine signed in Washington feels more like a promise for the distant future than a clear plan for real economic cooperation. Below, we break down why it could take decades to put the deal into action, when the investment fund might actually get filled, and how Russia factors into the whole picture.
Unwelcome agreement
The mineral resources deal between the US and Ukraine (hereafter “the Agreement”) has come to symbolise the uncertainty clouding relations between the two countries since the change of leadership in Washington. It was supposedly meant to signal continued support for Kyiv, but since its signing on 30 April 2025, neither the rhetoric nor the known actions from the White House suggest any deeper commitment.
Only a few months ago, the terms now on paper would have seemed unthinkable. Despite significant improvements from the version released in February, the central issue remains unresolved: the Agreement offers us no security guarantees, yet it holds more legal weight than Ukrainian law. To make matters worse, the US continues to openly nudge us towards territorial concessions as a means of securing a ceasefire—helping President Trump fulfil one of his campaign pledges.
On the other hand, the logic behind the Agreement is clear: to build a foundation for lasting peace through economic incentives. Its mechanisms aim to attract the foreign investment needed for reconstruction and future growth. Engaging the United States based on long-term economic interests could act as a deterrent to Russia. It’s no accident that the push for economic cooperation came from Ukraine itself and was formally included in President Zelenskyy’s Victory Plan in autumn 2024.
Despite the political pros and cons, the Agreement is riddled with uncertainties. First, there are no guarantees that mineral extraction in Ukraine will generate the revenues the signatories expect. Current resource estimates are, to say the least, highly uncertain.
Second, Russia shows no intention of surrendering the occupied territories—in fact, it seeks to take even more. This means the aggressor’s presence drastically limits the areas where the Agreement can realistically apply. From this standpoint, it seems the US may be acting against its own interests by pushing Ukraine toward territorial concessions and risking potential profits—especially since some of Ukraine’s most valuable mineral deposits lie in the east.
Virtual mineral reserves
Under the Agreement, half of the state’s revenue from natural resource extraction is to be directed into a reconstruction investment fund. However, as mentioned earlier, it’s currently impossible to predict how much revenue that will generate. For example, in 2023, the Ministry of Finance reported around $1.5 billion in income from the sectors covered by the Agreement—most of it from natural gas extraction.
Many have likely heard about the trillions of dollars worth of Ukrainian minerals; just before the Agreement was signed, the figure of $14.8 trillion was cited. However, according to Laura Lewis, an electronic materials engineer and professor at Northeastern University (Boston, USA), even if Ukraine does have these mineral deposits—including rare earth metals—the process of exploration and infrastructure development could take 15 to 20 years.
Reports on Ukraine’s mineral wealth often confuse “deposits” (concentrations of minerals in the earth) with “reserves” (confirmed, extractable deposits). So, if the goal is to secure relatively quick economic benefits, it’s the reserves that truly matter.
When it comes to Ukraine’s rare earth metals, however, we’re talking solely about “deposits,” as there are no confirmed, extractable reserves yet. In early 2025, the American press mistakenly reported that Ukraine had $500 billion worth of rare earth metal reserves—a figure that’s simply unrealistic, not least because the total value of rare earth metals ever extracted worldwide hasn’t even reached $500 billion.
That said, there’s no doubt Ukraine holds significant mineral deposits that the US is keenly interested in. For instance, Ukraine boasts some of the largest lithium deposits in Europe. While other European countries may have more proven reserves, they struggle to maintain consistent extraction levels. If Ukraine can successfully explore and ramp up lithium production, it could become a major player in this market. The same goes for many other minerals, including graphite, manganese, and titanium. The key question is how long it will take to scale up extraction—and what kind of revenue the market demand at that time will support.
And time is exactly what’s needed. Even if the fighting in Ukraine stops, demining will take years. Some revenue might come from selling extraction licences, but the state will likely offer them at a discount to speed up investment. Either way, we’re looking at decades of intensive work ahead.
Grab what you can
The mineral agreement makes no mention of assets seized by Russia. At present, the occupiers control, among other things, two of Ukraine’s four lithium deposits, as well as titanium and other rare earth metal sites, coal reserves in the east, and natural gas fields on the continental shelf. The largely occupied south-eastern region of Ukraine—including the Donetsk coal basin—holds around 80% of the country’s hydrocarbon reserves. Since 2014, Russia has been working to integrate Ukraine’s extractive industries into its own economy.
Russia’s 2024 Strategy for the Development of its Mineral Resource Base explicitly calls for incorporating the mineral resource complexes of the so-called DPR and LPR, along with the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, into the Russian economy. It specifically highlights coal, iron ore, manganese ore, rare earth metals, and other minerals used in construction.
This integration lies at the core of Russia’s occupation-driven economic policy: any seized industry is quickly absorbed into state development plans.
It’s also one of the Kremlin’s ways to offset the impact of sanctions—by exploiting resources in the occupied territories. For example, Russia actively uses the captured port of Mariupol to ship looted Ukrainian minerals, grain, and products from the chemical and metallurgical industries, either to Russia or for export abroad.
By destroying and plundering Ukraine, Moscow weakens one of its competitors on the global market. As the world’s largest country by landmass, Russia possesses vast natural resource reserves. Yet extraction is often held back by a lack of investment and outdated technology. So it’s no surprise that Russia has also started offering mineral cooperation to the United States.
In the Agreement, Russia is mentioned only briefly—as the aggressor and as a party excluded from benefiting from Ukraine’s reconstruction. What it fails to acknowledge, however, is that Russia has been profiting economically from looting Ukraine since as far back as 2014. Simply put, the Agreement contains no provisions addressing the economic costs of occupation or holding the aggressor accountable.
No strings attached
The minerals agreement is partly based on the assumption that U.S. economic interests in Ukraine will help ensure continued American commitment to a peaceful and stable Ukraine. But turning those interests into reality depends on countless factors—none of which are addressed in the Agreement.
Recall how economically intertwined Ukraine and Russia were before 2014, and even up to 2022. Moscow enjoyed profitable trade with us, importing everything from civilian goods to military technologies. Quite frankly, the Russian invasion made no economic sense for the occupiers. Similarly, it’s hard to believe that U.S. economic interests alone will guarantee peace. Whatever people say, classic Kissinger-style realpolitik will always come first for Washington.
Despite the scepticism expressed here, Ukraine had little choice but to sign the Agreement. It now stands as just one pillar on the long path toward lasting peace and national rebuilding. Yet this foundation feels alarmingly fragile and built on stark injustice. But that’s the reality in a world where power rules.
