In this interview, The Ukrainian Week delves into key issues shaping Ukraine’s wartime strategy: how to boost the effectiveness of the Defence Forces, the crucial role of parliamentarians in the fight, and the challenges of leading a nation with often inadequate leadership. We also explore the necessity for total mobilisation and the emerging new elite that will shape Ukraine’s future post-Victory. Stepan Kovalchuk, Chief of Security for the 7th Separate Assault Battalion “Arei” of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army, 129th Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, shares his insights on these critical topics.
***
— Why wasn’t the initial wave of patriotic enthusiasm effectively harnessed, and why are we now facing a shortage of fighters? It seems there are major issues with mobilisation, including the need to forcibly conscript people. What went wrong?
— The answer isn’t that straightforward. Let me share a personal observation from my time in the Mykolaiv region. Around the second week of the full-scale war, while we were in Voznesensk, red-and-black flags [a flag previously used by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army – ed.] began appearing throughout the city. In Mykolaiv, Voznesensk, or Pervomaisk, seeing these flags was quite unusual. Most people—I’d say about 70%—didn’t recognise them, and the remaining 20% did associate them with banditry or fascism. It’s important to note that these flags didn’t appear due to any official orders. People, on an intuitive level, felt that these symbols and this ideology offered a form of salvation for the state during a time of great uncertainty. And indeed, we were on the brink. I saw this with my own eyes.
In Voznesensk, we had a newly formed unit of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army (UVA), a group of 14 people. Without our team, the patrol police didn’t even respond to calls for a month. Yet, there were no thefts, murders, or other crimes. At the start of the war, people experienced a kind of primordial self-governance in Ukraine, managing things without police or prosecutors. Communities handled their own security, setting up checkpoints and making decisions intuitively, even without having served in the military. They knew which flags to use at these checkpoints: red-and-black. For many, nationalist ideology was seen as the only path to salvation. By then, patriotism alone was no longer enough. This needs to be acknowledged.
So, what went wrong? A mix of factors. First off, the ideological training of the military might have been lacking initially, but it should have been addressed by now, after two years of a brutal war. Let’s be clear: as Bismarck said, the regular army is great for parades, but in a real war, it’s the people who fight. Our army of 250,000 couldn’t sustain a two-year conflict on its own. If the people hadn’t risen up, the war would likely have ended long ago—and not in our favour. Back then, the longest lines were at gas stations, ATMs, and military enlistment offices, with enlistment queues often outstripping those at ATMs. Many felt a strong urge to defend their country voluntarily. There were at least a million of them, which was substantial. Sadly, that number is now shrinking.
Secondly, there has been a significant neglect of ideological and political training. Even now, within the Armed Forces, in battalions and brigades, there are no dedicated roles for ideological guidance. It’s clear to me—and I believe everyone understands this—that it’s not the metal that fights. We might be supplied with thousands of tons of equipment: tanks, missiles, the best in the world—but it’s all operated by people. These individuals must be well-trained and professional, but they also need to be ideologically grounded. They need to really grasp why they’re fighting, what their purpose is, and have a clear picture of the end goal. To me, that goal should be crystal clear: taking down the quasi-empire of Russia. If we don’t focus on this, the war will just drag on forever. Russia’s been messing with our lives for over 300 years, and if we don’t deal with them decisively, they’ll keep at it.
If you’re asking how we’ll physically achieve this, I don’t have all the answers for you right now. What I do know is that we need to prepare, stay persistent, and commit fully. The outcome will definitely be in our favour if we stick to it. Any half-hearted approaches, agreements, or ceasefires will lead to dead ends. History teaches us that these cycles keep repeating…
Today, we find ourselves in an unmatched historic moment since the liberation war led by Ukrainian Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the 17th century. The level of national unity and support we are experiencing now is unprecedented. However, it’s worth noting that Khmelytsky’s war was not fully concluded, and its true objectives were never fulfilled. We faced setbacks, endless annexations of Ukrainian lands, and immense turmoil and suffering for our people. Therefore, we must focus on achieving victory.
Victory won’t come from weapons alone; it will be shaped primarily by people. While weapons and diplomatic efforts have their roles, it’s the determination and resilience of the people that will drive our success.
But it’s not just about having any people—it’s about having those who are ideologically strong. Physical strength is important, but it’s spiritual resilience that keeps us from breaking down or veering off course. Just like it kept the Ukrainian Insurgent Army [an armed Ukrainian resistance that fought against Nazi Germany, Soviet and nationalist Polish armies to create an independent state in Ukraine – ed.] fighters on track for decades, despite terrible conditions and months spent in cramped bunkers. Their ideological commitment meant almost no one gave up. Why our Armed Forces haven’t learned from the Ukrainian Insurgent Army’s example is beyond me; it’s a real mystery.
During these two years [since February 2022—ed.], we should have started ideological training for people. This needs to be done alongside physical and professional training. These things should happen in parallel.
— What’s going on with the civilians? Why is there such intense fear that people would rather drown in the Tysa River trying to sneak through the border than fight? Why is the state reacting so poorly to this, and what can we do to fix it?
— People mobilise and fight when their lives are directly threatened. But once that threat moves away from their immediate surroundings, other factors inevitably come into play.
From the very start of the war, the Ukrainian government should have made it clear: the country is fighting for its survival. This crucial message needed to be communicated clearly and consistently. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief and political leaders should have stepped up and stated outright that the survival of Ukraine and its people is at stake. They ought to have pledged no compromises or behind-the-scenes deals regarding our sovereignty or our lives until victory is achieved. Only after that should discussions about post-war Ukraine begin.
There’s a lot of discussion about why deputies aren’t fighting. While having 450 deputies on the front lines might not make a significant impact in combat, it’s crucial for people to see that justice is being served. The parliamentary corps should be at the front in some capacity—not as combat troops, but as support staff and brigade headquarters. It’s about setting an example. If they claim to be the elite, they should act like it.
People need to see a clear example of justice in action. Mobilisation must be fair.
In Ukraine, 70% of the population lives in cities, and 30% lives in rural areas, and this distribution should be reflected in the brigades. If we have a brigade of 10,000, it should include 7,000 from urban areas and 3,000 from the countryside. Currently, the ratio is closer to 50-50, which is far from ideal. Rural areas are already burdened with fewer resources, less education, and weaker legal support. Justice demands a fair representation across all sectors.
Moreover, it’s essential to state unequivocally that Ukraine will fight until victory. This means prioritising human resources and directing the economy entirely towards military needs. Those who aren’t on the front lines but have exemptions or are in critical industries must focus solely on achieving this victory. If funds are short, let’s cut salaries in the armed forces if necessary—even eliminate them temporarily. Fighting for your country is a noble cause; those who help secure victory will benefit from a thriving nation. While financial compensation might not seem immediate, the promise of a stable future for your children and a robust and prosperous state is worth more. If it comes down to it, be prepared to fight for free if that’s what it takes.
Everyone not directly fighting should be engaged solely in the defence sector. It’s important to note that while we appreciate every donation and act of support, such as a businessman contributing a generator, these gestures are often small compared to the massive needs of the war effort. When the economy is focused entirely on military objectives, support won’t rely on individual generosity; instead, resources will be deliberately and systematically allocated to the front lines in the required quantities.
Volunteers are still essential, and their enthusiasm and desire to contribute are valuable. Even if they can’t be on the front lines, their involvement in supporting the country’s defence is crucial and appreciated. We can’t and shouldn’t restrict their contributions; they play a vital role in the overall effort.
However, it is crucial that 99% of the army’s supplies come from a wartime economy, which must be fully dedicated to supporting the military effort.
Here’s the situation: after two years of war, the army still lacks essential command vehicles. We’re stuck with outdated Soviet models and haven’t ramped up production for new ones. Instead of building our own, we’re buying a hodgepodge of Peugeot, Mitsubishi, and other makes, even picking up old 1980 Mercedes G-Wagons and assembling them ourselves. While pickups are everywhere on the front lines, we still don’t have a domestic production line to meet these needs. We’ve tapped out European supplies and are now importing from France, China, and America—this isn’t a coordinated, state-led effort.
And this is just the tip of the iceberg. I haven’t even started on heavy hauliers or artillery yet. The disarray in our supply strategy reveals a deeper problem: without a comprehensive plan for equipping our forces, it’s evident there’s also no clear vision or strategy for winning this war.
— Here’s the problem: at higher levels, we’re being led by incompetent people. We all want to win, but the war makes it nearly impossible to replace them. So, what’s the solution?
— We’re currently governed by people elected by Ukrainians before the war, and it’s become painfully clear how that choice has worked out. The situation is a global issue now. Yes, replacing them isn’t easy in wartime, but it’s crucial to consider a full wartime state. This means suspending the Constitution, establishing the role of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and requiring deputies and department heads who aren’t fulfilling their roles to join the military. I’m not suggesting they should be imprisoned—there’s no time for that. Instead, new leaders should be quickly appointed. Over the past two years, the military has cultivated a new generation of leaders who’ve risen through the ranks.
The army isn’t just made up of conscripts; it includes businessmen, engineers, programmers, and agronomists. If someone could build and grow a successful business before the war, they’ve got the smarts.
A person who was once a sergeant in an assault battalion might now be suited for a role like Deputy Director of Ukroboronprom. There’s no need to fear this change. They’ll bring their pre-war skills and wartime experience to the job. If they don’t deliver results within a month, they can be replaced just as swiftly.
This will all happen only if we temporarily suspend the Constitution with everyone’s agreement and let the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s headquarters take control of the whole country. Then, we can quickly replace all the positions with people who can do the job. It’ll take about six months, but after that, everything will work totally differently.
– What do you think about the current mobilisation process? Is it working to just push people into the military and send them straight to the front lines?
– If we want to avoid seeing videos of people being rounded up and shipped off to recruitment centres, then it’s simple: get people to volunteer. If a million people stepped up in a month, there’d be no need for forced enlistment. As it stands, we’re struggling to fill the ranks, with battalions and brigades at only 40% capacity. So, who’s left to fight?
Sure, there are millions of men living abroad right now. I can’t believe our leaders can’t negotiate with European countries to address this. We should be telling them: “Listen, your residency permits won’t be extended, and you’re no longer considered refugees. But don’t worry about your families—they’re safe. Instead, we’re opening a recruitment centre. If you join us, you won’t be thrown into the front lines immediately. Instead, you’ll spend three months training with our instructors, fully equipped, and then you’ll head back to defend your homeland as part of a well-prepared brigade.” I bet Europe would be on board with that. This represents a massive untapped resource—millions of people ready to step up.
On the flip side, we need to stop pretending that Ukraine can fully operate as a democracy right now. Even after a victory, the country might not be ready for a full democratic system—at least not immediately. What we need is a strong autocracy, or even a military dictatorship, for a defined period, say ten years, with societal consent. During this time, we should ensure decent living conditions for everyone—something that reflects the worth and dignity of every Ukrainian—and in return, the public would tolerate some state-imposed restrictions to swiftly restore order, enforce justice, and rebuild faith in a brighter future. Things will improve if there’s an explicit agreement between society and the leadership, and it’s honoured for the agreed period.
Of course, Ukraine can’t stay under a dictatorship forever. Historically, there will always be uprisings and calls for change. But for now, a temporary dictatorship could be crucial for re-establishing order, delivering justice, and making quick, effective decisions. It needs to be strict but fair. Only then will we see rapid progress towards a better future.
Photo: Roman Malko
— There’s a concern that after the war, we might see a major conflict between those who were on the front lines defending the country and those who stayed on the sidelines. What’s your take on this?
— People who haven’t been on the front lines need to understand that after the war, those who return from the fight will be seen as a whole different class. I hope these individuals will become the new elite of Ukraine. It’s only fair that those who stayed behind acknowledge and respect the sacrifices of those who fought, especially after years of struggle—some for two years, others like the UVA fighters, for a decade or more.
I’m 40 years old, and nearly a quarter of my life has been dedicated to this cause. I’ve sacrificed time with my family and lived without a salary for a long stretch. Now, while I’m paid, the sacrifices have been real. I hope my contribution to the country’s independence and future prosperity is recognised—voluntarily acknowledged by society. So, people need to be ready for this shift. On the flip side, nothing’s stopping anyone from joining now and being part of this future elite that defended Ukraine.
I genuinely think this issue is being blown out of proportion. The divide isn’t as wide as it’s made out to be. The media and various online sources are definitely exaggerating it, and it’s worth noting that the enemy and certain political circles in Ukraine are behind this hype. They’re already gearing up for a hypothetical end to the conflict, preparing for the next political moves—like presidential and parliamentary elections. Political strategists are playing these games deliberately, just as they’ve done with language and history before.
In reality, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have around a million people involved. But it’s not just those in the trenches; it includes their families, volunteers, and countless others. Overall, about ten million people are directly affected by the war.
Take a young mother who’s been sheltering her child in a basement for two years—she’s at war, too, in her own way. She faces the daily fear of losing her child and the stress of having a loved one on the front line.
Right now, society is deeply entangled in the war, and everyone left behind is, in one way or another, connected to it. Even those who simply walk through the city, constantly hearing the sirens, are affected. It’s a strain on their mental health, keeping them in a state of perpetual danger and stress.
The gap between the army and the public isn’t as huge as it’s made out to be. It would be great if the authorities could crack down on those who are deliberately widening this divide. This needs to be done with clear, decisive action—something that only a strong, authoritarian approach with well-defined rules can provide.
— Recently, you’ve brought prisoners into the battalion. Are they joining the fight out of a genuine desire to defend their homeland, or are they just looking for a way out of prison?
— It’s a mixed bag. The environment is incredibly tough and specific. If it weren’t for the exploitation and certain games played by the prison administration… They’re being put to work, even sewing uniforms for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and they’re getting paid for it. For them, it’s a matter of survival and opportunity. But on the flip side, the so-called criminal bosses—those pulling the strings in the underworld—don’t want a mass exodus from their ranks. Losing control over their people would hit their operations and wallets hard.
The solution seems pretty straightforward: implement a law for the universal mobilisation of prisoners. With over 40,000 behind bars, we could easily create eight combat brigades. This would also free up some guards and prison staff for partial mobilisation. Instead of indiscriminately rounding up civilians from bus stops and workplaces, why not recruit directly from the prisons? It’s a no-brainer that these individuals could contribute, given they’re already in the system. It’s absurd to be negotiating with prisoners when we’re dragging civilians off the streets. Such absurdity during wartime is not only counterproductive but outright unacceptable.
– Why is the state hesitant to take such drastic measures?
— We’re playing at democracy while Russia doesn’t mess around. They make a decision in an hour and roll it out within the next. Want to produce a million drones? Done. Need to mobilise? It starts the next morning, and no one argues. They just tell their people it’s war, and resources are needed. Meanwhile, we’re stuck debating decisions in parliament for months, with endless readings, when something could be decided overnight. It’s laughable and absurd. In wartime, this kind of democracy can be deadly. It could, God forbid, cost us the country.
People often cite the Second World War examples—democratic America and Britain—but it’s not that simple. Look into it and you’ll be shocked by the level of ‘democracy’ during those wars and how things were handled. Even now, compare American democracy with ours. In Ukraine, if you’re stopped by the police, you whip out your phone, start filming, and make a scene. In some U.S. states, you’d be shot for that. Now that’s democracy in action. What we’re getting here under the guise of democracy is more like a bad joke, a parody, and a perversion.
Back in the days, in the traditional Ukrainian villages, there was always an elder in charge—no police or prosecutors needed. If you were caught sneaking into someone’s chicken coop, you’d get a beating so severe you’d struggle to sit for a month. Get caught again, and you’d be kicked out of the village. That was traditional Ukrainian democracy in action.
— What stage of the war are we at?
— Objectively speaking, the enemy’s resources—human, economic, and even technological—while perhaps not as extensive as what we get from our allies, are still remarkably substantial.
If we’re talking about Ukraine defeating Russia, we need to brace ourselves for a long, drawn-out conflict. Let’s be clear: don’t hold onto any illusions about a quick victory.
Last year, many TV personalities were promising us that it would all be over soon. We heard the same during the ATO: claims that Russia was collapsing, that Putin was on his last legs, and that he’d be out of the picture any day now. This created a false sense of security, leading people to think they could just sit back and wait for the end while Putin allegedly withered away. Sure, if Putin were to die, it could push things towards a resolution. But what if that’s three years down the line? And with our front lines consistently shrinking by 100, 200, 300 meters every day, just think about how much Ukrainian land we’ve lost in the past six months alone.
And if God forbid, Russians manage to break through somewhere on the front, do we have anything in place to stop them? Are there combat brigades in the operational command reserve or at the General Staff ready to go? I don’t have that information, though I wish I could be confident that there are. What we saw during the Russian offensive in the Kharkiv region was telling – no operational reserves were sent into the fray. Instead, forces were shuffled from other parts of the front, which speaks volumes. Simply waiting for Putin to die isn’t going to cut it.
So, we need to ramp up mobilisation—bring back Ukrainians living abroad, fully mobilise prisoners, and ensure rigorous training. It’s not enough just to call people up; they need proper training. The sophisticated weapons provided by our allies require skilled handling, not just basic rifle use. This kind of preparation should have been underway a long time ago, and frankly, it seems like we’re just starting now.
It’s tough for me to provide a clear answer. Objectively, I’m not privy to the detailed plans of our military and political leadership, but from what I’m seeing on the ground, I have to say, I’m not particularly reassured.
