Ukraine can, and indeed should, develop relations with the tiny yet influential Asian powerhouse, given its economic importance and shared interests. Navigating the political landscape remains a challenge, as Singapore’s political stance, though generally pro-Ukrainian, falls short in terms of supportive indicators compared to other partners. Yet, Ukraine’s environmental struggle caused by the Russian aggression has sparked renewed interest in collaboration with Singapore, particularly in areas such as environmental protection and resilience-building efforts.
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A few years back, the Ukrainian media space buzzed with enthusiasm over Lee Kuan Yew, envisioning a ‘Singaporean leap’ for Ukraine. Some politicians even adopted this strategy, but it ultimately fizzled out, yielding little beyond superficial admiration for Singapore’s successes. It wasn’t until the full-scale invasion and Ukraine’s renewed foreign policy outreach to the Global South that interest in Singapore rekindled.
So, what makes this city-state so compelling to Ukraine? Apart from the global appeal of the “Singaporean model” (although its democratic credentials are often questioned), Singapore serves as a crucial economic gateway to Asia. Its strategic location near the Malacca Strait ensures its prominence as a major transhipment and brokerage hub, with its port continually setting new global container capacity records. Moreover, Singapore’s balanced and open international approach has solidified its status as the world’s largest trading hub, boasting free trade agreements with over half of the world’s nations.
However, politically speaking, despite the generally pro-Ukrainian rhetoric, Singapore still falls short in terms of supportive indicators, including narratives, compared to most of our partners. While this stance has a firm political foundation, it prompts the question: is it worthwhile for Ukraine to allocate political and diplomatic resources towards altering this dynamic? Is the risk of jeopardising a reliable economic partner for an uncertain political one worth taking? Moreover, what potential scenarios exist for the future of Singapore-Ukraine relations? Let’s delve into these questions further in the following discussion.
Political positions: whose side is Singapore on?
Periods of significant crises and upheavals often simplify the work of analysts, as it becomes easier to perceive the world in starkly contrasting terms of absolute good versus evil. However, when considering Singapore, as with many other Asian countries, we encounter nuances akin to delicate ink on silk—fragile and requiring careful examination.
Since the onset of 2014, Singapore has maintained a resolute stance in condemning Russian aggression against Ukraine. Yet, it’s essential to acknowledge the complexity of Singapore’s position on this matter. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and incursion into Donbas in 2014, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong condemned the “unprovoked invasion of a sovereign country,” emphasising the importance of upholding international law. Subsequently, in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Singaporean government unequivocally condemned Russian aggression on February 24 and imposed sanctions on February 28.
From June 2 to June 4, 2023, Singapore played host to one of Asia’s pivotal defence summits, the Shangri-La Dialogue. The primary objective for attendees from Ukraine and Europe was to rally regional support against Russian aggression while underlining Europe’s growing interest in the Asian sphere. Notable participants included then-Ukrainian Minister of Defence Oleksiy Reznikov, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, along with Defence Ministers from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden. President Volodymyr Zelensky also joined the summit via video call.
This event, alongside the developments in Ukraine, has sparked vigorous debates regarding Singapore’s political stance. Why would a country renowned for its adeptness at navigating the interests of global powers forsake neutrality for a more supportive position? Some analysts speculate that Singapore’s alignment with Ukraine stems from pressure exerted by Western powers or solidarity with the US and EU. However, such a simplistic explanation fails to encompass all facets of the situation. In March 2023, Kasi Viswanathan Shanmugam, the official representative of Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reaffirmed the country’s condemnation of Russia’s violations of the UN Charter and international law. Yet, he stressed that Singapore’s stance isn’t about being “pro- or anti-Russia or pro- or anti-any other country.” Shanmugam argued that the conflict stemmed from Putin’s ambitions and highlighted NATO’s stance on what he called “not absorbing” Ukraine.
Shanmugam then detailed his stance: he pointed out that “the West did not engage in meaningful consultations with Russia on significant matters” or “accord it respect due to a nation of its stature.” He asserted that the US disregarded Russia’s security apprehensions, violating the “no inch to the East” principle as NATO expanded in 1999 and 2004 to include former Soviet territories. Shanmugam appeared to empathise with Russian security concerns, drawing parallels to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the recent pact between China and the Solomon Islands, aiming to illustrate how the US would react to Russian missiles near its borders. Ultimately, he contended that as NATO expanded, it should have addressed Russia’s concerns rather than brushing them aside. He also sympathised with Russia’s perspective on the removal of Viktor Yanukovych and its scepticism regarding Ukraine’s adherence to the Minsk agreements and questioned whether the Minsk agreement served as a mere tactic to stall for time on Ukraine’s part.
Put simply, while Singapore’s policy towards Ukraine seemed in line with European and American stances, the rhetoric varied. There were efforts to “understand” Russian narratives, at times even with a noticeable Chinese, if not Russian, undertone in the statements of Singaporean politicians.
However, for observers of Singapore’s foreign policy, this development hardly came as a surprise. A nation that has consistently grounded its policy in maintaining equilibrium could hardly veer from this path today. Its adherence to international law and a rules-based global order precluded overt alignment with Russia. These principles serve as the bedrock of Singapore’s survival and prosperity. In a world where “might makes right” instead of “right makes might,” navigating as a small state would prove infinitely more challenging. Nonetheless, openly siding with the West would risk provoking Russia, alienating Beijing, and exacerbating existing complexities within the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries—a group of states geographically proximate to Singapore that, like it, endeavour to balance among “major players.”
All of these factors could also impact trade, and Singapore aims to optimise benefits while maintaining a balanced approach to trade relations. Currently, China holds the top position among trading partners, with Singapore’s trade with mainland China totalling $175 billion, followed by Malaysia in second place at $153 billion. It’s worth noting that despite close economic ties with China, Singapore maintains a significant level of trade with Taiwan, which ranks fourth among its economic partners at $114 billion.
Economy as a key to closer cooperation?
Ukraine has the potential and should actively engage in the broader global market. In many ways, this ambitious objective is already being realised, with Ukrainian goods and services catering to both niche and mass markets, finding buyers across numerous countries worldwide. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that trade relations with Ukraine are lucrative and significant for Singapore. In this context, one need not search for political or moral dimensions: mutual economic advantage serves as ample justification to establish common ground on various issues.
Negotiations between the two countries to finalise a Free Trade Agreement commenced in 2007. However, the status of this agreement remains uncertain to this day, with no signature and minimal discussion in recent years. There are speculations that concerns might arise upon the agreement’s finalisation, particularly regarding the complete abolition of tariff protection for all goods, although both parties may seek to retain it for certain items. Additionally, Ukrainian analysts anticipate that a pact with Singapore could bolster Ukrainian exports, albeit with potential repercussions on nominal GDP due to tariff elimination. Since Ukraine gained independence, its largest share of exports to Singapore has been hot-rolled steel products.
For instance, in 2012, Ukraine exported goods valued at $237 million to Singapore, with rolled products comprising around 80% of the total exports. This trend persisted in 2013. However, in 2014, the volume of hot-rolled exports saw a slight decrease to $177 million. Subsequently, in 2015, Ukrainian exports experienced a significant decline, plummeting to only $11.8 million, with the share of pig iron in exports dropping from 70-80% to 4.62%. From 2016 to 2020, Ukraine steadily increased its exports of pig iron to Singapore, leading to an overall rise in export volume. For instance, in 2020, Ukraine exported goods worth $173 million.
Nevertheless, in 2021, exports once again saw a slight dip. According to The Observatory of Economic Complexity, Ukraine’s exports to Singapore in 2021 amounted to $129.9 million, with primary products including hot-rolled items, poultry meat, and oil. However, over the past 26 years, Ukrainian exports to Singapore have been on a downward trajectory (in 1995, this figure stood at $136.2 million).
What’s next?
What should we expect in our relations? Should we try to leverage our close economic ties—perhaps even manipulate them—to create a Singapore that is more favourable to us politically and can fully support our position on all possible international platforms?
It seems so, but it’s unlikely that we’ll get everything from Singapore all at once. In a country where even the landscape and architecture are aligned with the principles of feng shui, it’s difficult to give up the balance that is perceived as harmony in Singapore. But that doesn’t mean the situation is hopeless.
Considering Singapore’s weight in the region and its economic and innovative potential, Ukraine should deepen and expand the current bilateral dialogue. Considering Singapore’s interests and priorities in global and international security issues, it is worth focusing on areas that could potentially trigger further, deeper cooperation.
Singapore is aware of its vulnerability to global climate change, so in the context of Singapore’s security priorities, it is worthwhile to propose its involvement in specific aspects of Ukraine’s Peace Formula concerning food and environmental security.
The Asian nation also excels in environmental protection, particularly in the purification of rivers, lakes, and seawater and water resource management. Ukraine urgently requires this expertise due to the catastrophic consequences already inflicted on Ukrainian nature by Russia’s war against Ukraine and those yet to come.
Considering that post-war reconstruction in Ukraine may require the integration of migrant labour, Singapore’s experience in migrant community integration is noteworthy.
In the end, there’s potential for both countries to benefit from sharing knowledge and experience in enhancing national resilience. Singapore, in particular, could find value in expertise related to information and cyber security, along with fortifying port security against blockades and attacks, such as those involving maritime drones. This exchange could occur through both bilateral and multilateral forums. Presently, Singapore’s ports, instrumental in establishing it as an international trade hub, remain unthreatened. Nevertheless, in a world that’s becoming more dynamic and fraught with risks, resilience becomes increasingly vital.
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This text is part of the New Global Partnerships – Expert Diplomacy and Advocacy project, which is supported by the International Renaissance Foundation. The material presents the author’s views and not necessarily those of the International Renaissance Foundation.
