For the fourth consecutive year, Ukrainian farmers have launched the harvest season for early grains and oilseeds amid the relentless backdrop of Russia’s full-scale invasion. This season unfolds against the harsh realities of ongoing conflict in frontline and border regions, extreme weather conditions, and a deepening labour shortage. Yet, this year brings fresh challenges to an already daunting landscape: uncertainty clouds trade relations with our key agri-food partner, the European Union; mid-season regulatory shifts have upended the playing field for soybean and rapeseed producers with the introduction of the so-called “soy amendments”; and a long-awaited Cabinet reshuffle has, unexpectedly for the sector, once again resulted in the dissolution of the standalone agrarian ministry.
Preliminary estimates indicate that Ukraine’s harvest of key crops will fall roughly 10% short of 2024’s yields. But readers should take heart—there will still be enough to meet domestic demand and sustain significant export volumes. The current predicament of domestic agricultural producers could aptly be described as a perfect storm for the sector.
It’s becoming increasingly clear that this war of attrition reaches every part of the country—every business, every individual. Under these conditions, Ukraine’s economy simply cannot recover, held back above all by Russia’s continued aggression and the persistent lack of physical security.
The longer the war drags on, the more factors emerge that distort the economic landscape. Inefficient mobilisation and a mounting human capital crisis are just the beginning. Small producers face a chronic lack of long-term, accessible financing, while depleted state resources cripple the full rollout of crucial support programmes. This war of attrition demands marathon-level endurance—an endurance built on strategic vision and the flexibility and adaptability for which we’ve now earned global recognition.
Trade with the EU, accession talks — and other not-so-minor details
The introduction of import restrictions on June 5 — in the form of tariff-rate quotas on agri-food exports sensitive to the European market, such as grains, sugar, eggs, and poultry — came as a shock to many of our exporters. Despite repeated warnings from European partners throughout the past year that the EU’s autonomous trade preferences would not be extended into 2025, we still hoped the European Commission would muster the political will to continue economic support for Ukraine, given that the war is far from over.
Yet, the lingering uncertainty about the war’s duration, political pressure from farmers within the EU, and the firm stance of certain member states ultimately outweighed those hopes. It’s important to remember that the introduction of autonomous trade preferences in 2022, combined with the launch of the so-called solidarity lanes, not only helped prevent a severe collapse in domestic prices — triggered by the near-complete halt of foreign trade and the blockade of seaports — but also allowed many exports to be redirected through EU member states to EU or third-country markets. As a result, the EU’s share of Ukraine’s agri-food exports rose sharply from 27.7% in 2021 to 56.8% in 2023, before easing slightly to 52% in 2024.
So, what exactly changed once the Autonomous Trade Measures (ATM) regime ended this past June?
First, exports to the EU didn’t come to a halt, though quota volumes were reduced for exporters of certain product groups. As a result, the capacity to efficiently export products to EU countries also took a significant hit.
Second, Ukraine and the EU agreed on a new trade framework under the revised Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agreement. Instead of the near-complete trade liberalisation we had previously enjoyed—without any preconditions on our part—a refreshed system of tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) for agri-food products has been introduced. This arrangement is set to remain in place until 2028, when the next round of negotiations on revising bilateral trade terms under the DCFTA may occur.
Meanwhile, several sources have reported that “…Ukraine has committed to gradually align its agricultural production standards, especially regarding animal welfare and pesticide use, with EU standards by 2028.” The European side emphasises that this commitment is a mandatory component of the updated trade agreement, designed to secure broader market access for Ukraine while establishing a level playing field through fair regulatory conditions for both parties.
This commitment is incredibly ambitious, especially when considering the assessments from various agricultural sector representatives about the level of investment required to meet these production standards—particularly in areas like animal health and welfare.
In reality, it means that the liberalisation of bilateral trade in the agri-food sector is now directly linked to Ukraine’s tangible progress in aligning production standards with those of Europe. This is likely to be a tough challenge, especially for small and medium-sized producers.
Adding to the strain, recent developments in domestic agricultural trade policy have delivered a serious blow to small and medium producers of soy and rapeseed. Members of the Verkhovna Rada, acting hastily and through questionable legislation, succeeded on their second attempt in passing a measure to impose a 10% export duty on soy and rapeseed—right in the middle of the production season.
This is yet another unfortunate example of unsystematic, ad hoc policymaking in agriculture that benefits specific groups—in this case, certain processing companies that made ill-considered investments in capacity without properly evaluating the raw material market size or trade balances. The decision wasn’t grounded in solid economic analysis but rather driven by populist slogans and vague assumptions: “It worked with sunflower twenty years ago, so it will work now with soy and rapeseed.”
However, even broad estimates from one of Ukraine’s leading agricultural economists, Professor Oleh Nivievskyi, indicate the net economic impact of the export duty will be negative. Overall, Ukraine stands to lose between 280 million and 670 million hryvnias annually. Farmers will be hit even harder, receiving lower prices for their crops and facing losses that could run into the billions of hryvnias.
Meanwhile, the market’s trust and investment incentives will erode further, undermined by unpredictable economic policies and ill-conceived decisions—yet again.
EU accession talks: almost there
Lately, you often hear claims that Ukraine has already started negotiations with the European Union on accession, particularly in the agri-food sector. But here’s the reality: official talks between Ukraine and the EU on agriculture are still on the horizon. When you hear about meetings, discussions, or even agreements, it’s important to realise these don’t mark the closing of negotiation chapters. Instead, they represent the early stages — the screening and groundwork. During this phase, the EU assesses how Ukrainian laws, institutional frameworks, and agricultural infrastructure line up with EU rules and standards (the acquis communautaire).
Right now, Ukraine and the EU are deep in technical talks as part of the screening process for Cluster 5, which covers key areas like agriculture, food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy, and fisheries. But it doesn’t stop there — the agricultural sector is also closely tied to other parts of the EU framework, including the free movement of goods, consumer protection, and even customs and tax policy. Bringing Ukraine’s agri sector in line with EU standards isn’t just about ticking boxes — it’s a complex, far-reaching process that involves coordination across multiple ministries and sectors.
European experts’ assessments of Ukraine’s readiness across different parts of the agri-food sector vary widely. In some areas, we’ve made significant progress; in others, we’re still at the very early stages of preparation. This means that most EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) standards remain unimplemented, and key tools—like the subsidy system, agricultural land registries, digital monitoring, and rural development programmes—still need major overhauls. The next crucial phase of this screening process is set for September, with the goal of wrapping it up by the end of 2025.
But it’s crucial to understand that adopting EU standards isn’t just a technical challenge—it demands political will, management reforms, and significant investment in institutional capacity. And on that front, we’re once again making a costly mistake. Ignoring past lessons and sidelining the advice of partners, stakeholders, and experts, we’re effectively dismantling the already weakened Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food for the second time in six years.
Whether this move will actually help us prepare for official accession talks or bolster institutional strength is a question best left unanswered. As things stand, it looks like we’re not only making our own path to European integration more difficult but also erecting unnecessary barriers for domestic farmers—at a time when both they and the country can least afford it.
