When it comes to Russia’s so-called ‘liberal’ opposition, especially those residing outside of the country, there is a somewhat misleading perspective prevailing in Europe and the U.S. Many Russian intellectuals tend to attribute Russia’s key problem either to Putin personally or, in a more realistic view, to the authoritarian system he has instituted. Some opposition figures appear to be steadfast in their belief that the fundamental problem lies in the absence of democracy in Russia, as well as the inability of pro-Western politicians to rise to positions of power. However, it’s worth remembering that such relatively pro-Western circles have already held influential positions during the rule of Yeltsin and even early Putin, perhaps even extending into Medvedev’s formal presidency.
However, this oversimplified perspective overlooks the complex political and cultural dynamics within Russia. Russia diverges from the typical modern European state model, shaped by the aftermath of two World Wars, where one predominant nation distinctly defines the state. In essence, the Russian Federation mirrors a colonial empire from the 19th century, cleverly concealed behind a facade of pseudo-democracy. Furthermore, this empire has experienced unavoidable phases of decay, yet each time, it was artificially rejuvenated. Following the events of 1917, the Bolsheviks provided merely formal, legal recognition to all rebellious nations within the crumbling empire, establishing them as united republics or autonomous entities. While any semblance of autonomy was quickly quashed through escalating repressions and state totalitarianism, on paper, all subjects of the newly established Soviet empire retained their legal ‘autonomy’.
In the 1990s, Yeltsin’s regime yet again revived the collapsing empire. Back then, the rapidly expanding liberation movements, which culminated in the dissolution of the USSR, also spread to Russia itself. As a result, Moscow had to consent to the Federal Treaty, acknowledging the sovereignty of all signatories, ranging from national republics to regional entities. However, even at that time, limitations on freshly acquired rights started to emerge. Some regions were subdued through the bribery of elites, like in Tatarstan, while others faced brutal coercion, such as Chechnya and the Chechen Wars, which followed. Under Putin, the dismantling of not only Russia’s initially ‘federal’ system but also local self-governance reached its zenith. Formally, the Russian Federation is still a federation, as many recall. This was highlighted by participants in recent rallies in Bashkortostan, where people gathered in support of the detained Faizal Alsinov, an advocate for preserving the ecology, language, and culture of their homeland.
Persistent unrest in Dagestan, protests in Bashkortostan, as well as ethnic clashes in Yakutia all point to the fact that changing Russia is impossible without addressing the national question. Several options exist, ranging from allowing complete independence for all national units to establishing a genuine confederation. The pivotal role of the central authority needs to be abolished, as even a liberal regime would harbour an interest in controlling dependent territories aiming to preserve the empire. This means that Moscow, as an imperial centre, will inevitably strengthen its police force operating outside the constraints of the law and foster chauvinistic sentiments within the ethnic Russian population. The eventual transfer of complete power to the security forces in the late 1990s also occurred with the aim of “establishing order.” For a long time, Putin acted in coordination with supposedly liberal and democratic-minded politicians. Specifically, in 2003, Anatoliy Chubais, one of the architects of the capitalist reforms in Russia in the 1990s, openly articulated the concept of an “ideal liberal empire,” envisioning the Russification of Crimea through economic expansion.
Even in exile in 2022, there was a reluctance among the Moscow opposition to embrace regionalism and the notion of freedom for distinct nations. This resulted in a rift and reciprocal accusations between the “Forum of Free Russia,” backed by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and organisations representing individual nations administered by Russia, who eventually coalesced into the “League of Free Nations of Russia.” Over time, the “democrats” started recognising the legitimacy of regionalist opinions, leading to a change in their rhetoric. Even Khodorkovsky, who refrained from openly condemning the annexation of Crimea until 2021, underwent a shift in his public perspective. While top Russian liberal bloggers extensively cover events in Dagestan and Bashkortostan, highlighting the national question, they tend to downplay the involvement of these nations’ representatives in public discussions and broadcasts.
But how genuine is this shift, or is it merely a quest for temporary allies? Putin himself, when he deems it necessary, resorts to manipulations concerning the multinational federation. Specifically, he grants certain preferences to the elites of Muslim republics, aiming to influence the opinion of the Global South (traditionally, the preferences are often given to Chechnya and partially to Tatarstan). Moreover, to avoid mobilisation in the capital, he shifts a significant war to the local republics, allowing them to form volunteer battalions, name them in their own languages, and use republican symbols. However, the goal remains unchanged – to retain power and strengthen the front against Ukraine. Ironically, Putin is sometimes more of a federalist than the lion’s share of the so-called democratic opposition. They often criticise the privileges enjoyed by the current Chechen political elites, but only under the notion of bringing a complete order and spreading nationwide norms. In their view, there cannot be local customs or laws in separate regions. But what kind of federation is it, then?
In essence, the metropolitan liberals’ eagerness to instruct the less developed, deprived regions on how to live properly reflects a blatant colonial approach embedded in their political perspective. Hence, the potential resurfacing of the “democrats” and their return to power is not critical for the survival of the empire; in fact, it could serve as a lifeline amid the anticipated defeat in the war. Seeming democratic shifts at the imperial centre will facilitate reconciliation with the West and could even lead to seeking assistance in maintaining the empire. Justifications will be contrived – from the Chinese threat to Siberia to the perceived spread of Islamic fundamentalism. The crucial goal is to secure a decade or two and, once the conditions are favourable, revert to the customary dictatorship and external aggression. Without this trajectory, the empire’s sustainability is in question. Only compact states resembling European dimensions in this region can sidestep these pitfalls by concentrating on their internal economic and political development.
